The REVIEW *of* RELIGION

Volume III MARCH, 1939 Number 3

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The Review of Religion is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscription: $2.00 a year (foreign, $2.30); single copies 60 cents (foreign 70 cents). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

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HISTORY AS *THE* PROBLEM OF OUR PERIOD

By Paul J. Tillich
Associate Professor of Philosophical Theology, Union Theological Seminary

Every period in history has its special problem. The different historical periods are much better characterised by what they ask than by what they answer. The answers may contradict each other; but the fact that they are answers to the same question unites them. This unity of questioning which qualifies a period is rooted in the unity of needs, demands, embarrassments and hopes of a period. In order to know the fundamental character of an historical situation, we must know its fundamental concern; and in order to know that, we must know its basic question. Therefore, in order to know our own period, we must ask: which is our ultimate concern, which is *the* problem of our period?—There are, of course, many questions in every period, but beyond them there is *one* all-embracing question of which they are sub-questions. Often this basic question is not asked consciously, but indirectly, only in and with other questions. And it is implied, not only in the ideas, but also in all the other activities of a period. It gives color and flavor to a culture; it consciously and unconsciously directs its ambitions and creations, and, finally, its self-destruction. It expresses the ultimate need as well as the ultimate achievement of a period. Hence we ask: which is the ultimate concern and, therefore, the uniting question, *the* problem of our period?

I

My answer is: history; or more accurately, our historical existence. In order to understand this characterization of our period, let us compare it with the period which preceded ours, and which is transformed and completed by our period. Let me call the preceding period the *modern* period, beginning with the Renaissance, about 1450, and ending with the first decades of the twentieth century. The problem and the ultimate concern of these five hundred years was *control of nature and society by human reason.* The question of the preceding five hundred years, the so-called Middle Ages, had been the question of a theonomous culture supported by a hierarchical church. The power of this problem diminished after the theoretical and practical work

of half a thousand years. Man freed himself from transcendental bondage and considered himself the center of all natural powers. For the Renaissance philosopher praise of man and man's greatness replaced praise of God and God's greatness. The natural elements were subjected to man by means of science and technical creativeness. Astrological and magical forces were disarmed by mathematical speculation. Analysis and construction became the tools of man's control over both nature and society. Divine encroachments on human activities were banished to the extreme boundaries of the world. God became a restrictive rather than an affirmative concept. Religion, instead of being an end in itself, became a means to personal and social morality. It was measured according to rational, humanistic standards, instead of being itself the standard for everything else.

On the one hand, the enlightened absolutism to which Lutheranism as well as Counter-Reformation Catholicism contributed, and on the other, educational democracy to which Calvinism as well as Sectarianism contributed, attempted to subject human society to human reason. Religious toleration unconsciously handed over religion to the state; the state more and more became a tool of the nation; the nation, a tool of the economic imperialism of bourgeois society, which tried to bring the whole of nature and humanity under the control of rational human activity. All answers given by modern philosophy and theology have their roots in this problem. The naturalistic answers speak of man's desire to adapt himself to the laws of nature and society; the idealistic answers speak of his desire to shape nature and society in accordance with this adaptation. Whether pantheistic or theistic answers are given, they both tell us of a God guaranteeing a rational development of the world, a development which can be calculated, and wherein no serious disturbances are to be expected. Whether irrational vitalism or rational moralism is expressed, they both serve the same purpose. The former points to the power which is necessary in order to gain control over nature and society; the latter points to the rational form which is necessary in order to exercise control. Even in the most subtle problems of epistemology and psychology, of sociology and historiography, this fundamental question is implied. It is presupposed in the method of mathematical science, as well as in the problems of modern theology. It is *the* problem of the modern period.

In this period, too, there is some reference to the problem of history, as there was in the preceding medieval period; for it is impossible that in the Christian era history as a problem was excluded entirely. But it was not *the* problem either in the medieval or in the modern period. It could not become predominant in either of them, because according to medieval thought the final period in history had already begun with the rise of an ecclesiastical hierarchy representing the reign of Christ. And to the modern period the scheme of progressive rationalisation of human existence gave a simple and powerful, but naturalistic, solution of the problem of history. Despite all accidental regressions and distortions, technical and educational progress is the law and the essential mean of history. In the end, divine providence or the "strategy of the idea," or a kind of pre-established harmony will bring about rational control of man's world by man's reason.

II

The breakdown of this belief is the birth of a new period of human self-interpretation and self-determination. It is the birth of the problem of our historical existence as *the* problem of our period. Two foundations had to be shaken before man could be brought to realise that historical fate is his decisive fate: first, the transcendental foundation which made the historical fate of man relatively unimportant compared with his eternal destiny; and second, the immanent foundation which let the historical fate of man appear to be a preliminary stage in his continuous progress towards perfection. Both convictions have gone, at least as convictions, if not as probabilities. Man is now cast into the darkness and conflicts consequent on being historical without having a transcendental or future refuge.

The transformation of the modern period into the new period which began in these decades did not occur suddenly. It was prepared and prophesied long before (since historical periods always overlap to a certain extent). Two men must be considered the representatives of this prophecy and transformation at the end of the modern period, because they, more than anybody else, determine the ideology of our present,—Marx and Nietzsche. Both of them assumed the complete destruction of the transcendental foundation of human existence; both of them attacked the immanent foundation, the idea of harmony and progressive development. This immediately

led them to the question of our historical existence. The social disharmony of bourgeois society gave Marx the impulse to a most thorough analysis of his period, and to a universal view of human history as the real place of human fate. It is not our present task to judge the truth of his political and economic inferences; nobody, however, can deny that his ideas and their political consequences created an historical consciousness never known before except in Jewish prophecy. Historical consciousness is not historical knowledge. There was a vast amount of historical knowledge in bourgeois historicism, and an almost negligible amount of historical knowledge in proletarian utopianism. But the whole strength of historical consciousness was on the side of the latter, and none on that of the former. Historical consciousness is the consciousness of history as one's ultimate fate. Historical knowledge may be used in order to detach oneself from historical reality. Historical consciousness compels us to historical action; historical knowledge may weaken and break the impulse to action. Therefore we may assert that the problem of history grew in the lap of the modern period in so far as in this period there developed a realization and a consciousness of those historical tensions whose catastrophical clash we now experience.

In Nietzsche's attack on Christianity and humanitarian ideologies an historical consciousness of a quite different character expresses itself. A new period of creative life is expected. Self-destruction of vitality in the Christian era will be overcome by a new aristocracy with a new system of values, neither Christian nor humanitarian, but pagan and vitalistic. Nietzsche's followers emphasized the tragic element in him, speaking of the unavoidable self-destruction of reason and of Western civilization. In the last two decades these ideas have been adopted as well as distorted politically by the Nationalist and Fascist ideologies, especially in German National-Socialism. Here too, we must refrain from political and moral judgments, and merely state that historical consciousness has been aroused by these movements and their ideological expression. Furthermore, we state that the mighty conflict between these two ideologies and movements the world over drives our period to the question of our historical existence, even in those countries in which a catastrophe has not yet occurred. At least they are forced to think about history and mankind. While emphasizing the two ideologies which have produced historical con-

sciousness, I do not deny that they acquired their historical power only because they represent proletarian mass movements on the one hand, and on the other, the resistance against them by the nationalistic lower middle and upper bourgeois classes.

While these two large streams of thought and action express the specifically occidental situation, a third event should be mentioned, which will have increasing importance for the development of historical consciousness: the fact that for the first time in history "world" has become a concrete concept. Because of bourgeois technical and economic expansion, world-history as a reality arose with the world-war. A system of interdependence of all nations developed, filling the ideal concept "world" or "mankind" with concrete content. This refers to the non-occidental countries also, which during the modern period were thought to be mere objects for colonisation and evangelisation, but not independent historical units. This has changed entirely. World-history no longer means the spread of European reason and control over all the world. It is an active interrelation of all parts of the world producing world-historical consciousness and world-historical reality in spite of all isolating tendencies.

III

We are now at the beginning of the period in which the problem of history becomes decisive. Therefore, we do not know much about it. We do not even know whether the problem of history will, in the long run, prove to be part of a larger problem which, in our present situation, we cannot yet realise. Nevertheless, we must wrestle with the problem of our period in so far as we can understand it. Four main questions may be mentioned and discussed from the theological point of view: (a) the presuppositions of an historical interpretation of existence; (b) individuality and institution; (c) church-history and world-history; (d) history and the kingdom of God.

(a) It is not at all evident that human existence and existence in general should be interpreted in historical terms. With some restrictions we may say that it is done, and can only be done on the basis of Christianity. It is much more natural to the human mind to interpret existence from the point of view of nature. Nature, the all-supporting and creative reality, her eternal laws of birth and growth and decay and death, her abundant gifts and her violent acts of de-

struction, seem to give the universal pattern of being and existence. According to this pattern, history is the process by which human groups, tribes, nations, empires, cultures, rise and grow, decay and disappear. The significance of an historical group is measured by its power to grow and maintain itself. The meaning of history is the development of all human possibilities inherent in human nature as part of nature generally. The most striking expression of this attitude is the belief that the gods themselves are subject to the fate of birth and death, that is, to the tragic circle of nature. The gods, the embodiments of the highest values of an historical group, subject to the law of nature; that is paganism; that is an a-historical interpretation of history. Yet it is the belief of the most powerful and successful political groups of today. Nature and history, space and time, again contend with each other, as they did in the first Christian centuries.

But there is a difference. In those early Christian centuries still another answer was given to the question regarding the meaning of existence: neither history nor nature, but the super-natural, the timeless, the eternal, is the meaning of our existence. In this answer the tragic circle of nature and history is conquered. With respect to history it makes no difference whether the eternal beyond nature and history is considered to be a realm of ideas or values, as in Platonism and occidental idealism, or as the abysmal, the Atman-Brahman, as in Neo-Platonism and oriental mysticism. The tragic circle of nature is dissolved into ecstasy or Nirvana, because nature and history are dissolved. In the early Christian period this attitude was combined with Christianity. Therefore the historical elements in Christianity could not develop. Now, in our period, we are not allowed to escape from our historical existence, although many of our contemporaries take this road, driven to it by the historical disillusionments and catastrophes of the present. We are not allowed to escape from history, because we have learned that the meaning of our existence cannot be separated from the meaning of history, and that this connection is a foundation of Christianity.

For Christianity is the historical religion *kat' exochen*, and it is the true religion because it is the historical religion. Christ is an historical event, God manifesting himself in time as the centre of time, and by his appearance filling time with meaning, conquering the natural time of endless repetition as well as the timeless eternity of super-

nature. The prophetic spirit, creating the figure of Abraham, produced that essentially historical nation in which the national gods were negated on principle; time conquered space, justice replaced power, the future overruled the present, hope conquered tragic heroism. And the continuation of that selected and rejected nation in the Christian Church is the final justification of our historical existence. In the Church, despite its division into different branches, the unity of mankind is maintained, not as ideal demand, or humanistic belief which breaks down under the tremendous pressure of nationalistic and racial feeling, but as a reality independent of human distortion. In the Church, universalism has become a concrete reality, rooted in the community of sin and salvation,—and only by the power of this historical universalism of the Church will mankind be able to resist the attack of a-historical Nationalism and Paganism.

(b) In the first Christian centuries, the problem of the whole period inside and outside the Christian Church was: how is the individual to be saved from the world which is in the hands of demonic powers? Not the historical group and certainly not the historical institution, but the individual, was the object of salvation. The only historical institution was the Roman empire, which was considered either as the chief demonic power, as in Revelations, or as an instrument to prevent complete chaos, as in Paul (followed by Lutheranism), but never as an object of justification and sanctification. To our period the problem of historical institutions and social structures has become evident. We recognise that the individual cannot be separated from the historical situation to which he belongs. His ideas, as historical materialism to a great extent has shown, are dependent on the social and historical situation in which he lives. His personality, as analytic psychology has shown, is to a considerable degree dependent on the experiences of the very first years of his life, and these experiences again are socially conditioned. Mysticism, as well as ecclesiastical moralism, did not understand the situation. Both conceived the freedom of the individual abstractly and salvation individualistically. Our historical conscience forbids such individualism; for the same reason it forbids a dual predestination. It links our eternal destiny to our historical fate, and connects our common historical destinies, and therefore our eternal fate. Moreover, it gives a new meaning to the old idea of the sacredness of institutions.

(c) This leads to the third set of questions implied in the problem

of our historical existence: Church-history and world-history. When saying that the Church is the historical community by which universal history acquires its meaning and its frame of reference, I do not speak of the European national churches, nor of the American denominational churches, nor of any one of the great Christian confessions. I mean *the* Church, which is intended, and more or less realised by all these sociological groups. This Church, which is the spiritual reality in all those churches, is the bearer of historical consciousness and of historical being in all places and at all times. Nations either are waiting for it in expectation and preparation, or they receive from it the historical consciousness which gives meaning to history, even in the face of mere fragments and self-destruction.

The concept "world-history" is a very difficult one in itself. It is true that today we have a world which is united to such an extent, at least, that a world-war is possible. But we did not have it before and may not have it in a future time, when the Tower of Babel story will again apply. But we have the Church, the community of those who expect or receive the new Being-in-Christ. There will always be world-history, because there will always be a latent Church-history, in so far as always the divine word, the *Logos* manifesting itself in Christ, will always prepare the world for his reception, and grant anticipation of his appearance to those who are longing for him. It is the task of missions to transform this latent Church-history into a manifest Church-history, by transforming preparation and anticipation into reception and realisation. Therefore missions, more than any political or technical force for world-unity, have the key to world-historical consciousness. Missions are the continual test of Christ as the centre of universal history.

(d) The final answer, however, to the question implied in history is not the Church, but the Kingdom of God, of which the Church is the historical representative. The Kingdom of God includes more than the Church and more than history; it is the transcendental meaning of all existence, including nature. Yet it has a special relationship to history. Kingdom is a historical symbol which indicates that the transcendental meaning of existence has a special relation to our historical existence. The Kingdom of God may be described as the transcendental unity and fulfilment of the meaning of our existence, which in time and space remains fragmentary, divided, and ambiguous. This

makes possible an answer to some of the main problems of our historical existence. I shall point out one of them briefly. I refer to the problem which is implied in Utopianism, and which is the main issue between Christianity on the one hand, and revolutionary and progressive movements on the other. Is history progressive; has it cumulative value; will there be a state of fulfilment in time and space; can the nature of man be radically changed in history? (It makes little difference whether this occurs by slow progress or dramatic catastrophe.) Or on the contrary is history ultimately without meaning, a play, a cruel play, of course, of man with himself, as Barthianism asserts, while the meaning of existence is eternally fulfilled beyond history and independent of human activity? Has historical action any ultimate importance, has the Kingdom of God any realisation in history or only beyond history? In these questions historical problems and political decisions of the utmost importance are implied. By describing the Kingdom of God as the transcendental unity of the fragmentary meaning of history, we emphasize its dynamic character, which can be expressed, neither in terms of timeless eternity, nor in terms of temporal finiteness or endlessness. And we emphasize its dialectical character, which admits absolute importance for historical activity without admitting the absolute claim to any particular historical realisation, power, greatness or perfection.

I will close here. My task was not so much to give a religious interpretation of history, as to show that the problem of history has become the main problem of our period. There may be a competing problem in the doctrine of man. It is obvious that systematically the doctrine of man is more basic and universal than the problem of history. But the latter, and not the former, is the actual problem of our time; here are to be found our main needs and our principal concerns, as every day since the beginning of the World War has shown us. Theology is capable of meeting this problem, because its foundation is an historical one, and because the spirit of prophecy urges upon it an historical view of human existence. Doubtless a theology guided by the question of our historical existence will transform, step by step, the static and individualistic concepts of theological tradition. This transformation may reach the very centre of religion, the belief in God, and fear may arise that values and truths will be lost, the loss of which would mean the end of Christianity itself. But trans-

formation is not abolition, and the prophetic spirit is not the only spirit in Christianity. As in the problem of the Middle Ages the problem of early Christianity was still alive, and as in modern Protestantism the medieval problem is still effective, so in the period beginning with this century the older problems are preserved. In the question of our historical existence the questions of the salvation of our soul, of a theonomous culture, and of the place of man in nature, and of the immovable being beyond history, all remain valid and powerful. But the specific problem laid upon us, upon our whole life, soul and mind, is the problem of our historical existence.

SAMUEL HOPKINS, RATIONAL CALVINIST AND MYSTIC

By Gordon Boit Wellman
Associate Professor of Biblical History, Wellesley College

From 1725 to 1900 New England produced an indigenous theology. It was the result of the earnest loyalty of many souls to deep personal experience. Outwardly it was a mutation of its parent Calvinism; inwardly it was the expression of sincere yearning to find divine peace. Brave names stand between Jonathan Edwards and Edwards A. Park; one of them is supreme, Samuel Hopkins. On him fell the task to build the theological system and establish the so-called New England Theology in such power that it lasted through many vicissitudes for a century after his death. "Hopkintonian" arose as an odious title, doubtless much as the term Christian seems first to have been used, but it was quickly adopted by his followers as the designation of their peculiar doctrine. Its influence spread in America and even reached distant parts of the world, until with swift denouement hidden forces of another type of thought triumphed over it. The drama of that theological endeavor is impressive, and it bears a significant warning for our day in its tragic failure against high resolve. All this happened yesterday as time goes, but already historical recovery is difficult.

It is almost a Christian conformity today to raise the cry of crisis. On all sides, Thomists to Barthians, intellectuals and liberals darken counsel with fear. These New England theologians lived in a time of crisis too. Hopkins came through war and disaster, complete economic distress and spiritual drought, yet he lived and found faith and fought his way toward truth. He died in peace. Such a life has much to say to us whose situation is not dissimilar, and whose answer to our problematic crisis has not been given.

Hopkins was a man of noble mien, with great strength of body and mind. Once, when he walked down the streets of Newport with George Washington, it was remarked that he was the more imposing figure. A graduate of Yale College, he spent his whole life in two parishes,—Great Barrington in the hills of Massachusetts, and Newport, Rhode Island, by the sea. His reputation has been colored by the vehement

language of his sermons and the harsh phrases of his solemn treatises upon obscure doctrine, until one would suppose him to have been a dour theologian, expounding the terrifying results of predestination and sin, a man of few contacts and no sociability. In this unjust picture which has come to be the recognized portrait, he is seen heaving his great Johnsonian body from bed to study, and from study to bed, writing from four in the morning until nine at night, with scarcely time to eat. God's sovereign power and man's small estate, one would think to have been his constant theme; so his enemies, and even his adherents, represented him. But at heart Samuel Hopkins was a man of another sort. His letters, part of his diary preserved, his sermons and *Works* as well as the careful, if prejudiced *Memoir* by Professor Park, still give material for a truer study of his deeper self.

His theological system obliterated the real temper of Hopkins, because it forced his thought into a rigid form, and because it became the textbook of all those who followed the "New Divinity" for a century after his death. During that time those who called themselves his successors had to struggle against a fresh striving of heart and mind that we today would call a mild form of Unitarianism and Naturalism, and they found his *System of Doctrine* a veritable arsenal for their battles. It is no wonder that this side of Hopkins was transmitted to us. Hopkinsians founded one of the first seminaries in America for the training of Protestant ministers, Andover Seminary. His theology became the doctrine taught at Yale, Oberlin, and Chicago Theological Seminary; in England his books were selling better than in America during the first half of the nineteenth century. The interpretations of Hopkins became more important than the scriptural revelation they were based upon. In a letter preserved in the correspondence of Leonard Woods, a friend writing from Newburyport calls the Bible, "that pure Hopkinsian fountain."[1] Arminians, Universalists, and all Arians, were made to feel that a new power had arisen in the world. It was called the old Calvinism made reasonable. Channing says Hopkins was known as the Rational Calvinist, and so he appears to his followers and biographers. Meanwhile the real Samuel Hopkins was forgotten, indeed, perhaps never known to many. Calvinism had overwhelmed him, and now it took possession of his posterity. It

1. L. Woods, *History of Andover Theological Seminary* (Boston, 1885), p. 631.

is the purpose of this paper to inquire afresh into the theological contribution and the religious mind of this man.

The striking physical strength of Hopkins was matched by a spiritual nature of remarkable virility. Such precious gifts of the spirit could not be cut off by doctrinal discourse, rather they were the inspiration of all this thought. He was one of the favored friends of God in whom the consciousness of God's love and providence pulsate with the beat of his heart and constantly dictate his life. He had, too, a deep love for his fellow man; his contempt for social inequality and racial hatred was notable beyond his day. In him religious feeling was tempestuous; his diary, like Edwards' and David Brainerd's, shows with what sublime content he was often seized and lifted into the heaven of bliss. "I had a sweet hour between nine and ten today," he writes in his diary. "Words cannot utter it, nor can I write a thousandth part of my experiences."[2] Ecstasy overcame him, as it has often overcome Christians through the centuries. He was "mad with pleasure," as Henry More used to say, ravished by the thought of God's imperishable love for him, until he could write no more, but must walk his narrow room for hours in a state of ineffable joy. In pulpit, as well as in study, these moments of spiritual conviction would come to him, and suddenly he would begin to proclaim God's infinite love. "I would rather be stripped of my worldly comforts than be without this," he cries. The opposite experiences of fear and despondency were rare, which is the sign of his wholesome attitude toward life, especially since he lived through the sordid days of the Great Awakening. He became a friend of Whitefield's; they were brothers in inward divine joy, but Hopkins bridled his emotions with stern thought which the tender Whitefield could not understand.

This profound experience of elation, full of contrasts and replete with meaning, penetrated Hopkins' theology until it almost dislocated his "consistent theories." Jonathan Edwards was a man of similar nature. It has been supposed that Edwards was under the influence of Berkeley; certainly idealism struggled in him often against his Puritanism and theism. At least, he never wrote out a closed system, and the reason is not difficult to understand when one studies his feverish mind. Much of this open attitude toward truth came to Hopkins from Ed-

2. S. West, *Sketches of the Life of the late Rev. Samuel Hopkins, D.D.* (Hartford, Conn., 1805), p. 59.

wards, and, strangely enough, Hopkins spent the most important years of his life at Newport, where Berkeley had lived and worked. So Hopkins must be read in the light of this warm and rapturous faith. Circumstances of time and inheritance destined him to be a Calvinist, and to use his superior intellect for proving and "improving" many suppositions which we think today to be false, but through it all he was consistent to another demand, an inner light, as truly as was George Fox or John Woolman. No one would think of naming Hopkins with them, so far has his name been removed from such a category. He stands as a theologian of a particularly rigorous theology. True, he wrote with no attention to style; he never decorated his thought with fine phrases, but the spirit moved in his blunt expressions. Sometimes the congregation was lifted into evangelical power by his utterances. "I had freedom today in speaking," he would say, and then would follow a description of some particular outpouring of grace. This was the honest heart and mind of a Christian saint more truly speaking than in all his vehement *Works*.

When Jonathan Edwards died in 1758 he left his manuscripts to Hopkins, who spent six years upon them, studying and preparing some of them for publication. Edwards in his early life struggled against dogmatic views, but the prevailing theory captured him; his rising genius was smothered, and during the rest of his life the spirit breathed heavily in his writings. This enslaved freedom and imprisoned idealism stares from his pages, and through the manuscripts it smote his disciple. This happened in the formative years of Hopkins' life at Great Barrington. Already conservative by nature and chaste in thought, six years with Edwards' close arguments made Hopkins a Calvinist forever. From then on he took the lead in the New England theology, but his religious ardor continued, resulting in a bold independence of thought, and an originality that was constantly creative. Nothing was so precious to him as God's love, which remained an intense reality; to that everything was finally sacrificed. To the end of his life he held an open mind about his doctrines, and although he appeared to be such an intrepid warrior for his "Consistent Calvinism," he expresses the conviction that great changes were to come in the future in our thought about God and man's relation to the divine. He was, first, a Christian and, second, a Calvinist, because the latter seemed to him to be the best truth of his day. Sometimes, when it was noted that he differed

from Edwards or Bellamy, he would say, "I don't care, that seems to me to be the truth." That was independence which, given a different background, might have led to a liberal theology.

His thought on the atonement is an example of how the inner spirit appraised and moulded a high doctrine of his Puritan forbears. The terrible words of the *Institutes,* "Non enim pari conditione creantur omnes; sed aliis vita aeterna, aliis damnatio aeterna praeordinatur,"[3] burned themselves into the mind of Hopkins. Whether there was a logic in the harsh doctrine which appealed to these New England theologians, or whether the inertia of an inherited religious complex was too much for them to overcome, would be a difficult psychological problem to attempt to solve. Clearly the mind of Hopkins was fixed upon the intention of Almighty God, and he thought his immediate task was to find the true meaning of that purpose. Election and eternal punishment must be reasonable and scriptural; this was the path of argument and venture in any doctrinal problem which he studied. Channing says, "The System of Hopkins was indeed an effort of reason to reconcile Calvinism with its essential truths."[4] Herein, compared with Edwards he was rather the better thinker, more steady in argument, more creative of new outlooks. Granting the sovereign power of God and predestination, Hopkins turned to Christ and the Cross to find the transforming alembic which should explain that distillation of pure love of which he was so sure. High Calvinism seemed inevitable once the absolute decrees were accepted, but Hopkins found a new way because he envisioned the Redeemer working through benevolence. He introduced accordingly a change that brought a different meaning to the atonement. But for the advance of science without the theological pale, he might have introduced a new era in theology. Destiny, in one of its strangest moves, was about to make futile the old asseveration to doctrine; Hopkins did not live to know this.

To understand how he viewed the atonement, one must examine the essence of this new alchemy; Hopkins called it "disinterested benevolence." Indeed, it is the Christian virtue central to the New Testament which consists in love to all sentient life, God and one's neighbor, though that neighbor be one's enemy. Hannah Adams in her unique *View of Religions,* written before Hopkins died, made a

3. Calvin, *Christianae Religionis Institutio* (Geneva, 1559), Lib. III C. 21.
4. W. E. Channing, *Works* (Boston 1872), Vol. 4, p. 343.

summary of the tenets of the Hopkinsians, and she puts "disinterested benevolence" first. "All true virtue consists in disinterested benevolence."[5] In his remarkable treatise on the *Nature of Holiness*, Hopkins proclaims this to be the true Christian life. How this idea, with its ethical and religious implications, dominated his doctrine is an intriguing study. Three things Hopkins placed above all in his original theological point of view,—the true nature of holiness or virtue, the unalterable judgment of truth, and a peculiar kind of discerning knowledge characteristic of the regenerate. To benevolence and truth, Hopkins was always returning at the end of every argument. Discerning knowledge, a penetrating insight due to the indwelling grace of God, opened the mind, he thought, to the beauty of divine providence. In these substrata of his approach to doctrine one recognizes the Platonic triad of goodness, truth, and beauty, and in making discerning knowledge the way of life he seems unconsciously to teach the Vedanta. No true reading of Samuel Hopkins can slight these emphases, yet they passed immediately out of the attention of his Calvinistic biographers. The effect of all this upon such doctrines as that of the atonement was subtle.

If these were the essentials in his thought structure, no less fateful was his desire for freedom, another reaction against the Calvinistic pricks. Edwards had felt it first, and after long argument fell into a tautological discussion which brought no result. Distinctions between natural and moral ability and inability were not acceptable to Hopkins. He thought he could escape the bugaboo of Arminianism by claiming the perfect freedom of the will, while he kept subordination to God. He says, "The constant and entire dependence of man on God, his creator, for existence, for every perception and thought, and every motion of the body and mind and every circumstance of these—is absolute and perfect in the highest degree and in every respect."[6] At the same time liberty of action, which he calls moral action, remains the sure possession of the individual. How such apparent contradiction can be Hopkins tries to explain with much lively and vigorous thinking. He fails to make it clear, but he goes a long way toward truth when he makes the will the only essential actor, and denies antecedent choice and consequent reaction any validity. All virtues and sins ut-

5. H. Adams, *View of Religions* (Boston, 1801), p. 128.
6. S. Hopkins, *Works* (Boston, 1852), Vol. 1, p. 142.

terly depend upon this voluntary action. Hopkins had cleared the field from many footfalls. Thus, with natural freedom established as at least apparently real, with assurance of God's providence, and with a quickening sense of his love, he approached the Calvinistic doctrine of the atonement. One is not disappointed in his inquiry.

If there had been no pressing theory of the atonement, the death of Christ would still have been central for Hopkins. His religious experience was fixed upon Christ, and his mind was bent upon the meaning of the Cross; Calvinism became the matrix for this ferment. Edwards' and the eighteenth century theory of the atonement were Anselmic and penal. Christ died, an infinite debt for an infinite sin; Christ suffered instead of us, who deserve infinite punishment; so ran the old familiar phrases of this perfect logic. The satisfaction was made to God's anger. Almost without question this theory had prevailed in New England; they called it Calvinism, but Calvin had really set the office of Christ's sacrifice back upon God's love. The *Institutes* are nowhere more surprising than in the doctrine of the atonement. Since the days of the Arminian controversy, however, the penal idea in all its harshness had obliterated this liberalism in Calvin. Cotton Mather stated, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, that the Churches of New England perfectly hold to the Westminster Confession. The Confession reads, "The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of himself, which he through the eternal spirit once offered up to God, hath fully established the justice of his Father."[7] This was interpreted with the full penal meaning of satisfaction to God, who has been displeased by man's sin.

Hopkins' approach, which we have seen is from his personal experience and ethical interest, changed this radically. It is he, not Bellamy, as sometimes affirmed, who really gave the new theory of the atonement to New England Theology. It is perfectly possible, and indeed probable, that he read the *Defense of the Satisfaction of Christ;* at any rate Hopkins' ideas were quickly seen to have a Grotian turn to them. But it is his own reaction and thought that are the significant part of the changes he made. His assurance of the nature of God's true holiness could not countenance the Anselmic theory. Disinterested love was the perfect and only motive of God in dealing with us, he thought. Such

7. *The Westminster Confession of Faith* (Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1907), Chap. VIII, 5.

affection could entertain not the slightest touch of displeasure that necessitated an event in time and space for its healing. Hopkins came to this proposition first, before his announced theory of the atonement, and in this he refused to follow Edwards or anyone else.

The presuppositions of the atonement, according to Hopkins, lie in God's moral perfection and creative love on the one side, and man's self-love on the other. These opposites must be reconciled, but the former needs no debt to make it complete; God's love is always unmerited. Only in suffering, he argued, not in the obedience of Christ to God, is the basic dynamic of the atonement, no matter how meritorious the obedience may have been. Thus he continued a penal theory, but one in which Christ's suffering is a satisfaction to the law, not to God's anger or offence because of man's sin or injustice to him. "Rectoral Justice," he called it with a fine flourish; God's love never winced while the law proceeded unstained in full power and recognition,—a vicarious sacrifice amazingly detached from all other divine attributes. There had been much pusillanimous thinking on the atonement in Hopkins' day, but his is strong and positive. Salvation is for all, since justice, *ipso facto*, is set in equilibrium; there man's responsibility begins, and the problem of forgiveness and regeneration takes up the disquisition of our further acts of progress toward heaven. Thus Hopkins justified his essential idea of the perfect love of God, since the atonement honored the law, not God. Man is still left under the power of sin, "without the title to eternal life":[8] he must believe, that is, have the discerning knowledge of faith to receive God's grace. In this view of Hopkins the complete denial of Christ's righteousness imputed to man was only one step away, and the later controversy with the Universalists brought even that to a factual reality.

So Hopkins, by his radical treatment of the atonement, opened a way to the true believer; God's love claimed its beloved, a spiritual doctrine of great beauty, instead of the boast that God's anger was appeased and neutralized while man was ignored. Within the ranks of Calvinism the dignity of man was being restored as surely as in the liberal theology of Schleiermacher. Here, in the midst of one of the severest theological disciplines, Hopkins was spreading the leaven of a new movement toward the commitment to the spirit. To the conservative he seemed out of step; even Park omits Hopkins from his

8. Hopkins, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 345.

selections in the study of the *Atonement in New England*, and tries to bring him into line in his essay of *Introduction*. Hopkins' theology was an act of faith. Reason and scripture assured his mind, but faith guided his soul. Edwards had enumerated some eighty different elements of faith. Hopkins made five the pillars of saving faith,—belief, trust, love, repentance, and obedience.[9] Characteristic of him, trust and love are essential. Repentance is the necessary condition; obedience the ground of acceptance of God's love, and belief the only way to truth. As his "improvement" dwelt upon trust and love, so these virtues were the ones that swayed his mind. The drift of his interest is clear as he continued to show that trust means the exercise of the heart, involving a direct assent to the moral beauty of Christ's life, a mystical experience which all good Hopkinsians would deny as such, but which was nevertheless central to his thought. From such a source disinterested love springs into being, love that made all being divine. Justification lost its forensic acquittal, for after the formal act of Christ's suffering and death salvation is a spiritual act within man's moral character. Thus even his Grotian interpretation of the atonement bowed to this ardent expression of faith. Since it is God that loves us, says Hopkins, it is only reasonable that there should be a plan of acceptance in his providence. There must be a moral choice; James Relly was silently condemned. True holiness is the complement of true love, disinterested benevolence.

It was a genuine spiritual insight that caused Hopkins to make love the binding element of faith. "Faith which worketh by love"[10] is the natural corollary to God's grace. One passage in the *Nature of Holiness* is reminiscent of the famous command of von Staupitz to Luther—"St. John taught, 'We love him, because he first loved us.' . . . Had he not first loved us, and given his Son to die for us, and then called us by his grace, and given us a heart to love him, we had continued enemies to him. . . . According to Scripture, we can have no evidence of our interest in God's special love and pardoning mercy until we believe and embrace the Gospel; and love to God, or what implies it, is the only evidence we can have that God loves us."[11]

9. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 421 f.
10. Gal. 5:6.
11. Hopkins, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 65.

The *Essay* continues to enhance the nature of this true benevolence and shows with what noble selflessness it must be pursued; it must be motived without thought of reward and relentlessly sought, "though one see not the least evidence that God loves him."[12] This passionate Christian imagination led Hopkins to great lengths in the further development of his thought. He believed he was carrying out the ideas of Edwards, but, from the prospect of years, it seems more like new wine in old bottles. To paraphrase the *Essay* further, he says with almost Plotinian inspiration that love in the universe all springs from its source in God. True happiness consists in discerning this which alone leads to the greatest good, and the highest, supreme beauty and excellence, in which all moral values rest. Such is the apotheosis of Hopkins' system—a glorious invitation to the creative spirit through God's love.

One might think from all this that, when it came to argument, Hopkins would play the slender rapier along the armor of his doctrinal opponents, but no, his was the heavy thunder of artillery. Day and night, working at his desk to the end of his life, he battered at the fortresses of all whom he thought wrong. Ever ready with fresh ordnance and new ammunition, he never relinquished ground to those who enslaved his brother man, who exploited the Indian, who forgot the poor, or who were filled with what seemed to him the worst of all sin, self-love. Calvinism did not hinder his swift power of denunciation, though it closes in upon his systematic doctrine and often concealed the fine spirit beneath.

Moral government demands human freedom, but infinite being means perfect fore-ordination. This is an example of a relative truth which entangled Hopkins' spiritual insight. These both must be, "however unable we may be to reconcile them and show or conceive how they are consistent,"[13] he says. Calvinism remained the presupposition of all his thought, and hid for his followers the true spiritual image of the man. His former glory as the systemizer becomes his oblivion today, unless we read between the lines. Hopkins the Rationalist was at heart the mystic; what a surprise that would be to his disciples! How could mysticism escape in the transcendent theism which Edwards began to sing, and which Hopkins followed? "Willing

12. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 389.
13. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 77.

to be damned for the glory of God," generally called the chief Hopkinsian peculiarity, is secondary to the fundamental ethical and spiritual discernment in this much misunderstood man, and, indeed, it appears that that phrase is not even an original thought with him.

"If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?"[14] These are the words of the New Testament that he cherished. All his life he labored in harsh circumstances and among uncongenial people, sure himself of God's justice and love, but discouraged over his narrow accomplishment in the wide field of the Kingdom. His own moral standard was so high that he could rarely bring others to keep step with him. He knew intimately the frontier of that mighty wilderness stretching west across the new continent, but that other wilderness, "where no man is at home," as Jacob Boehme used to say, was even more real to Samuel Hopkins. His soul yearned for the great day of Assize of which he wrote such stirring pictures, and for heaven, his home. On December 20, 1803, the year Emerson was born, Hopkins died with these assuring words upon his lips, "My anchor is well cast, and my ship, though weather beaten, will outride the storm."

14. I John 4:20.

HEGEL'S LUTHERAN BACKGROUND

By Ulrich Bernstein

Traditional appraisals of the meaning of Hegelian social thought are largely the results of merely structural analysis. They reflect a procedure in which a structural analysis is supplemented by a functional sequence "logically deduced" (from a too narrow pattern), but not empirically ascertained. It seems to me that the interpretation of Hegel's thought which so eminent an authority as Bernard Bosanquet gave, suffers from this failure to supplement a structural analysis by an analysis of an empirically ascertained functional sequence. When he says:

> Few lines of affiliation are better established in the history of philosophy than that between Rousseau's declaration that liberty is the quality of man and the philosophy of Right as it developed from Kant to Hegel. . . .[1]

And his modern commentator, Professor Ward, adds:

> The relation between the common will and force, which Rousseau had not accurately defined, is significant in the idealistic development.[2]

The implication of this statement is that there exists a community of thought between Rousseau and Kant-Hegel in the fundamental approach to the problem of the nature of the individual and the nature of society. In our discussion of the relation between Rousseau and Hegel, and in our consequent attempt to place Hegel in a non-Rousseauian context, we assume without submitting any evidence that there is a genetic continuity between Kant and Hegel. Admitting, for the sake of argument, that there also exists a continuity structurally between the Kantian and the Hegelian theories of sovereignty ("the relation between the common will and force" constituting the problem of sovereignty), the question emerges whether there exists any such continuity between Kant and Hegel in the functional sequence; this question we raise here without answering it.

We shall first take issue with that part of the problem which deals with the relations between Rousseau and Hegel.

I

The notion which Rousseau entertained concerning the place, na-

1. B. Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (London, 1899), p. 235.
2. P. W. Ward, *Sovereignty* (London, 1928), p. 53.

ture, and function of government in society is revealing for his conception of the nature and locus of sovereignty:

> What, then, is the government? An intermediate body established between subjects and sovereign for their mutual intercourse, charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of liberty—civil as well as political. . . . It is absolutely only a commission, in which, as simple officers of the sovereign they exercise in his name the power of which he has made them the depository, and which he can limit, modify, and take away when he wishes.[3]

For Rousseau, then, the government is a commissioned agency, charged with the execution of clearly defined and sharply delimited functions. The nature of these functions is again indicative of Rousseau's imputation of merely instrumental quality to that agency of the community which he has called the government. The maintenance of the social order and the preservation of the natural rights of man are the supreme objectives of governmental regulations.

What then is to Rousseau the most inclusive nexus of social relationships which has a distinct character, what its origins, and what sanctions does he provide? And what is the relation between this most inclusive nexus of social relationships and the distributive scheme of competencies and functions of its legal-political organization?

> Immediately, instead of individual person of each contracting party, this act of association [social contract] produces a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly has votes, which receives from this same act its unity. . . . This is called the *State* by its members when it is passive; the sovereign when it is active. . . . With regard to the associates, they take collectively the name people, and call themselves individually citizens, as participating in the sovereign authority, and subjects, as submitted to the laws of the state. . . . But these terms are often confounded and are taken one for the other. It is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are employed with all precision.[4]

Before commenting on the meaning of this passage, let us ascertain its fundamental notions. (1) Society has its origin from the social contract. (2) There arises from this "group process" a collective entity called the state, which is co-extensive with the society's politico-legal organization. (3)There is, however, a residual entity which is simply called the "sovereign," who sanctions the legal-political or-

3. J. J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (New York, 1893), pp. 85 ff.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

ganization of the communal activities. (4) All these distinctions have validity only in their appropriate context.

Rousseau here fails to distinguish clearly between the categories of society and state. By his failure to identify his "active sovereign" with any social nexus other than the politico-legal organization of society, Rousseau identified the state and society, as Professor MacIver has shown so convincingly. Thus the system of politico-legal relationships is designated by Rousseau the "social" state, which is indicative of his lack of precision, or shall we say his lack of an adequate categorical scheme to distinguish the "social process" from its politico-legal "aspect."[5]

It seems to me that Rousseau's conception of society is subjected to two interpretations, both of which rest on the fundamental fact that Rousseau's implementation of the "social process" is a legal and not a political implementation. This is to say that he conceived the regulation of the external relationships of men in society to be "under the authority of laws" rather than dependent upon an incoherent succession of political governmental fiats. This conception of a government by law rather than a political government by men as the form of social organization is the distinguishing mark, as we shall show, between Rousseau's and Hegel's conception of the state. This inference is based partly on Rousseau's intellectual indebtedness to Montesquieu's scheme of social relations, and partly on his indebtedness to the Calvinistic theory and practice of Geneva's city-state.

This leads us to Rousseau's identification of moral and legal obligations as he expressed them in the passage which probably formed the basis of Professor Bernard Bosanquet's ascertainment of the historical affiliations between Rousseau and Hegel. Rousseau's identification of legal and moral obligations is in no way equivalent to an identification of the postulates of the moral imperative with the commands of a governmental authority:

> That whoever shall refuse to obey the general will, shall be compelled to it by the whole body, which signifies nothing if not that he will be forced to be free, for it is this condition which, giving each citizen to his country, guarantees him from all personal dependence, a condition which forms the device and working of the political machine . . . which without that would be absurd, tyrannical, and subject to abuse.[6]

5. See R. M. MacIver, *Community* (New York, 1920), Appendix A.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

This passage, while indicative of social coercion and possibly of legal coercion, is in no way expressive of political coercion in the sense of the "social" validity of governmental injunctions as such. When we follow along the lines of the "legalistic" argument we arrive at a theory of sanction which identifies disobedience to a given law with the violation of the fundamental principles of social obligation. This implies that the sanctions of enacted laws are equivalent to the sanctions of the basic forms of togetherness which must be kept inviolable, lest the social structure dissolve.

If we follow the logic of this argument, we arrive at the Calvinistic theory and practice of ecclesiastical presbyterianism and correlative system of political democracy. In such a system all individuals are equally free, and equally bound by the all-pervasive regulatory system of ecclesiastico-legal political injunctions. It seems to me that Rousseau's attempt to reconcile liberty and law in his quest for a "form of association which shall defend and protect with the public force the person and property of each associate; and by means of which, each uniting with all, shall obey only himself and remain as free as before,"[7] is expressive of Rousseau's affiliation with the Genevan system of social organization. In this connection it should be noted that the Calvinist congregationalism does not recognize, as does Lutheran territorialism, the prerogatives of existing secular authorities in the social organization of society. As a matter of fact, Lutheranism does not enjoin its believers to reconstitute the form of social organization according to a divine law like the Decalogue in the same way that Calvinism enjoins its followers.

The Rousseauian conception of society is a secularization of the Calvinist implementation of social organization by the principles laid down in the Decalogue. From this point of view, too, Rousseau's scheme of social relations is a legal implementation (namely, the general rule of law laid down in the Ten Commandments) of social organization, and not a personal or political implementation as in the Lutheran territorialism, where the secular prince determines ecclesiastical and political relationships by the fiat of his will, bound by his inner conscience, but not by any canonical or legal rules.

When we turn to Hegel's conception of sovereignty, we immediately sense the transition from an "instrumentalist" view of govern-

7. *Ibid*, p. 21.

ment to an "idealist" view of government. For the purpose of our comparative analysis Hegel's discussion of the merits of the "commission" theory of governmental authority presents an ideal point of departure. Hegel quotes an argument for the commission theory which might easily have been taken verbatim from Rousseau:

> "Because it is the concern and interest of the people which the monarch has to provide for, it must be left to the people to choose whom it will depute to provide for them and only out of such a commission arises the right of governing." This view, as well as the idea that the monarch is the chief-officer of state, and also the idea of a contract between him and the people, proceed from the will of the multitude, in the form of inclination, opinion, and caprice. These views, as we long ago remarked, first make themselves good, or rather seek to do so, in the civic community. They can make no headway against the principle of the family, still less that of the state. . . .[8]
>
> The particular state-business, which monarchy transfers to executive officers, constitutes the objective side of the sovereignty inherent in the monarch.[9]

The meaning of this passage is very easily explained. In the first place, we have a depreciation of the "commission" theory on the ground that such a utilitarian interpretation of government is not legitimate, since the system of wants, the civic community, is distinct from the state. In the second place, we have an avowal of the fact that in a social order which constitutes in itself the ethical realization of the individual, sovereignty resides in the state offices.

We can now proceed to an examination of a second point in our comparative analysis: the positions of Rousseau and Hegel respectively concerning the delimitation of the competencies and functions of legislative enactments and administrative decrees. Says Rousseau:

> When a whole people legislates concerning a whole people, it thinks only of itself; and if there is then formed a relation, it is between the whole object from one point of view and the whole object from another point of view, without any division of all. Then the matter about which enactments are made is general like the will which enacts them. It is this enactment which I call a law.[10]

In this connection I like to come back to our discussion of Rousseau's relationalism. We see here how he applies this notion to the conception of legal enactment when he speaks of forming a "rela-

8. G. W. H. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Dyde trans. (London, 1896), p. 294.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
10. Rousseau, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

tion without any division," by which he means that the fundamental principle of freedom is preserved, is made consistent with the principle of legal coercion, when we have no class-legislation and no substitution of governmental decrees for legislative enactments, but legislation by all and extending to everyone:

> for the will is general or it is not; it is the will of the body of the people, or only of a part of it. In the first case this declared will is an act of sovereignty and makes law; in the second it is only an individual will, or an act of magistracy; it is, at the most, a decree.[11]

Hegel on the other hand, speaking of the relative competencies of legislating "classes" and administrative officials, says:

> The highest state officials have necessarily deeper and more comprehensive insight into the workings of the state and also greater skill and wider practical experience. They are able without the classes to secure the best results, just as it is they who must continuously do this when the classes are in actual assembly. General well-being does not therefore depend upon the particular insight of the classes, but it is rather the achievement of the official deputies.[12]

We can summarize the argument in a schematic fashion:

(1) Hegel recognizes class legislation.

(2) The state officials have the decisive vote in the deliberation about legislative enactments.

(3) General well-being depends upon the activities of the state officials rather than upon legislative enactments or individual planning. This means that *de facto* governmental decrees replace statute laws in competency and function. In other words, the Rousseauian scheme is completely reversed.

We now come to the discussion of the politico-philosophic problem *par excellence*. It is the problem of the nature of the good life and its relation to the distributive scheme of competencies and functions. As we might expect, Rousseau's political argument is fundamentally concerned with the conditions, rather than with the constitution of the good life. He is here interested in the good life only in so far as the utilitarian organization of society enters into the problem of the basis and realization of virtue. Social organization as such makes neither for nor against virtuous conduct:

11. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
12. Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

If we seek to find in what the greatest good of all consists . . . it will be found that it is reduced to two principal things: liberty and equality.[13]

The utilitarian basis of Rousseau's scheme is well expressed in the following passage:

I wish to discover whether in the existing social order there may not be some rule of safe and legitimate administration, taking men as they are and laws as they might be. I shall try to ally in this research that which the law permits with that which interest prescribes, so that justice and utility may not be divided.[14]

An examination of a parallel passage will reveal the Hegelian conviction that the final good is constituted and realized in the governmental regulation of all the activities of groups and individuals which go to make up the community. Hegel clearly marks off final "ideal" sovereignty from the utilitarian aspect of the "civic community" which is co-extensive with the Rousseauian institution of government.

Were the state to be regarded as the security and protection of property and personal freedom, the interest of the individual as such would be the ultimate purpose of the social union.[15]

We see that the well-being and the virtue of the individual, as such, is of little significance in the Hegelian scheme, while the Rousseauian imputation of liberty and equality to his ideal implies his high regard for the well-being and the virtue of the individual.

Let us now proceed to an examination of Hegel's conception of the final end.

It would then be at one's option to be a member of the state. But the state has a totally different relation to the individual. It is the objective spirit, and he has his truth, real existence, and ethical status only in being a member of it. Union as such is itself the true content and end, since the individual is intended to pass a universal life. His particular satisfactions, activities, and way of life have in this authenticated substantive principle their origin and result.[16]

For Hegel the end of human life is co-extensive with the organization and "regulation of the outstanding external relationships of man."[17]

13. Rousseau, *op. cit.*, p. 77 f.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
15. Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 240.
16. *Loc. cit.*
17. See Professor MacIver's *The Modern State* (Oxford, 1926), Chap. 1, for "utilitarian" definition of the State.

The evidence we have submitted testifies to the insufficiency of the thesis advanced by Bosanquet. The problem that emerges may be stated thus: Is there another intellectual tradition, another historical context which will make more intelligible the various non-Rousseauian aspects of the Hegelian theory, or must we assume that Hegel evolved his theory in an intellectual vacuum; that his theory of sovereignty with all its ethical, epistemological, metaphysical, and theological affiliations arose from Hegel's mind without any antecedents?

Quite apart from the natural fact that philosophies are not created fully *de novo*, there is the historical fact that in the idealistic tradition before Hegel there emerged a theory of sovereignty which found that the locus of the ultimate power in the community resides in the governmental hierarchy. The official hierarchy consequently enjoins the unconditional obedience of the "subjects." To be sure, on the basis of this position we distinguish between two types of sovereignty. First, there is the sovereignty of the existing governmental hierarchy; and second, there is an "ideal" sovereignty, an "imperative" sovereignty, so to speak, a sovereignty of the people, realizable in some future millenium. To be sure, any attempt to devise methods to bring about this second type of sovereignty by means of constitutional convention, legislative enactments, or revolutionary activities would violate the sanctity of the existing governmental sovereignty. This dualistic type of sovereignty, providing for a chasm between an existing empirical and a possible transcendental sovereignty, is, of course, none other than the Kantian theory of sovereignty, postulating in the political sphere the same dualism between and irrelevancy of empirical possibilities and ideal, transcendental "realities."[18]

Our concern, however, is neither with the Kantian theory of sovereignty per se, nor with the consequences of this existential dualism in the idealistic tradition, except as it places the Hegelian theory, when seen in the light of this tradition, into another context, and thus elucidates the meaning of the "governmental" theory of sovereignty. In other words, we shall approach the Hegelian theory of sovereignty as a particular instance of the Lutheran tradition. As a consequence, it will appear that the Hegelian contention that the Prus-

18. This Kantian conception of the irrelevancy and causal inefficacy of our natural desires in the realization of the good (as the rational part of the real) constitutes the basis for the existential dualism of theory and practice, ends and means, reality and appearance, whose logical, metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical implications Professor Dewey has elaborated so convincingly.

sian State constitutes the most advanced form of social organization is not a mere "rationalization," or arbitrary justification of a given fact, but is integrally bound up with fundamental metaphysical, logical, epistemological, and ethical theories of this tradition.

Our inquiry into the affiliations of soteriological and ethical positions in the Hegelian system, and their functional context, will sustain the thesis that the Hegelian conception of the spiritual community of believers is a reflection of the Lutheran conception of the universal priesthood of believers.

II

The thesis which we propose to set forth in the sequel is that the Hegelian political philosophy is continuous with Lutheran soteriology in general, and with the cosmology, ethics, and epistemology of Lutheran mystical tradition in particular. We propose to examine the Lutheran position on the problem of sin, and to deal with its application to the problem of salvation. We shall not be concerned, however, with the central question of soteriology, the efficacy of the redemptive power of Christ in the mediation between God's perfection and man's imperfection. Our concern is only with the implications of Luther's conception of sin for his conception of man's role in the process of salvation. We wish to deal with Luther's conception of the office of man's moral conduct and rational cognition in the quest for atonement of sin and knowledge of God.

Luther's position is well indicated in the following passage, which he wrote in defense of his views against Erasmus's *Pelagianism:*

> And that ignorance and contempt most undoubtedly are not in the "flesh," that is (as you interpret it) "the inferior and grosser affections," but in the most exalted and most noble powers of man, in which righteousness, godliness, the knowledge and reverence of God ought to reign, that is, in the reason and in the will. . . . What then can reason propose that is right, to him who is thus blind and ignorant? What can the will that is thus evil and impotent choose, that is good? Nay, what can the will pursue, where the reason can propose nothing but the darkness of its own blindness and ignorance? And where the reason is thus erroneous and the will averse, what can the man either do or attempt that is good?[19]

Luther rejects, in other words, any form of Pelagianism. The notion that faith is necessary to make God's mercy efficacious, to effect a bestowal of grace, is not original with Luther. Faith is,

19. Martin Luther, *The Bondage of the Will,* Cole trans. (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1931), p. 334.

in the Thomistic as well as in the Lutheran tradition, the "sufficient" condition on the part of man for the attainment of justification. But in the Thomistic scheme there is a transitive relation between the good life, based on natural excellencies, and the bliss of the eternal life; in the Lutheran system there is a transitive relation between the status of total depravity and the status of eternal bliss. From this we infer, then, that in the Thomistic scheme the good life is a "necessary," though not "sufficient," condition for the attainment of the state of eternal bliss, while in the Lutheran system it is not a scheme of natural excellencies, but rather the scheme of sensuousness and irrational tendency which constitutes the "necessary" condition for the attainment of the good life. Thus Luther says:

> If we believe that Christ redeemed men by his blood, we are compelled to confess that the whole man was lost; otherwise we shall make Christ superfluous, or a Redeemer of the grossest part of man alone.[20]

> Paul's whole design is to make grace necessary unto all men. Whereas, if they could make some sort of beginning themselves, grace would not be necessary. . . . Hence you see that "free will" is by this passage utterly abolished, and nothing meritorious or good whatever left in man, seeing that he is declared to be unrighteous, ignorant of God, a contemner of God, averse to God, and unprofitable in the sight of God.[21]

This is to say, that the "necessary condition" of salvation in the Lutheran scheme is the system of the "grossest part of man." When nothing meritorious is left in man, metaphysical coherence with God (unison) is established. To indicate Luther's divergence from even the Augustinian tradition, let us contrast the above position of a denial of the saving efficacy of the moral good and of rational insight with the position held by St. Augustine, that moral excellence and rational insight do constitute a necessary condition on man's part for the attainment of justification.[22] Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone, on the other hand, implies that justification is attained when man implements his sensuous nature with a faithful reliance

20. Luther, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 336.

22. "If the weak custom of human sense durst not be so bold as to oppose itself against the reasons of apparent truth, but would yield this languid infirmity unto wholesome instruction until by God's assistance and faith's operation it were thoroughly cured, then those that can both judge well and instruct sufficiently should not need many words to confute any erroneous opinion, or to make it fully apparent unto such as their desires would truly inform. But now, because there is so great and inveterate a disease rooted in the minds of the ignorant, that they will (out of their extreme

on God's gracious compensation. Luther's denial of the efficacy of virtuous conduct and rational insight implies thus a *de facto* recognition of appetition and feeling to the status of a necessary condition of the process of salvation.

If we make an attempt at classification, Luther's position must be considered as an example of extreme Augustinianism. St. Augustine himself held that the imperfection of man's virtues and the deficiency of man's knowledge, not his total depravity and his complete ignorance, necessitated salvation. He sometimes hints that it is only because the majority of men are incapable of the pursuit of goodness and rational knowledge, that revelation and grace must complement reason and virtue.[23] The very conception that the two cities exist contemporaneously in this world shows St. Augustine's adherence to a Greek scheme of values. Thus he postulates, in accordance with his Greek preconceptions, a "double standard" of behavior for good and bad men in the process of salvation. "Patience for the good" and "repentence for the bad." Luther knows of no such difference in excellence with respect to the process of salvation. On the basis of his conception of the total depravity of man Luther makes the soteriological process one of existential "consubstantiation alone," and not also one of ethical reformation and cognitive illumination. There is a correspondence between the Lutheran conception of salvation as existential consubstantiation alone—which view is re-enforced by Luther's conception of the "physical ubiquity" of Christ in the Eucharist—and his conception of justification by faith alone.[24]

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blindness, whereby they see not what is most plain, or out of their obstinate perverseness, whereby they will not brook what they see) defend their irrational and brutish opinions after the truth has been taught them as plain as one man can teach another; hence it is that there arises a necessity that blindeth us to dilate more fully of what is already most plain, and to give the truth, not unto their eyes to see, but even into their heads, as it were to touch and feel." St. Augustine, *The City of God*. Healy trans. (London, 1931), Book II, Chap. I, p. 45.

23. *Ibid.*, Book V, Chap. VII.

24. In a passage bristling with analytic ingenuity the late Professor McGiffert says: "To claim that the Protestant Reformation was due primarily to ethical considerations, and was the result of dissatisfaction with the moral state of the world, . . . is nothing less than a travesty upon the facts. . . . Paul, too, thought of salvation as a present possession and of the Christian as already saved, but the ground of his salvation was moral transformation, not divine forgiveness. . . . Luther broke with the Catholic theory, not by going back to Paul and asserting a present and instantaneous sanctification, but by repudiating altogether the Pauline and Catholic notion of salvation, and making it wholly a matter of divine forgiveness rather than of human character." A. C. McGiffert, *Protestant Thought Before Kant* (New York, 1917), pp. 24 f.

In concluding our discussion of Luther we must emphasize that his conception of the causal efficacy of appetition, and of the cognitive certainty of feeling, is only relevant to a system of reference where man is face to face with the Godhead, where he contemplates his relation to divine omnicompetence, and, to use an expression of Santayana, his relation to divine omnificence. We must bear in mind this reference in our later consideration of Hegel's cosmic validation of the man-state relationship.

The mystical and the humanist wings of Lutheranism had never become fully reconciled to Luther's biblical literalism and his conception of sin. From the days of Karlstadt and Franck these two wings had claimed their rights. For a time Lutheran scholasticism was able to suppress them, yet the humanist claims made themselves heard, even in the camp of the scholastics, when the synergistic controversy was waged between Lutherans and Philippians. The mystical claim of knowledge of God was re-affirmed by Valentin Weigel and Jacob Boehme. The mystical tradition of Lutheranism found its greatest elaboration in the system of Jacob Boehme, propounded in the first third of the seventeenth century. Boehme's system, however, was far more than a systematic elaboration of the mystical foundations of Lutheranism. Boehme was not only concerned with re-instating the "aspiring and contemplating" man to the place which the pre-Lutheran mystics had assigned him in the scheme of salvation. The contemporaneous influence of the alchemists' search for the transmutation of metals, which had been inspired by the desire to find that magic force which produced life, exercised a profound influence upon Boehme. He received these streams of thought, together with the impact of the pantheistic tradition of Giordano Bruno, which was mediated to Boehme by Paracelsus, who had received the suggestion of many thought systems, especially of pantheism, alchemy, and the Jewish Cabala. Jacob Boehme utilized the alchemists' speculations, but did not elaborate them. However, he further developed the implications of the pantheistic conception of the universe and the cabalistic conceptions of God and the Devil, and fused them with his Lutheran preconceptions. His speculative approach was avowedly in the tradition of the German mystics, whom he had read with great patience. Out of these elements Jacob Boehme concocted a cosmogony and a cosmology, the structural nexus of which became of fundamental importance for the Hegelian cosmology.

Giordano Bruno had proclaimed the immanence of God; to him nature and God were co-extensive. Boehme was attracted by this aspect of Bruno's system. He was dissatisfied with Luther's identification of nature and metaphysical "appearance," as it was implied by the "salvational" irrelevance of natural excellences, moral and cognitive. Boehme was convinced of the efficacy and reality of both nature and man's powers. His aspiration was to fit the Lutheran theological universe of discourse into a wider universe of discourse, expressive of a more inclusive reality than God, and a more inclusive process than the salvational process. Now in the cabalistic cosmology, Boehme found the model for a universal scheme which made God, evil, man, and nature specific instances of a cosmogonic process of creation. We have seen that, in his relegation of will and reason to a secondary status, and in his elevation of appetition and feeling to the status of an existential condition (e.g., in his conception of the necessity to save the whole man), Luther had implied what he explicitly stated in many places: that man had succumbed wholly to the Devil, who was the master of this world. In other words, Luther's conception of salvation means his ascription of existential status to the principle of evil. If man cannot be saved unless he abandon the pretenses of free-will and rational cognition, evil must certainly be accorded the status of an existential condition in the soteriological frame of reference. Now the cabalistic cosmogony recognized, on its part, the cosmic efficacy of the element of evil.

Boehme's scheme of a cosmogonic creation encompassed both the religious and the cosmological efficacy of the element of evil. In Boehme's scheme of analysis God is conceived to be the formal cause, nature the material cause, evil the efficient cause, and manifestation or actuality the final cause.

Let us first note that with regard to nature, the material cause of the universe, Boehme speaks of "the soul having its source also out of nature, and that in nature there is good and bad."[25] We see nature is the "container" of good and evil in the Boehmean analysis.

Let us next proceed to Boehme's conception of evil as the efficient cause. "Man has cast himself through sin into the fierceness or wrath of nature, so that the soul is daily and hourly defiled with sins . . . , therefore soul cannot attain unto any perfect knowledge in this life till

25. Jacob Boehme, *Aurora* (London, 1914), p. 35.

at the end."[26] The identification of this world with sin, and with the existential condition of salvation shows the Lutheran affiliation. But we must proceed to follow Boehme's extension of this existentialist conception of evil to a cosmological frame of reference, where it receives the status of the efficient cause. "For from its twofold source everything has its great mobility. . . . For meekness in nature is a still rest, but the fierceness in every power makes all things moveable, running, and generative."[27] Contrariety is the very condition and basis of manifestation; apart from the existence of contrariety manifestation could not be. Had the will of the 'still rest' not been met and crushed by a contrary will, the 'still rest' had been the ceaseless condition and manifestation would not have taken place.[28] The meaning of this passage is that the fierceness in nature, or the contrary will or the element of evil, is the efficient cause of the cosmos.

What then is the formal cause, the structure of the universe? It is this very "meekness," this "will of the still rest," and this is the principle of good.

> When I reflect about the nature of God then I say: He is the One against the Creature, as an eternal Nothing. He has neither ground, beginning, nor locus, and he does possess nothing but himself. He is the Will to potentiality.[29] In the eternally speaking word . . . there is neither darkness nor light . . . neither pleasure nor pain, for it is but a force of understanding . . . it is the eternal good and nothing more. It is led then to an appetition to feel what it is . . . and there would not be created any sensitivity without this appetition. For thought aches for the determinate, therefore the first verb is *making*.[30]

We recognize then the "impotency" of the mere good and the potency of the evil, which takes here again the form of appetition. Yet evil does not form a part of the structure of existence. What really arose was not darkness, strife, and wrath, but a spiritual principle. A spiritual principle which, if allowed to take on form or quality (structure), would then—but then only—appear as these evil things.[31]

God is the structure of the cosmos, but not the final cause of the cosmogonic process. "It is not permissible to think that we had no

26. *Loc. cit.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
28. *Loc. cit.*
29. *Sämmtliche Werke* (Leipzig, 1843), Vol. v, *Mysterium Magnum*, p. 7.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
31. *Ibid.*, Cf. pp. 11 f.

approach to the hidden divine world, to divine what she really is . . . for in the visible world of creation we do recognize the figure of the inner spiritual essence of the world force."[32] The final cause of the universe is the visible world of creation, is manifestation, the "category inclusive" of God's mere goodness and the Devil's mere badness. Manifestation, actuality as such, is the final cause of the universe, and is neither goodness nor badness. To anticipate our argument, in the Boehmean conception of manifestation lies the root of the Hegelian existential-logical unity of the concrete universal, and his ascription of metaphysical necessity to the actual. This becomes especially obvious when we notice that Boehme looks for the nature of God in the "visible world of creation." The possibility of knowing God, which Boehme recognizes, is indicative of the mystic's claim.

For our particular purpose it is important to emphasize this cosmological extension of the Lutheran soteriological principles of the impotence of virtuous conduct (good), and Luther's imputation of existential status to appetition. The Boehmean mystic and cosmological advances, however, did not strike into the cultural and intellectual life of German Lutheran civilization until the advent of the Pietistic revival of evangelicalism had prepared the ground for a more pervasive effectiveness. The reason for the failure of the mystical tradition to catch the imagination of the Lutheran intelligentsia, at large, seems to me to be of a twofold nature. In the first place, there was next to complete stagnation of the intellectual and cultural life of Germany as an after-effect of the damages wrought by the Thirty Years War. In the second place, the mystical tradition was irrelevant to major contemporaneous thought-movements. The seventeenth century witnessed a definite transition from medieval to a modern cosmology; in other words, the break with the Middle Ages which had begun with the cultural re-orientation of the Renaissance had entered now upon the stage of scientific and cosmological re-orientation. This re-orientation took the form of a transition from a conception of nature as a hierarchically integrated form of final substances to a conception of nature as a continuum of bodies and forces in motion. The motion of these homogeneous masses was stateable in terms of geometric patterns and numerical ratios. In the metaphysical interpretation there arose

32. *Ibid.*, p. 4. See also N. A. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York, 1930), appetition an efficient and final cause.

some subtle differences which do not concern us here; the important fact was the recognition of a rational pattern, or if you like, a rational substance which guaranteed the continuity of the system. God, to be sure, still maintained his position as an entity whose attributes were extraneous to the course of physical nature. It is obvious that, in such an intellectual atmosphere, a cosmology which recognized discontinuities and reduced God to a specific instance of a cosmogonic scheme could find no acceptance.

At the end of the seventeenth century, however, there emerged a metaphysics within the German universe of discourse which claimed to unify the "necessity" of the rational structure of atomic motion with the "freedom" of the experiencing subject. The Leibnitzian scheme carried the Cartesian dualism between a mechanical nature and a free soul into the very foreground of nature. These basic units of existence, the monads, were members of the rational structure of atoms, while they were at the same time members of an "ideal" order of free souls. Leibnitz never made quite explicit just what his metaphysical scheme predicated about the nature of God. Sometimes God has the status of the highest monad and sometimes he has the more transcendent status of a Being whose nature was extraneous to the actions and reactions of physical nature.

It is important for our purpose to draw attention to the fact that the Leibnitzian unities of existence, or monads, were substances. The Leibnitzian notion of substance was force, and the first principle of intelligibility was appetition. But this is not the place to establish the particular affiliations between the Lutheran soteriological principles and the Leibnitzian monadology in general, nor between the Boehmean conception of force as the efficient cause of cosmic creation and the Leibnitzian notion of substance as force in particular.

The more general fact to be emphasized is that through the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy the genetic continuity of the Lutheran tradition was guaranteed when, in the middle of the eighteenth century, Kant set out to lay the foundations of his transcendental system in terms of the Luther-Leibnitzian rather than the Cartesian dualism, and when he postulated the antithesis of reason and understanding and imputed metaphysical reality to the transcendent (with respect to the empirical self) will.

Our concern, however, is not with Kant, but with a contemporary

thinker who was in more immediate contact with the Lutheran tradition in general, and the mystical expansion of the Boehmean tradition in particular. This explains his reaction to Kant's "moral" implementation of the volitional and affective life. Hamann was a man thoroughly imbued with the faith and spirit of Lutheran religion. That itself, however, would not have been sufficient to account for the influence he exerted on the leading figures of the "German Renaissance." Whether we think of Herder or Goethe, Kant or Hegel, Schelling or Novalis, none seems to have escaped the virus of Hamann's imaginative flights.

The pervasiveness of Hamannian thought must be accounted for on other grounds than his Pietistically flavored Lutheranism. Together with Klopstock, Hamann introduced English literature and English philosophy to the German intelligentsia, or, better said, he presented a concoction of Lutheran religion and English scepticism and empiricism. Hamann thus effected a secular implementation of Lutheranism designed to be most effective in the shaping of a generic German culture.

The influence he exerted was more permanent in its effects on the Romanticists, and on Goethe and Hegel, than on Kant and Schiller. To be more precise, Hamann's influence proved to be most lasting wherever, by inclination or aspiration, a tendency towards the vision of mystic revelation combined with romantic libertinism manifested itself, and it proved to be least attractive and permanent where rational insight was associated with moral conduct. The nature and direction of his influence is indicative of the character of his thought. Hamann's integration of the beliefs of Lutheran religion and the values and ideas of English thought in general, and of Hume's philosophy and religion in particular, resulted in the postulation of a new philosophy of values. This philosophy of values embraced religion, art, epistemology, and ethics. To be sure, he did not elaborate a full-fledged system, nor were his literary achievements equal to the originality of his thought.

Our concern with Hamann, however, is restricted to a consideration of his achievements in ethics and epistemology, or to put it differently, we are concerned with an examination of his secularization of those two principles of Lutheran soteriology with which we have been preoccupied in this paper: the impotence of virtuous conduct and the ignorance of rational insight in the process of salvation. Our concern

is to examine the methods and principles by means of which Hamann effected the transition in these matters from a transcendent to an immanent frame of reference, thus extending the validity of those "anthropological" notions involved in the soteriological universe of discourse to the dimensions of ethics and epistemology with exclusive this-worldly reference:

> Everything divine is also human, since man can only act in accordance with his nature. This communication of divine and human idiomatum is a fundamental law and key to all our knowledge and the key to all visible existence.[33]

Here in this "communication of divine and human idiomatum," in this principle of the unity of opposites, Hamann found the instrument or epistemological key to unlock the mysteries of the relation between God and man, the appropriate ways to attain truths, and the appropriate logical principles to interpret truth. Hamann here provided an instrument with which the Boehmean antinomies could be "logically" resolved. Thus he resolved the problem of the ethical antinomy in his recognition of the necessity of evil and its "logical" compatibility with the idea of good. "Without Manichaeism I have found everywhere contradictions in the elements of the material and the intellectual world."[34]

Let us now see how Hamann, by the use of the principle of the "unity of opposites," extends the validity of appetition and feeling "as such" from the soteriological to the epistemological and ethical frame of reference. "The unlimited independence of our sensuous nature should be unified with the amenities of civilization. A unification of these extreme opposites appears to me as the sole solution for the problem of all human happiness."[35]

In commenting upon this passage we must note that he regards appetition "as such" as a value. The non-empirical integration by the principle of the unity of opposites excludes a rational empirical adjustment of appetition with the values of civilized conduct. An ethics which integrates sensuous urges with feeling, excludes the element of rational deliberation. The resultant philosophy can only be a philosophy of impulsiveness.

33. J. G. Hamann, *Collected Works*. Roth Ed. (Berlin, 1821-43), Vol. IV, p. 23.
34. *Ibid.*, Gildemeister Ed. (Gotha, 1857-73), Vol. V, p. 49.
35. *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

In other words, Hamann postulates an ethics beyond good and evil, an ethics of manifestation or actuality. The logic of this moral philosophy is the logic of mysticism, the logic of the unity of opposites. This means that we have to depend on "feeling" as the agency which instructs us to what extent our impulsive propulsions will be tolerated by actuality. Faith is our method of adjustment with actuality in its ultimate, physical, cultural, and social manifestations.

Let us now submit evidence for Hamann's Lutheran affiliations, and for the way in which he extended Lutheran soteriology to secular concerns:

> That part of our faculties which is concerned with theoretical knowledge gives expression to the impotence of activity as well as to the corruption of all virtues. Our reason is given to us not to make us wise . . . but on the contrary, to show us how irrational our reason is and how our errors are multiplied by it. . . . The ultimate truth of all philosophy is the knowledge of human ignorance and weakness.[36]

The passage needs no comment since it only amplifies the persistence of the Lutheran tradition.

To complete our exposition of Hamann let us examine his conception of the meaning of Hume's natural religion. "I was full of Hume, our own existence and the existence of all things outside of us must be believed and cannot be proved by any other method." Any student of Hume's philosophy is aware of the fact that Hume's argument was intended as a disproof of any certainty in matters of religion, but it did not mean that "belief" and its correlative logic provided greater certainty than deductive reasoning, or the self-corrective logic of experience.

Here is another instance of Hamann's transformation of Humean reasoning: "You philosophers do not seem to know as yet that there is no physical connection between cause and effect, means and purpose, but that there is a spiritual and idealistic connection as the greatest earthly historian of this country has demonstrated."[37] At first sight the passage sounds rather Berkeleyan, yet if we bear in mind the context of Hamann's reasoning, and that he infers a mystical connection in sense experiences from Hume's rejection of a necessary connection in sense-experience, we realize that this position is in no way in accord with Berkeley's reasoning concerning the origin of the sensory data.

36. Hamann, *op. cit.*, Roth Ed., Vol. I, pp. 405 f.
37. *Ibid.*, cf. Vol. I, p. 115.

In estimating the significance of Hamann's contribution to Lutheran thought, and his significance for the Hegelian theory, we come to the following conclusions:

(1) Hamann extended the validity of the principles of Lutheran soteriology to ethics and epistemology.

(2) He applied a method and a principle used in the theological universe of discourse to the problems of culture and nature, and suggested its application to cosmology.

(3) He evolved a new ethics, the ethics of immoralism.

III

Our functional-genetic inquiry into the antecedents of the Hegelian system in general, and of his political philosophy in particular, has come to an end. It will now be our endeavor to undertake a structural analysis of the Hegelian system in terms of the categorical scheme which has emerged in this functional sequence.

An evaluation of the Hegelian cosmology must emphasize that the ultimate category in the Hegelian system is the primordial will. This primordial will is equivalent to the notion of "creativity" as employed by Professor N. A. Whitehead. "Creativity is the pure notion of the activity conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual world."[38] In the Hegelian scheme, however, God is a special instance of creativity. He is not identical with the ultimate category. He does not even have the highest status in the derivative categorical scheme.

> If God in the creation of the world is supposed to be the absolutely positive, then let man turn where he will, he cannot in the positive find the negative. The view that God permitted evil to exist, involving a passive relation of God to evil, offers no satisfactory solution of the problem. In the religious myth the origin of evil is not rationally conceived; the negative is not recognized to be in the positive. One is supposed to come after the other or to exist side by side with it, so that the negative comes to the positive from the outside. With this view thought cannot be satisfied. Thought desires a reason and a necessary relation and insists that the negative and the positive spring from the self-same root. The solution of the difficulty from the standing-ground of the conception is already contained in the conception. The conception, or to speak more concretely, the idea, must in its very essence find distinctions in itself and establish itself as negative. To adhere to the positive merely, that is to say, to the pure good, which shall be in its origin nothing but good, is an empty ef-

38. Whitehead, *op. cit.*, pp. 46 f.

fort of the understanding. . . . But from the ground of the conception the positive phase is apprehended as an activity distinguishing itself from itself. Evil as well as good has its origin in the will, and the will in its conception is both good and evil.[39]

We see that the will is the primordial category, and that its category is "activity." Further, the derivative category which is most relevant, which occupies the highest place in the hierarchy of derivative entities, is not God, the mere good, but it is rather the "negative" principle which is the source of distinctions, which yields factuality, manifestation, actuality. "Philosophy has to do with ideas or realized thoughts, and hence not with what we have been accustomed to call mere conceptions. . . . Through the actual shape which it takes upon itself in actuality, is the conception itself understood."[40]

In the Hegelian scheme this negative principle is essential to the efficient cause of all creation, which Hegel calls the dialectic. "The efficient or motive principle which is not merely the analysis but the production of the several elements of the universal, I call dialectic. . . . The higher dialectic of the conception does not merely apprehend any phase as a limit and opposite, but produces out of this negative a positive content and result."[41]

We have seen that Hegel himself called the dialectic the efficient cause. However, the dialectic is more than its "negative element," which is rightly called the efficient cause because it is, in Boehmean phraseology, the generative principle, the principle of unrest. To Hegel the dialectic was, however, strictly speaking, the principle of interpretation which establishes a necessary relation between the negative and the positive. The dialectic is not only the negative principle but it is the "unity of opposites." "Good and evil are inseparable, their unity lying in this, that the conception becomes objective to itself."[42] When we thus consider the dialectic in its logical aspect, as principle of interpretation, we must consider the dialectic as the formal cause of the universe. It is the structure of the universe. This formal cause of the universe is what Professor Whitehead has called appetition:

Appetition is at once the conceptual valuation of an immediate physical feeling combined with the urge towards realization of the datum concep-

39. Hegel, *op. cit.*, pp. 135 f.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 36 f.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

tually prehended. For example, "thirst" is an immediate physical feeling integrated with conceptual prehension of its quenching. Appetition is immediate matter of fact including in itself a principle of unrest, involving realization of what is not and what may be.[43]

The question now arises, what is the particular form which existence assumes in the human sphere, and furthermore can we place this type of existence into a hierarchical relation to other types of existence? "Impulses and inclinations are in the first instance the content of will and only reflection transcends them."[44] Thus we see that impulses constitute the "content of will," which is another way of saying that they are the primary derivative facts of the ultimate category, the "will," or, as we have interpreted it following Professor Whitehead, the category of "creativity."

What now remains to be done in the four-cause analysis, is to identify the final cause in the Hegelian scheme. We recall that Hegel distinguished between existence and conception as phases of the will. The will is the primordial, rather than the ultimate, category. The ultimate category must be a "realized" entity.

We have identified the negative phase of the dialectic with the efficient cause. The formal cause must be recognized in the structure of the cosmogonic process. This structure is the unity which the negative phase creates out of opposites. In other words, the structure or form of the process rests in the characteristic of unity which it creates, and in the characteristic of an unrest which it retains in the unity. Now the characteristic of the unity is to be seen in its exemplification as "apperception" in the sense of "at once the conceptual variation of a physical feeling combined with the urge toward realization of the datum apprehended."[45]

Emphasis must be laid on "feeling" when we approach the exemplification in the realm of human existence.

> The will, which is at first only implicitly free, is the direct or natural will. The distinctive phases which the self-determining conception sets up in the will appear in the direct will as a directly present content. They are impulses, appetites, inclinations, by which the will finds itself determined by nature.[46]

The self-consciousness of the will in the form of appetite or impulse is

43. Whitehead, *op. cit.*, pp. 47 f.
44. Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
45. Whitehead, *loc. cit.*
46. Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

sensible, the sensible in general indicating the externality of self-consciousness, or that condition in which self-consciousness is outside of itself. Now this sensible side is one of the two elements of the reflecting will, and the other is the abstract universality of thought. . . . In this universality the directness of the natural will is superseded, and so also is the private individuality which is produced by reflection and infects the natural condition.[47]

We can now appreciate Hegel's conception that the cosmologically relevant form of human existence is a non-intellectual integration. Desire, dialectically integrated, is equal to impulse when referring to the human agent, and is purposive will. When referring to the cosmos at large, feeling dialectically integrated is faith with respect to the human agent, and becomes only "cosmically" conceptualized into a system of sentiments expressive of ideas or ideals. In the same sense as the "abstract universal" was cosmically irrelevant, in the realm of desires a merely rational principle of purposive activity is inadequate.

But absolute universality is not to be thought of either as the universality of reflection, which is a kind of concensus or generality, or as the abstract universality and self-identity which is fashioned by the understanding, and keeps aloof from the individual. It is rather the concrete self-contained and self-referring universality, which is the . . . immanent idea of self-consciousness.[48]

Let us now see what is the meaning of the "incidence of the concrete universal" on the system of impulses. Are we entitled to think of the resultant "structure of impulses" as a structure of appetitions?

This we shall test by an examination of Hegel's conception of the inadequacy of the ideal of happiness as the form which is relevant to an intelligent integration of desires. "The reflection which is brought to bear upon impulses placing them before itself, estimating them, comparing them with one another, and contrasting them with their means and consequences, and also with a whole of satisfaction, namely happiness, brings the formal universal to this material, and in an external way purifies it out of its crudity."[49] On the basis of our acquaintance with Hegelian thought we immediately recognize the derogatory implication of "formal" in "formal universal," and of his attribution of externality to the rational integration of desires.

Let us proceed next to Hegel's postulation of an ethical ideal—

47. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 31 f.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

expressive of what Hegel called "the unlimited independence of our sensuous nature"—and to Hegel's conception of the relevant agency for its implementation.

> But these impulses are self-directing, crowding upon and jostling one another. . . . To set all but one in the background and put myself into this one is to limit and distort myself, since I, in so doing, renounce my universality, which is a system of all the impulses. Just as little help is found in a mere subordination of them, a course usually followed by the understanding. There is available no criterion to make such an arrangement.[50]

Hegel's idea then of "my universality" as the system of all impulses amounts to Hamann's ideal of "the unlimited independence of our sensuous nature." He realizes that such an ideal is not subject to an implementation by a rational principle. What then may be the nature of a non-rational agency of implementation? "But the truth of this formal universality, which taken by itself is undetermined and finds definite character in externally given material, is the self-directing universality which is will or freedom."[51]

Thus, in other words, it is the "given" actuality which constitutes the implementing agency, and this actuality is, of course, external to the moral agent. This actuality, furthermore, must correspond to the system of all impulses. The final cause, then, of the Hegelian scheme is that actuality which is permissive of the system of all impulses. In other words, the non-rational implementation of desires means that the moral agent finds a satisfaction in himself, and a realization beyond himself, of desires which do not find a rational integration in the form of responsible purposive overt activity of the individual personality, but receive overt realization in the "act" of the external agency. The reflective urge of the private individual is satisfied within the individual, and the desires realized outside the individual in an "emotional" grasp of the actual.[52] Instead of a rational implementation of desire and feeling eventuating by a conscious will and its responsible action into a sublimation of emotion into sentiment, with a correlative philosophy of values, we have an irrational implementation of desire.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
52. The mechanism involved here in this dualism between satisfaction and realization seems to me to be adequately treated by James and Dewey, when they distinguish between normal (emotion with object) and pathological (objectless emotion). *Psychological Review*, Vol. I (1894), p. 562.

Hegel presents us, in all the spheres and levels of being, with two complementary elements, which are potentials and contradictions in isolation and metaphysical entities of existence in conjunction. These two potential elements are the empirical, the particular, the existential, the subjective, and the individual on the one side, and the ideal, the universal, the conceptual, the objective, and the substantive on the other side. Now these two potential elements are conjoined by a necessary relation which is as universal as the two constituents of all metaphysical existence. This form of necessary relation is efficacious in realizing the two potentials, and in establishing consistency between the two contradictions by virtue of its character, which possesses in creative adjustment the characteristics of both elements. The type of unity into which it has resolved the characteristics of the opposites is a unifying process. It is the appetition, which "is at once the conceptual valuation of an immediate physical feeling combined with the urge towards realization of the datum, conceptually prehended."[53] The latter is the efficient, actualizing, realizing aspect.

"Appetition," by virtue of its structural-logical and its functional-efficient-actualizing aspect, can create entities, metaphysical units of existence which are inclusive of the empirical and the ideal, the particular and the universal, the existential and the conceptual, the subjective and the objective, the individual and the substantive. The character of this appetition is understood by its two characteristics, its attributes of "unification" and of "process." In its characteristic as "unification," "appetition" recognizes the two opposites; in its quality, its characteristic as "process," it is creative of the metaphysical unit of existence, dynamic "actuality." Its characteristic "unification" might be called "the characteristic" relevant to the cosmic purpose. Its characteristic "process" might be called relevant to the "primordial category" of creativity or will (this, to be sure, is not God, who is only a contradictory, or a special non-actualized instance in the cosmogony).

We propose to name this view of the "constant universal uniform aspect of the cosmic creation": dialectic experientialism; dialectic, because of the characteristic "unification," and experientialism, because of the characteristic "process."

Now the problem remains: in what sense is the emergent unity of

53. This is its logical structural aspect, the unity of the opposites, the establishment of consistent, necessary relation. See Whitehead, *loc. cit.*

the existence expressive of the "character" of dialectic experientialism, and in what sense are its two "characteristics" expressed, or, in Hegelian language, retained? It is obvious that the latter cannot be represented in the form of their original isolation; they are both modified by the "unification." Now the particular, individual, in its volitional aspect as desire becomes the impulsive; it is satisfied in itself, though not realized in itself. The universal and the objective in its functional aspect is the coercive, restraining, omnipotent, despotic—in short, the will, desire, efficacious, yet not realized in itself. Realization is in process; it is only a post- and not a pre-unification affair. Realization is in the form of the absolute will, which is the individual unified with the universal in the will, the concrete universal, which is the "common end," the relationship, the processual advance. "Process and relationship" is thus the final principle of intelligibilty. It is in process and relationship, the pursuit of the concrete universal, which is inclusive of the special instances, individual and universal, and which constitutes the end, the nature, common to both of them, that realization of the cosmos is attained. In the cosmology of Boehme we have the same appreciation of the necessity of "visible existence" in the process of cosmic realization, when he calls attention to the fact that we do cognize the nature of God in visible existence.

To be sure, Hegel's and Boehme's conceptions of God are fundamentally different, in so far as God, the Good, constitutes for Boehme the structure of the cosmos, whereas in Hegel the structure in its dialectic form is retentive of the evil moment. Actuality, which is here the realized ultimate category, is the outcome, then, of the experiential interaction of creativity and visible existence. Both creativity and visible existence, both the abstract universal will and the concrete particular are modified, qualified in the experiential interaction, as expressed in the term concrete universal, which is the absolute will. The character of this experiential process is dialectic, it unifies contradictories. In other words, the "principle of non-contradiction" has lost in the cosmic race of realization.

In conclusion we want to emphasize the fact that in the Hegelian scheme visible existence, or actuality in the colloquial sense, is not the ultimate realized category of cosmic creation. It is visible existence only when dialectically modified; when given structure by "appetition."

IV

It will have become obvious, I hope, that we have been in search of the Hegelian theory of value. This does not mean that we take the cosmological and metaphysical pronouncements simply as anthropomorphisms in the sense that they constitute cosmic projections of human experiences, which are of merely human relevance. The fact that they are human experiences, too, does not in itself invalidate their cosmic applicability. On the other hand, the question arises, whether these interpretations of genuine human experiences are expressions of the most perfect cosmic collocation of atoms which the human species in its present evolutionary stage is capable of producing, or, in other words, whether the record of these experiences is to be identified with the record of the most inclusive integration of the political, emotional, and rational activities of which the human species is capable.

The philosophy of value, which I believe underlies the Hegelian theory of sovereignty, seems to me to be derived from the Lutheran tradition, and seems to me to become intelligible in terms of the theory of dialectic experientialism. The fundamental points seem to be the notions of creativity, appetition, and actuality. Appetition seems to me to be equivalent to the notion of dialectic, and to provide the concatenation between creativity and visible existence.[54] The Hegelian social philosophy I consider, then, as the account of how the dialectic-appetition brings about the cosmic concatenation between the primary unrealized primordial "creativity" and the conscious, purposive human being. As it is well known, Hegel believed that this concatenation, this unification and realization occurred when the human agent was placed in the social nexus.

Let us then examine whether, indeed, the same patterns of integration and the same resultant categorical scheme can be recognized in social as in cosmic processes. If we take as a hypothesis the proposition that the social nexus constitutes in Hegel's scheme the integration of the cosmos and the human race, the question arises whether appetition in its characteristic as physical feeling, and in its characteristic as conceptual valuation, does indeed constitute the link which unifies the individual and the cosmos in the social nexus. The question arises whether the system of all impulses[55] and the correlative system of

54. Note that Royce called Hegelian dialectic the "logic of passion." *Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (Boston, 1892), p. 227.

55. Instance of "creativity."

fixed customs,[56] laws, and associations do, if dialectically integrated, exhibit the final cause of the cosmogonic process.

> The truth contained in this indefinite demand is that impulses should be phases of will in a rational system. To apprehend them in this way as proceeding from the conception is the content of the science of right. The content of this science may, in all its several elements, right, property, morality, family, state, be represented in this way that man has by nature the impulse to property, to morality, to sexual love, and to social life.[57]

In other words, impulse is always the basis of all activity, and as far as the individual is concerned, the satisfaction of his desire. The social order implements impulse with customs and laws. It is in the "state-relation" that the social process is finally integrated. Here the social order attains "actuality."

> The ethical theory of duties in their objective character is not comprised under the empty principle of moral subjectivity, in which, indeed, nothing is determined [meaning metaphysically real]. A duty or obligation appears as a limitation merely of undetermined subjectivity and abstract freedom, or of the impulse of the natural will, or of the moral will which fixes upon its undetermined good capriciously.[58] . . . Duty limits only the caprice of subjectivity, and comes into collision only with abstract good, with which subjectivity is so firmly allied. When men say we will to be free, they have in mind simply that abstract liberty, of which every definite organization in the state is regarded as a limitation. But duty is not a limitation of freedom, but only of the abstraction of freedom, that is to say, of servitude. In duty we reach the real essence, and gain positive freedom.[59]

"What a man ought to do, or what duties he should fulfill in order to be virtuous is in an ethical community not hard to say. He has to do nothing except what is presented, expressed, and recognized in his established relations."[60] That virtue does not mean perfection of the self in a moral sense, but that, on the contrary, this is anti-moral, is well expressed in the following passage: "In any present ethical circumstance, whose relations are fully developed and actualized, virtue in the strict sense has place and reality only when these relations come into collision. But genuine collisions are rare, although moral reflection can on the slightest provocation create them. It can also provide itself with the consciousness that, in order to fulfill its special mission, it

56. Instance of "visible existence."
57. Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 157 f.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 158 f.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

must make sacrifices."[61] Hegel relegates virtuous perfection to second rank. Then he is somewhat ashamed to own openly that virtue is of no import to the individual, and so he assigns it a certain place in the social nexus. But then his real intent comes out, and he derides the morally virtuous resentment of the objective injunctions of the social order. For, to be sure, when thinking of social obligation, Hegel thinks in terms of customs, laws, and political decrees, but not in terms of what we have called above the fundamental principles of social cohesion. These fundamental laws of social cohesion are continuous with genuine moral obligations. The moral conscience will not be coerced in a structurally integrated society to "provide itself with the consciousness that, in order to fulfill its special mission (i.e., obedience to the dictates of institutions and associations), it must make sacrifices."

Let us proceed to an examination of Hegel's conception that the authorities of the social order have a sanction which is particularly relevant to the cosmic process of creation.

> This ethical reality in its actual self-consciousness knows itself and is therefore an object of knowledge. It, with its laws and forces, has for the subject a real existence. In them he feels that he is himself, and in them, too, he lives as in an element indistinguishable from himself. This relation is more direct and intuitive than even faith or trust.
>
> *Note.*—Faith and trust belong to the beginning of reflection, presupposing picture thought and such discernment as [is implied in the judgment] that to believe in a heathen religion is different from being a heathen. The relation, or rather identity without relation, in which the ethical principle is the actual life of self-consciousness, can indeed be transformed into a relation of faith and conviction. By further reflection, also, it may pass into an insight based on reasons, which originate in some particular end, interest, or regard, in fear or hope, or in historical presuppositions. But the adequate knowledge of these belongs to the conception arrived at through thought.[62]

That the "relation is more direct and intuitive than even faith," explains why, in the relation between the individual and the state, the union, as such, is the end.

We cannot do better than conclude this exposition by a reproduction of Hegel's rejection of Rousseau's political philosophy, and by reproducing the political philosophy which he propounds as an antidote.

61. *Loc. cit.*
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 156 f.

The theory that the end of the social union is union as such seems to me to be again an exemplification of the Lutheran existential theory of salvation.

> Were the state to be considered as exchangeable with the civic society, and were its decisive features to be regarded as the security and protection of property and personal freedom, the interest of the individual as such would be the ultimate purpose of the social union. It would then be at one's option to be a member of the state. But the state has a totally different relation to the individual. It is the objective spirit, and he has his truth, real existence, and ethical status only in being a member of it. Union, as such, is itself the true content and end, since the individual is intended to pass a universal life. His particular satisfactions, activities, and way of life have in this authenticated substantive principle their origin and result.[63]

In the light of the foregoing analysis Hegel's postulation of a social process integrated according to the principles of dialectical experientialism foreshadows in idea the corporate "union" of the totalitarian societies.

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 240 f.

La Genèse des mythes. By Alexandre H. Krappe. Paris: Payot, 1938. 359 pp. 8 plates. Fr. 50.

This book is intended as a synthesis of the various systems of belief described by Professor Krappe in his *Mythologie Universelle*, published in 1930. He disclaims any attempt to advance a theory, dogma, or system, nor does he purport to write a compilation or encyclopedia. It is not easy, however, for a general treatment to avoid both at the same time. One cannot escape the feeling that he is reading a compilation or handbook to mythology, in which the discussion is organized according to ostensible subjects of the myths, rather than underlying processes and problems.

The emphasis on abstaining from thesis and dogma may be a reaction against the theorizing, and over-theorizing, that has made the field of comparative mythology often a barren one. Some of the author's tenets should perhaps be understood in this light. The definition of a myth stresses deities, and not the supernatural: «Dans l'usage grec, comme dans le moderne, le terme désigne un récit où les divinités (au sens le plus large du mot) jouent un ou plusieurs des rôles principaux.» This has a certain advantage in view of the difficulty of defining the supernatural, but it is awkward for other reasons. Gods may be considered merely as a special formulation of the supernatural; to single them out as a diagnostic feature in a general study of religion or mythology seems hardly warranted. In many mythologies the animal trickster, the demi-god culture-hero, and the Creator are intermingled, and the myth motives cannot with certainty be ascribed to either of these figures exclusively.

The insistence on individual authorship of myths is somewhat dogmatic. «Tout mythe, . . . est le produit d'un homme ou tout au plus de deux ou trois hommes, . . .» is a reaction against the outmoded theory of "communal origins" in traditional literature. If the essential aspects of traditional (oral) literature are considered—that the creator is not necessarily distinct from the story-teller or singer, and that consequently literary forms are in a state of constant flux—the controversy of individual versus communal origin resolves itself. Students of comparative literature or folksong like Mr. Phillips Barry and Professor Louise Pound developed the concept of "communal recreation" to cover this point.

Another tenet is that the poet more than the priest is the creator of myths. The poet-priest antithesis does not seem fruitful, however, as soon as we think of shamans and medicine-men in societies where we cannot speak of an organized priesthood. They are the official intermediaries between man and the supernatural, and they are often poets and creators or carriers of mythological tradition. The role of the poet-creator becomes somewhat confusing in the light of subsequent statements that intellect rather than the subconscious enters into the construction of myths, that myths are at first purely intellectual and literal, and that symbolism or allegory are "later."

As for the function of a myth, we are told that it always attempts to explain something. Yet, one might ask, what does the *Odyssey* explain? It has been shown that the explanatory element in folktales and myths is often the most fluid, most *ad hoc,* most unstable element.

At times statements tend to be put down with more force than the evidence might warrant. It is rather speculative to assume that myths about the sufferings of the condemned (Sisyphus, Tantalus, Tityos) originated in erroneous efforts to explain already existing pictorial or sculptured representations whose original meaning was quite different. Monotheism is presented as late; yet Father W. Schmidt has shown that among some tribes which have the simplest mode of organization and culture there are single supreme gods. That women are more inclined to religious practices than men is not supported by primitive material, which if anything suggests the contrary. Nor do we have conclusive evidence that lunar mythology is older than solar.

Many of the source-references used for pre-literate or so-called primitive peoples go back to the period between 1860 and 1880. Since that time we have had a mass of detailed observation with which the older literature cannot compare qualitatively, quantitatively, or methodologically. It is regrettable that the treatment leaves out of consideration most of the discussion of primitive religion and ritual by contemporary anthropologists. The main sources employed are such monumental compilations as Sir James Frazer's works and Briffault's *Mothers,* but there is no mention of the studies of scholars like Marett, Durkheim, Rivers, Lévy-Bruhl, Lowie, Radin, Malinowski in religion; or of Boas, Radin, Benedict, and others in mythology.

Most "comparative" studies in literature, religion, and related fields are badly handicapped in that a disproportionate initial effort is spent on classical antiquity and the oriental high civilizations. Extensions into

the "semi-civilized" or "savage" field are tentative, erratic, and are seldom based on a full appreciation of the historical and social backgrounds. The present book is no exception. It seems to suffer especially because the connection of mythology with ritual and religion is surprisingly underrated, the cultural setting of the myths is not treated consistently, and the literary problems are barely touched upon. The enumeration in the subtitle itself reflects the wake of the school of nature symbolism, although the exaggerations of that school are dispensed with: Le ciel et la terre—Le soleil—La lune—Les étoiles—Mythes atmosphériques—Mythes volcaniques—Les eaux—Mythes chthoniens—Les démiurges—Les cosmogonies—L'homme—Les cataclysmes—Mythes historiques. Nevertheless the book makes good reading. It is a useful digest and an introduction into the material of mythology, especially that of classical and oriental cultures, and it acquaints the reader with some of the theoretical battles which have been fought on that territory. It is a storehouse of facts and tempting observations upon detail; there are many stimulating ideas concerning the subject, and a case is made out for most, if not all, dicta. Its chief contribution undoubtedly will be to the classical or literary scholar, but the amount of knowledge and *esprit* that went into making this book can be appreciated also by those in other fields.

George Herzog

Columbia University

What Was the Original Gospel in "Buddhism"? By Mrs. Rhys Davids. London: Epworth Press: 1938. 144 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*

Indian Realism. By Jadunath Sinha. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1938. xvi + 287 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*

With sufficient good will one may, perhaps, justify the lumping of these two books in one review. For though very different in content, aim, and method, they are, at least, both about Buddhism, one of them dealing with the origin of the Hinayana, the other with the early thought of the Mahayana.

Mrs. Rhys Davids' position as to the probable message of Gotama and its relation to the Hinayana Canon in its present form, and to the doctrines held by modern Buddhists of the Southern Lands, she has expressed in six or seven recent volumes preceding this. It is probably familiar in outline to many readers of this *Review*. In the present

book, however, she has summarized her position and concentrated her arguments in a form which is perhaps more forceful, and certainly more brief and comprehensive, than in any of her earlier presentations.

It is easy to say that our only source of knowledge of the Founder's teachings is the present Canon, and that to attribute to Gotama other teachings than those found in it is to build, not on evidence, but on imagination, and perhaps on the will-to-believe. But before dismissing Mrs. Rhys Davids' position so cavalierly, it is well to consider the following facts: the Hinayana Canon as we have it today was committed to writing in the first century B.C.; before that it had been handed down orally, from generation to generation, during the four hundred years and more since the Buddha's death; this transmission had been wholly in the hands of the Buddhist monks; the oldest books of the Canon were put in their present form (in the oral tradition) about B.C. 380, before which time, without question, they had suffered considerable modification in the process of transmission. The fact that this transmission, with its accompanying modification, was entirely in the hands of the monastically-minded is not without significance. Furthermore, a number of the teachings that one finds in the present Canon are of the sort which one can well understand Indian monks to have prized, but which would be very unlikely to make the wide and stirring appeal to the lay mind that we know the Founder's teachings did make. Among such teachings are the following: there is no real self—a man is merely body, and a collection of ephemeral psychological pulses or qualities; there is no God or Absolute—merely a number of rather unfortunate and partly deceived *devatas* or spirits, superhuman in power, but with less insight than a good Buddhist; since there is no real self, there is no real transmigration, and the best one can hope for is a final fading-out of consciousness; the chief aim of life and of religion is to get rid of desire—the ideal is the man who wants nothing; being is unfortunate and becoming is worse. Certainly in the Canon as we have it today, there are other and finer teachings and ideals; but it is hard to see how a teaching which contained and emphasized the matters indicated above could ever have set even India on fire, as the Founder's words (whatever they may have been) certainly did. This being the situation, the hypothesis is not unreasonable nor far to seek, that the Pali Canon,

and still more the actual teaching of Southern Buddhism throughout the Indian Middle Ages and today, goes back indeed to the Founder, but has been "sicklied o'er" with the pale cast of monastic preferences and interpretations.

That such is the case is Mrs. Rhys Davids' mature conviction. However, she does not base her opinion merely on the a priori considerations suggested above, but upon a life-long study of the Pali Canon, in which she believes there are indications of subtractions, additions, and misleading implications.

Perhaps the most important of these modifications is on the fundamental question of the self. The traditional *anatta*, or no-self doctrine, is accepted today by all schools of Southern Buddhism, and verbally, at least, by a majority of the Northern Buddhists. Nearly all Buddhists believe it to be the teaching of Gotama as expounded in the Canon; yet an examination of the passages in which Gotama is presented as dealing with this problem shows that the more important of them obviously imply the very reverse of the *anatta* doctrine. The other matters in which Mrs. Rhys Davids believes the Pali Canon misrepresents the Founder's teachings are not so clear, and her conclusions are sometimes based on very slight evidence. Yet the following questions should give defenders of the traditional view food for thought: If the Buddha's ideal was essentially peace, inactivity, passive contemplation, and an eventual "waning out" even from such passive existence, why is there in his teachings, as preserved in the Pali Canon, such emphasis upon becoming and active willing (even though the Pali had no specific word for will)? If Gotama was an atheist, and despised and pitied the deities of the land, why did he ascribe part of his new insight to inspiration from them? If he held the pessimistic opinion of life attributed to him, and considered birth and rebirth, here or in the heavenly worlds, a woe, why did he promise some of his disciples a happy rebirth here, and describe not infrequently, the happy fate in other worlds of comrades who had passed on thither; and why did both he and his disciples so enthusiastically dwell upon the joy of their blissful days?

One might considerably lengthen the list of questions. The truth seems to be that the evidence in our hands is not sufficient to solve the problem of what Gotama really taught, and doubtless we must go slowly with our guesses. But there are many, many passages in our

texts, monk-modified as they doubtless are, which should set the student of Buddhism on enquiry—very serious enquiry—before he accepts the traditional view (traditional in both east and west) as to the original teaching of the Buddha.

The second book under review differs considerably, as has been said, from that of Mrs. Rhys Davids', in both content, aim, and method. The western reader who plunges into it should first take a long breath. No time is wasted on mere ceremony or formal introduction: the writer gets down to business at once. The first sentence reads: "Madhavacarya gives the following account of the Yogacara idealism in Savadarśanasamgraha." Perhaps it is as well the reader should be not troubled with details as to Madhavacarya, and his Savadarśanasamgraha, but surely the author does the western public an undeserved compliment in supposing that they will all know that the Yogacara (about which the entire volume centers) was one of the earlier schools of Mahayana Buddhism. Not a hint of this is given the reader, nor of the place which the school occupied in the development of Buddhist thought. Perhaps a word or two should be said in this place to put matters in their setting.

During the first or second century A.D., Hinayana Buddhism split into several slightly differing schools of thought. Practically all of these were realistic in their epistemology. One of these, the Sautrantikas, worked out a theory of indirect perception and proposed a representative theory of knowledge. The position taken by this school led to the establishment of the Madhyamika doctrine, which is usually taken to mark the beginning of the Mahayana. This school substituted for realism a thorough-going nihilism. It was in answer to this nihilistic interpretation of the world that Asanga and his subtle-minded brother founded the school of thought known as Yogacara, whose most important doctrine, so far as our present interest is concerned, was a carefully thought-out subjective idealism. It states explicitly that there is no physical world: only "cognitions" (as Mr. Sinha translates) are real. These cognitions are all momentary and run in series. Some of them are common to all members of a group of "persons," and these shared images are known as physical objects; other cognitions are peculiar to individuals, such as dream images, and these are recognized by all as purely subjective. In fact, of course, *all* are purely subjective. The Yogacara, like Berkeley, rejects solipsism and be-

lieves in many individual streams of cognitions. Unlike Berkeley, however, the Yogacara denies the reality of selves, sticking faithfully to the *anatta* doctrine. Like Berkeley it realizes the necessity of an explanation for the rise of perceptual cognitions, in the absence of a physical world, but unlike Berkeley it recognizes no God. Instead of attributing human perceptions to God, it insists that it discovers underneath the flow of percepts and ideas a stream or reservoir of subconscious dispositions—the *alayavijñana*—which is neither God nor self, but which, as a fact, in later developments of the Mahayana, developed into something very like an idealistic Absolute.

The arguments presented in Indian philosophy for and against this subjective idealism fill Mr. Sinha's volume. Not that they are very numerous, but that our author, in careful scholarly fashion, has expounded each argument in favor of this view, first as the Yogacara writers themselves have presented it, and then (at equal length), as it is presented by each of the opposing schools—the Sautrantikas, the Jainas, the upholders of Sankhya and Yoga, of the Mimansa, Nyaya, and Vaiśesika philosophies, and finally by Śankara, Ramanuja, and other Vedantists. This exposition is, in each case, accompanied by an equally careful presentation of the criticisms of Yogacara urged by the various non-subjective schools. This scholarly method of presentation, while it makes the volume useful as a reference book, results in a good deal of repetition.

Most of the arguments in favor of and against the subjective idealism of the Yogacara, are familiar in the west; in fact, a perusal of this Indian controversy which took place in the first thirteen centuries of our era, brings back vividly the type of question and of argument in England and America during the early years of the present century, while idealism was being attacked, and the various schools of "new" and "critical" realism were formulating their doctrines. Some of the arguments, however, are not entirely familiar. One consideration that these Indian subjectivists made much of was the difficulty of conceiving the realist's physical object either as composed of atoms, or as the reverse. It must be composed of atoms, they argued, yet atoms are not perceivable, and the alleged physical objects which we do see cannot be conceived as similar to atoms. Hence, what we see is merely our own percepts. Moreover, the perception of the object and the existence of the percept are invariably simultaneous; hence there is no reason for supposing that two existences are here involved. We

know the reality of the subjective precept, and we have no evidence of any simultaneous duplicate. If the alleged physical object and the percept or "cognition" are not identical, they can have no relation: "the object would never enter into relationship with the cognition and consequently would never be perceived. If the object and the cognition were essentially different from each other they would never come into connection with each other"—a way of putting the matter which will remind the Western reader of a famous argument by Royce. "The object which is known by an act of knowledge must be identical with it." For "the object can never be known by a cognition if it differs from it. Identity is the condition of knowability." In cognition one form, not two, is apprehended; and this must be the form of the cognition. Plainly different percepts or cognitions have different forms. To assume, in addition, external objects possessing just these forms would be unnecessary and absurd. "Though we speak of the cognition of blue, the cognition of yellow and the like, as if blue, yellow and the like, were distinct from cognitions, yet they are not really distinct from them. It is the very nature of cognitions to manifest themselves as cognitions of blue, yellow, and the like, though there are no external objects independent of them."

The various opposing schools respond to these arguments in much the same fashion as the realists of our day have replied to Berkeley and his followers. The identity of blue with the cognition of blue is denied in much the same fashion as Mr. Moore denied it in his famous paper in *Mind* in 1903. Most of the realistic schools except the Sautrantika maintain a doctrine of direct perception somewhat like that of the English New Realism and the American Neo-realism—though still maintaining the dualism of mental and physical. The Mimansa carries this theory to the same extent as Mr. Laird, insisting upon the direct apprehension of the past. One of the most significant replies to the Yogacara argument is that made by both Kumarila and Śankara, to the effect that cognition is an act, and hence has no form and cannot cognize itself. "If the cognition were self-luminous it would appear in such a form as 'I am blue,' and not as 'this is blue'. Consciousness is different from self-consciousness." "A cognition is not perceived but is inferred from the cognizedness of the object." "Consciousness is common to different cognitions: the difference in their content is due to the difference in their objects."

The subtlety and the essentially modern quality of these ancient

Indian thinkers can be appreciated only by a detailed study of them, or of a book like this of Mr. Sinha's. And not only will the modern tone of these ancient controversies and writings be surprising to many western readers, but even more readers will probably find it something of a revelation to learn how large a portion of Indian philosophy during its years of busiest production was realistic rather than idealistic in epistemology. To be sure, not all the opponents of the Yogacara were realists: Śankara and his school of the Vedanta are commonly catalogued as idealists. But Vedantic idealism is not subjectivism or mentalism. For it the physical world is not idea, nor is its *esse percipi*. Just what it is, to be sure, has never been sufficiently revealed; but the Vedanta is at least clear that it is not what the Yogacara and Berkeley thought it. Ramanuja and his school of Vedanta seem to have returned to an acknowledged realism. And all the other schools to which reference has been made in this review were realistic without any reservations.

Mr. Sinha has given us a scholarly and remarkably clear presentation of a complicated subject. All of us who are interested in the history of Indian thought are in his debt.

James Bissett Pratt

Williams College

Die Jesaja-Apokalypse; Jes. 24-27. By Joh. Lindblom. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1938. (Lunds Universitets Årsskrift. N. F. Avd. 1. Bd. 34, Nr. 3.) 122 pp. 4 Kr.

The four chapters of Isaiah, which are universally recognized as an independent section of the book, and to which Dr. Lindblom devotes his attention in this excellent study, have provided an opportunity for many critics of the Old Testament to indulge in characteristic excesses. Among these, probably the most exasperating is the use of arbitrary and often mutually inconsistent textual emendations to force the material into a Procrustean bed of preconceived theory. So, for example, E. Sievers, in his *Alttestamentliche Miscellen I. Jesaias 24-27*, attempts to show the late date of these chapters by proving, by means of lines containing his own emendations, that they follow the unusual metric pattern of seven stresses to the line. Sievers, indeed, could point to some apparently legitimate "sevens"; in the light of Robinson's later studies in Hebrew metrics, however, it seems more likely that these are normal lines preceded by anacrusis.

Sievers used his marvelously-begotten "sevens" to prove the unity of these chapters and the late date of their composition. His follower, Procksch, in *Jesaias I*, published as recently as 1930, recognizes Sievers' "sevens" in those sections of the so-called Apocalypse which deal with the judgment of the world and with the kingdom of the future; this segment he dates in the third century B.C. In those parts which treat of the destruction of a world-renowned city, however, Proksch can discover only normal lines; this section he considers *later* than the other, conceiving it to have been composed in celebration of the destruction of Carthage by the Romans in B.C. 146. His emendations "prove" that these chapters were not originally a unity; he claims them, rather, as an amalgam of two poems written at different times. Thus doctors disagree.

The work of these two scholars has been noted at such length in order to give point to Lindblom's assertion that he is a conservative. He says:

> In textual criticism, I take a somewhat conservative position; that is, in this respect: I have approached the Massoretic Text with far greater trust than has generally been its portion in the past. I have thereby remained true to a basic principle which I have presented in my lectures for many years. Naturally, the Massoretic Text must not be considered and treated as sacrosanct. However, with patience and good-will on the one hand, and with sufficient attention to the corrections of experts in Semitics on the other, one can, indeed, in many cases, derive from the Massoretic Text far more than seemed possible at first glance (p. 10).

Lindblom further avows himself a practitioner of the type of criticism developed by Gunkel and Begrich, notably in their *Einleitung in die Psalmen*. In this method, various mutually exclusive literary types to be found in the Old Testament are defined in terms of a minute analysis of their content. Its fault is that the definitions are somewhat too rigorously narrow, which will lead eventually to an unnecessary and unwieldy multiplicity of types. For the moment, however, it is an extremely serviceable technique, and a bulwark against the advancing tide of emendators. Lindblom's use of this method renders metric analysis of limited value, as an auxiliary in exegesis and textual criticism.

The book has a double purpose: to gain a thorough understanding of the literary nature of the Isaiah "Apocalypse" and to study its historical background. Lindblom starts with an elaborate, and, for the most part, convincing essay in exegesis, based largely on the sug-

gestions of Kittel, Gray, and Rudolph. The thoroughness of the author is indicated in the fact that even Vitringa, a late seventeenth century commentator of no great stature, is canvassed for suggestive material.

Employing a division of the chapters into sections which differ in many respects from those adhered to by previous scholars, Lindblom next shows that the present redaction consists of one set of poems with eschatological subjects, and another set of songs of thanksgiving or jubilation, non-eschatologic in character, and having as their subject the destruction, not by the Jews, of a world-renowned, hostile city. Individual poems from these sequences were originally arranged alternately, not as a liturgy, since they do not fit exactly the specifications in the Gunkel-Begrich definition of a liturgy, but as a cantata for a festive occasion. The present form, however, includes three late eschatological notes and one lamentation, interspersed by the editor in such a way as to confuse the original pattern. The content of the three notes proves their late date; internal evidence is adduced to show that the lamentation is also late, dating from the post-Exilic period of greatest territorial expansion, about B.C. 145.

The entire cantata differs from these late accretions in that its vocabulary is marked by parallelisms with Isaiah, and in that its general attitude is that of the prophets. Lindblom's deduction is, therefore, that it was written in the time of the prophets, by one of the prophets connected with the Jerusalem cultus.

The finest portion of the monograph is that which deals with the identification of the destroyed city, and, by extension, with the dating of the chapters under consideration. After criticizing other theories and showing precisely wherein each fails in some way to meet the conditions set forth in the text, Lindblom proves by means of recently discovered inscriptions that, as many others had surmised, the city in question must have been Babylon; the destroyer, however, he shows to have been the Persian King, Xerxes I, and not Cyrus or Darius, as had been suggested; the date of Xerxes' campaign was B.C. 485. An interesting sidelight is that these inscriptions substantiate passages in Strabo, Herodotus, and Arrian upon which suspicion had been cast. It is noteworthy that, allowing for poetic hyperbole, the account in the Isaiah cantata parallels in all particulars the results of the attack by Xerxes, as detailed in the inscriptions and in the ancient chroniclers.

The four chapters have been regarded by almost all recent commentators as apocalyptic, despite the warning of Skinner, in his edition of Chapters 1-39 of Isaiah in the Cambridge Bible, that "there has perhaps been a tendency to exaggerate this feature; if we compare the passage with a typical apocalypse, like the book of Daniel, the differences are certainly more striking than the resemblances" (1909 edition, p. 179). Lindblom's analysis by the Gunkel-Begrich method proves conclusively that technically these chapters do not constitute an apocalypse. It may be objected that his definition limits too greatly the concept of an apocalypse. The course of the argument nullifies this criticism. That the cantata includes speculations in eschatology cannot be denied; but the apocalyptic literature drew its material from the prophets, as well as from foreign cults and popular superstitions, and is apocalyptic not so much in its eschatological content as it is in the specific and highly characteristic applications of this content, such as its pessimistic theory of history, its dualism, and its pseudomanticism. If the three eschatological notes be regarded as late additions, the remaining speculations are such as can be found in Micah, in Jeremiah, in Ezekiel, and in other parts of the book of Isaiah.

Dr. Lindblom's study is sage, moderate, and satisfying. It justifies the use of the Gunkel-Begrich method of analysis into literary types by one whose equipment enables him to see over and beyond its close confines. In the nature of things, the last word cannot be said on a biblical theme. This is, at the least, penultimate.

Joseph L. Blau

New York City

La Clé de l'Apocalypse, étude sur la composition et l'interprétation de la grande prophétie de St Jean. By André Olivier. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1938. 210 pp. Fr. 125.

A Roman Catholic exegetist is obliged to adopt a reverent attitude toward Tradition. One cannot then be surprised by the subtitle of this study. But M. l'Abbé Olivier publishes a treatise which claims to be the key to the Book of Revelation. He asserts that his discovery —"of great importance" (p. 10)—demonstrates the unity of the composition of the book.[1] Emphasizing the well-known fact that the six

1. He minimizes too readily the value of the theories proposed by the literary critics in showing that they contradict each other (Renan, Gunkel, Bousset, Boll,

main parts of the Apocalypse are of about the same length, he ventures to state that they have been composed according to a uniform frame of a certain number of grammatical elements. This figure is strictly the same for each of the six main parts and is found in the numerical value of the Greek name of Jesus which is carefully described in the Sibylline books as eight-hundred and eighty-eight.[2] He therefore divides each of the main six parts of the Apocalypse into 888 grammatical elements.

It is true that the author of the Book of Revelation is acquainted with this type of arithmetical speculation. It is hardly necessary to recall that the number of the name of the Beast is six-hundred and sixty-six. It is equally true that a tradition of arithmetical exegesis existed in the early Christian Church, but sound minds pointed out the conjectural character of such attempts of interpretation. Augustine gives a warning: "Unskillfulness in matter of numbers prevents the understanding of many figures and mysteries of the Scripture. . . ."[3] It is strange that Olivier finds here, on the contrary, an encouragement to manifest his skill.

Indeed, this system would explain certain peculiarities of the style, such as its lack of subordinate clauses (and consequently an abusive use of the co-ordinating conjunction), also many prolix enumerations, a repetition of certain expressions, an abusive use of the article, many solecisms, and even some tautologies (pp. 18-23). An author who must conform the expression of his ideas to a set pattern can be forgiven many incoherences of style. But in the mind of the reviewer the system proposed by Olivier encounters several difficulties.

First, one cannot help thinking that the grammatical elements as they appear in Olivier's book (pp. 62-137), have been detected without any precise criterion. Their length varies from one word (Rev. 1; 1, 2, 3, etc.) to eight (Rev. 13: 13); sometimes a noun is separated

Reitzenstein, Loisy, etc.). Since it has been pointed out that, after all, the Book of Revelation had been written by a Christian for Christian people, trends of a conservative reaction are becoming apparent. Today, many accept the unity of authorship (Swete, Allo, Charles, Loisy, Wilhemze, Lohmeyer, Zahn, etc.), but the unity of composition has not yet been demonstrated. Even Roman Catholic scholars accept the hypothesis of the fragments. Allo is inclined to admit that the scenes of the "harvest" and the "vintage" (Rev. 14: 14, 20) have been borrowed from a Hebrew document, *Commentaire sur l'Apocalypse* (Paris, 1933), p. clxxxvii. Charles proposes the theory of the "unintelligent editor," responsible for many interpolations.

2. I Sibylline, ll. 324-331.

3. *De doctrina christiana*, II, XVI, 25.

from the genitive which accompanies it (Rev. 6: 9), sometimes this genitive is retained in the same grammatical element without any consideration of the meaning or of the quantity of the syllables (Rev. 7: 4). The co-ordinating conjunction by itself always constitutes a grammatical element, but it is possible to find many grammatical elements which are made up of a whole subordinate clause with conjunction, subject and verb, etc. (Rev. 11: 8). These are only examples of many inconsistencies. One can easily imagine Olivier puzzling around with the text, changing the place of a break here and there, trying "à tout prix" to divide each of his six parts into 888 elements. One might as well work this method on a Shakespearian tragedy with the same result.

There is another difficulty. Olivier seems aware of it and cannot entirely conceal his embarrassment (p. 23). Besides the division into elements, he proposes another distinction within the text: a strophic arrangement, framed by certain groups of pericopes. Each stanza has the invariable number of three lines, and each pericope groups forty or thirty stanzas. Each of the six main parts of the entire book consists of eight, ten or twelve pericopes. A synoptical table will give a more precise idea of this elaborate division:

Parts:[4]	*pericopes*	*strophes*	*lines*
I. Messages to the Churches (1-3)	10	40	120
II. First vision into Heaven (4-7)	12	30	90
III. Vision of the Trumpets (8-11)	8	30	90
IV. Second vision into Heaven (12-15)	12	30	90
V. Vision of the Cups (16-17)	8	30	90
VI. Vision of the Triumph (18-22)	10	40	120
Totals: 6	60	200	600

What is the significance of such an arrangement? 600 lines, 60 pericopes, 6 main parts—very well, here it is, 666, the famous number of the Beast which has made already so much ink flow.[5] It is superfluous to point out that Olivier does not use in his account the total of the stanzas, this unwanted number 200. . . . And there is another significant fact. In establishing his division into stanzas and pericopes, he uses the whole Book of Revelation, the Epilogue included (Rev. 22: 6-21). He

4. With the indication of the chapters in the Apocalypse.

5. Cf. a witty lecture by Maurice Goguel, *L'actualité de l'Apocalypse* (Paris, 1921), pp. 10-11, where several fantastic interpretations are recalled.

carefully avoids mentioning in his first table that the Epilogue is excluded when he computes the famous 888 grammatical elements (p. 15), and the reader is informed of it by a discrepancy between two synoptic tables (p. 23, nos. 2 and 3).[6] A following paragraph tries to explain this "peculiarity which might be a surprise": It might have been almost impossible, in such a laborious composition to "cover up" exactly the two numbers 888 for the elements, and 666 for the strophes (p. 23).

Olivier reconstructs the lines, not according to the rhythm of the sentences,[7] but according to the value given to certain words which oblige the break of the lines, and which in a single line may be used as pivot-words. This is the method of the "catenary key-word." It has the advantage that it explains quite satisfactorily the various grammatical peculiarities mentioned above. Certain inversions (Rev. 11: 1, 2), several repetitions from one clause to another (Rev. 5: 1, 2), and many errors of agreement postulate the disjunction of two clauses into different lines (Rev. 4: 1). On the other hand, certain words imply by their repetition a linking of the clauses (Rev. 1: 5; 3: 12; 12: 9; etc.). Therefore, it is possible to follow the passage from one line to another, to group the lines together, and gradually to discern the whole strophic system. The classification of the different types of "key-words" is interesting. But it might be asked what is the reason for the great variety in the length of the lines.[8] Olivier answers that the author of the Apocalypse might have used a papyrus of relatively wide proportions[9] and that there is no disproportion from one line to another within the same stanza. On the contrary, a rapid glance at the text shows many disproportions of this kind. A single stanza has lines of respectively thirty-one, twenty-one and four words (Rev. 10: 5). Another shows lines of six, eight and twenty-two words (Rev. 7: 7), and the like.

Olivier does not seem to be surprised by the fact that he could not find in the text itself any relation between the arrangements of the invariable three-line strophe and the beautiful 888 grammatical ele-

6. The Epilogue is divided into 180 elements which have no significance for the system.

7. It has long been known that the processes of composition in oriental writings were entirely different from those of Greco-Latin literary works.

8. From 14 to 40 grammatical elements, or even more.

9. Nineteen feet, 8 inches in length, 15¾ inches in width.

ments.[10] In order to present his discovery Olivier reprints the text of Westcott and Hort in a special typographical presentation "with some modifications necessitated by the computation of elements and the strophic system" (p. 61), but he does not indicate his method of interpolation.

For the questions of commentary, translation and general interpretation which form the last part of his work, Olivier follows Allo.[11] Besides the letters to the Churches (first part), the chronology of the Apocalypse is dominated by the three fundamental visions of the victory of the Church over Rome (second and third parts), the struggles of the Church (fourth and fifth parts) and the final triumph (sixth part). The value of the visions and the symbols is not to be found in their precise details and their historical or geographical allusions, but in their "idée profonde." Olivier avoids and stigmatizes the fantastic interpretations which are still flourishing today. His moderation in this matter deserves praise. On the whole, the original part of this study is ingenious, but it needs further demonstration.

S. L. Terrien

College of Wooster

Jesus. By Charles Guignebert. Translated from the French by S. H. Hooke. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935. xviii + 563 pp. $6.00.

The Mission and Message of Jesus: An Exposition of the Gospels in the Light of Modern Research. By H. D. A. Major, T. W. Manson, and C. J. Wright. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1938. xxxi + 966 pp. + 1 map. $5.00.

Christian Beginnings. By Morton Scott Enslin. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1938. ix + 533 pp. $3.75.

The Peril of Modernizing Jesus. By Henry J. Cadbury. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. vii + 216 pp. $2.00.

These four books represent the fruits of recent liberal and radical scholarship in New Testament study. Only Guignebert applies his material directly to a reconstruction of the life of Jesus, but all of them deal with the problems presented by the sources and attempt to evaluate them from the historical point of view.

10. Except that the pericopes contain always a number of grammatical elements which is a multiple of 3.

11. *Op. cit.* One important difference: Olivier does not apply to the entire book the theory of the Recapitulation, accepted by Allo, rejected by Charles.

Guignebert's *Jesus* is an example of radical scholarship at its best. It is an attempt to stay within the canons of natural history in the reconstruction of all the episodes. It restricts the available material entirely to certain primitive elements of the synoptic tradition, and some scholars may feel that he fails to do justice to some of the matter peculiar to Matthew and Luke. The book is beautifully and persuasively written. At times a certain anti-clerical bias seems to be evident in the handling of particular passages, or he introduces norms which have not been definitely stated, and these norms color his interpretations of some particulars which might otherwise prove embarrassing to his central thesis. He is quite right in his assumption that the beliefs about Jesus influence the biographical sketches in the gospels, but it is possible that he ascribes too much to hagiography. For the scholar, the bibliography will prove invaluable, for it is well selected, is topically arranged, is in four languages, and presents all points of view. The index is good.

The Mission and Message of Jesus, by three English modernists, including the great editor of the *Modern Churchman*, is a fine commentary on the gospels. The guiding light of this book is primarily historical, but the liberal theology of the writers seems to this reviewer to condition many of the conclusions. Some statements are extremely reactionary, e.g., both the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse are ascribed to the Apostle John (p. 253). The bibliographies are good but brief, and they do not always take into account recent writings of importance. Except when referring to scriptural passages, it is difficult to find specific topics. A good cross-index is needed. There is some diversity among the writers, with Dr. Manson's section representing more recent opinions. The general introduction is written by Dr. Major, dealing with the historical value of the gospels in the light of modern research. Book I, by Dr. Major, treats the "Incidents in the Life of Jesus," including all of Mark and harmony, and the narrative incidents peculiar to Matthew and Luke. In Book II, Dr. Manson deals with the reconstruction of *Q* in Luke, and the teaching matter found only in Matthew and Luke. This section is exceedingly valuable. Book III, by Dr. Wright, is a commentary on the Fourth Gospel, in which he shows a great understanding of its religious value; but it is unfortunate that more is not said about the social and religious conditions which determined the radical reinterpretation of the message of

Jesus found there. This modern, non-technical, and topical commentary will be of permanent value, not only to scholars but to laymen as well.

Enslin's *Christian Beginnings* is a text book which can be used with advanced undergraduate and seminary students. The author has definite conclusions about his material, and sometimes they are not consistent with the general trend of scholarship, but they are scholarly. The views of others are always presented. The book is divided into three sections, one on backgrounds, one on the beginnings of the gospel story, and the last and largest on specific New Testament introduction. There is no particular theological bias, the style is good, and the chapters (although of uneven length) are usually adequate. There is no bibliography, because the author believes that every teacher wants to give his own, but it would have been a helpful addition.

Cadbury's *Peril of Modernizing Jesus* is a popular treatise which warns against the tricks of most biographers of Jesus. It shows the means by which we may protect ourselves and come to an understanding of the historical Jesus. While some of the positive statements are open to question, and more documentary evidence would be helpful, it represents the best fruits of modern scholarship and can be wholeheartedly recommended to laymen.

These four books disagree on many details, but in their treatment of the life and teachings of Jesus a general picture develops which might be called, tentatively, "Jesus according to New Testament scholarship." Treating these books topically, some suggestions can be made as to how we may think of the life and significance of Jesus.

I. SOURCES

According to Guignebert, the pagan and Jewish records have no value in throwing light on the life of Jesus. They would not even assure us that Jesus actually lived. The Pauline letters also give us no information, for Paul "has deliberately sacrificed Jesus to Christ" (p. 25). Early Christians were not very much interested in the details of the life of Jesus, and all that gives any evidence of value is to be found hidden in the sources of the synoptic gospels. Mark is dated about A.D. 75, Matthew between 85 and 90, and Luke between 100 and 110. These dates do not include later minor modifications. While Mark is the earliest of the gospels, "today all liberal critics admit that

Mark is a composite work" (p. 36). So Guignebert accepts the *Urmarcus* theory, and dates that writing about A.D. 60-65. It may have been written in Aramaic. We know little about it, but it "is almost the sole source of our knowledge of the life of Jesus" (p. 41). He also accepts the *Q* hypothesis, but little can be found out about the life of Jesus from this source. It is only from a critical use of these two doubtful sources that we can regain anything of probability concerning Jesus. The use of *Formgeschichtliche Methode* is "only a special and somewhat limited application of historical method. It has not revolutionized anything, it has filled a gap, and it is the historical method itself which remains, on the whole, our sole hope, when textual and philological criticism has said its last word" (p. 62).

Dr. Major begins the book by the English modernists by taking to task the Christ-Myth school, the Form-Criticism school (which denies the chronological order of Mark), the Jewish Prophet school (which denies Jesus' messiahship), and the eschatological school (which would deny most of the originality of Jesus' teachings). Mark is dated before A.D. 70, and Papias' statement about Mark's chronological order is to be doubted, because Papias already knew and accepted the different order of the Fourth Gospel. We may rely, then, on Mark's chronology, for it is based mainly on Peter's reminiscences. With two possible exceptions, it is a literary unity by John Mark. Matthew is dated about A.D. 80, and Luke after 70. Dr. Manson, in the middle portion of the book, dates *Q* as probably just before 50, the *M* source about 65, and *L* about 60. While the synoptics give us reliable information, it must not be forgotten that the Fourth Gospel is "essential biography," and that the author (according to Dr. Wright a disciple of John the Beloved at Ephesus) had known Jesus in Jerusalem during the closing weeks of his ministry.

Enslin, on the contrary, says definitely that if the attitude of Jesus "toward those about him was what Mark suggests, it was not that of John" (p. 445). For Enslin, our knowledge of Jesus comes from a very careful use of the synoptics. Mark is dated 70-85; Matthew and Luke were written about 100. The *Urmarcus* theory, which Guignebert accepts, has, says Enslin, been discarded by the majority of critics. "It was essentially our Mark from which Matthew and Luke drew nearly their entire narrative matter" (p. 430). Enslin feels that the existence of *Q* is doubtful, and that Luke probably bor

rowed from Matthew. The differences are to be explained as results of the evangelists' penning better stories. Their sources were probably in no permanent form, and they were used to suit the evangelists' needs. Perhaps Form-Criticism will throw some light on these matters.

Cadbury also believes that Form-Criticism, along with other aspects of social and environmental study of the gospel material, will throw new light on the life of Jesus. Modernization of Jesus started early, and even the synoptics and the oral tradition which preceded them were colored by the interests of the early Church. But the Jesus of history can be found only by sifting the synoptic evidence. The trouble with modern pictures of Jesus usually lies in the misuse of the sources, in theological biases, and in the lack of ability to see Jesus through the eyes of a first century Jewish mind.

II. PRELIMINARY INCIDENTS

All of these books join in rejecting the Virgin Birth. Guignebert says it is *probable* that Jesus was baptized by John. There was some relationship between John and Jesus, but all we know is the reflection of their similar teachings. When Jesus began to teach on his own, however, he did not make use of baptism.

Major is inclined to accept the Markan account of the baptism as a subjective experience on the part of Jesus. He was baptized "as an example to others" (p. 239), met his temptation, and began his divinely sent mission.

Enslin, on the other hand, believes that there was never any connection between John and Jesus. Because their respective cults were at odds in later times, the story of John's submission to Jesus was developed "to vanquish an embarrassing rival" (p. 152). If Jesus was a follower of John, and if his baptism meant so much, it is inconceivable that others did not seek baptism in order to gain similar blessings. So we can say nothing about him before his appearance as a prophet in Galilee. Enslin makes a good case, but it seems more likely that Guignebert is correct in assuming some relation, although both solutions offer difficulties.

III. LENGTH OF MINISTRY

There can be no definite solution to the problem of the length of Jesus' ministry. Guignebert reminds us that we cannot reinstate the

Johannine chronology. All of the events in Mark could have taken place within a very short time. After considering many conflicting theories, Guignebert's conclusion is that the maximum length of Jesus' ministry was three or four months. The synoptics reflect a very short and dynamic ministry, and it is only as traditions were magnified that we find extensions to two or three years. Enslin also believes that the ministry was short. Jesus probably began his ministry in A.D. 28 and was crucified in the spring of 29. This would involve only one trip to Jerusalem.

IV. DEATH AND RESURRECTION

Guignebert is doubtful about the authenticity of most of the materials concerning Holy Week. Assuming that Jesus' following was *not* large, he believes that the story of Palm Sunday is pious fiction. The story of the betrayal is also probably legend. It is likely that Jesus "was arrested by the Roman police, judged and condemned by the Roman procurator, Pilate or someone else" (p. 468). It was necessary to get rid of the messianic preacher in order to keep the peace, and so Jesus was not defended against what was probably trumped-up evidence. After the crucifixion, the stories presented by the gospels are not consistent. The burial, resurrection, and ascension must be considered together. On this basis, we must conclude that even the synoptic story of the burial is probably false, although inevitable as a story. The empty tomb narrative is not even part of the original legend. So we must turn to an analysis of the appearances themselves. It is likely that the confusing evidence goes back to a primary experience of one person, probably Peter, and this led by contagion to a group experience. It was entirely subjective in its nature, and was probably in the form of an hallucination. The psychology of despair and hope which is reflected in the more primitive materials is adequate to explain Peter's conditioning for such an experience. From such experiences as these, the legends arose, and probably assumed their present form about A.D. 60-70. "It was the result of a continuous process inspired by an inward logical necessity which transformed the spiritual manifestation which illuminated and strengthened Peter, into the material manifestation described by the sources" (p. 535).

Major accepts the usual tradition of the accounts of the trial and

death of Jesus, but when he comes to the resurrection he is concerned to preserve the *fact* rather than the *mode*. While Guignebert is inclined to doubt its significance, and Major desires to stress its certainty as an historical event, both of them emphasize the psychological side. Major says, "The belief in the Resurrection of Jesus was created not by an objective experience of His disciples after His crucifixion, but by a subjective experience created by the impact of His personality upon their personalities in the preceding period. Those who had become the disciples of Jesus had become so as the result of the influence of His personality " (p. 217). Because they believed he was the Messiah, they were compelled to believe in his resurrection. "That Peter was, in fact, the first to see the Risen Lord is attested by Paul (1 Cor. 15:5), and it is implied in Luke 24:34" (pp. 631-632).

While Guignebert believes that Jesus may have been in Jerusalem less than a week, Enslin believes it may have been a longer time. He says briefly what may be taken as agreement with the other writers: The disciples "had hoped in vain that it was he [Jesus] who should restore Israel. But the comradeship of the months with him could not be so quickly broken. He had built himself too vitally into their lives for that. Their first grief gave way; they experienced him again, became convinced that he had not been defeated, and returned to Jerusalem in joy and confidence" (pp. 167-168).

V. THE PURPOSE OF JESUS

In the discussion of the purpose of Jesus, there is more disagreement. "It is legitimate," says Guignebert, "to assume, *á priori*, that the preaching of Jesus was characterized by a main purpose" (p. 296). The central motive, as found in the synoptics, is "the announcement of the coming of the Kingdom." This "does not entail a definite system of doctrine." It means that Jesus wanted to attract people "to the hope with which he was himself consumed" (p. 297). He did not conceive of himself as "Son of God." Even if he used the term, "Son of Man," it is not applied to himself, and "there is no use of it which cannot be interpreted in a way entirely different from the pseudo-Danielic 'Son of Man.' " In spite of all the evidence and pious opinion to the contrary, Guignebert is convinced that "even if the confession of Peter were substantially authentic, all it would prove

is that on the eve of the journey up to Jerusalem the disciples believed Jesus would occupy the first place in the Kingdom he had announced. . . . There is not a single synoptic passage which proves that Jesus called himself the Messiah or allowed people to call him by that title" (pp. 285-286). The "Messianic secret" hypothesis is equally lacking in evidence. Even in Acts, we see reflected a primitive view of Jesus as a "man authorized by God," who has all the attributes of a prophet (Acts 2:22-36 and 10:37-38). "Jesus is never reported to have said, 'I am the Messiah; I bring you the Kingdom.' . . . At the end of the Last Supper (Mark 14:25) when he announces the Messianic feast to the Apostles, he does not say that there is a place of honour there for him" (p. 295).

Major argues that if Jesus was only a prophet, his fate could not have aroused his disciples. "It was because Jesus claimed to be the Messiah that His crucifixion discredited His claim in the eyes of His disciples and of Judaism generally, which claim was only revived as the result of His disciples' experiences both of His resurrection and of the outpouring of His Spirit into their hearts" (p. xxiii). Major is convinced that the secret Messiahship as revealed in Mark and disguised by the later evangelists is so original as to defy any theory of its growth in the primitive Christian community. If we fail to accept the Messianic consciousness as historical, we deny the historicity of all the sources. To accept this theory does not deny that he was thought of as a prophet by his contemporaries and very early disciples (before they saw the light).

Enslin is in fundamental agreement with Guignebert here. While the latter believes that Jesus expected the Kingdom to come immediately while they were at Jerusalem (which is not conclusively proved), Enslin also believes that Jesus thought the Kingdom was imminent, and his ethics are to be understood not as an interim ethic but as a "kingdom ethic." Jesus never identified himself with any of the current Messianic notions, although he used the phrase, "son of man," to refer to *another* (cf. Mark 8:38). "None the less, it is one thing for a first-century Jew to have expected a figure soon to appear; a totally different thing for him to believe that he himself would be miraculously transformed from a flesh-and-blood man into this figure. With all allowances made, it is hard to conceive how such a view could have been held except at the expense of mental sanity" (p.

163). That Jesus had authority and used it is not to be doubted, but it is the authority of "a prophet of God." It was God once more "speaking to his people in the old and accredited way. The prophet like unto Moses long expected had now appeared" (p. 164).

While Guignebert and Enslin ascribe to Jesus the motive and purpose of a prophet, Cadbury states that "Jesus probably had no definite, unified, conscious purpose, that the absence of such a program is *á priori* likely and that it suits well the historical evidence" (p. 141). Jesus "was largely casual." We find him appealing to a variety of motives in his ethical teachings. Most of the modern ideas of ethics are lacking. There may well have been a deep-lying consistency in his life, but it is not expressed in a self-conscious purpose. "That Jesus knew God more intimately than other men is not supported by the gospel evidence. . . . He did not proclaim a revival of direct revelation as in the prophets, although his followers often claimed it for themselves as well as for him" (p. 189). We cannot be sure whether or not he thought himself the Messiah, but it is likely that he did. "If Jesus believed himself Messiah, the idea came to him in accordance with [his] religious practice. Messiahship was not something he took upon himself; God put it upon him, and God's selection of him for that office would be known by him" in a passive way (p. 184). This type of resignation is Oriental and Jewish. Major also calls him a "determinist" in this sense (cf. p. 35).

VI. THE TEACHINGS OF JESUS

Guignebert believes that all of the teachings of Jesus are within the Jewish tradition. The synoptics present Jesus' idea of God as absolute master, as judge, and as holy. There seems to be a softening of the harsh rigidity of righteousness usually ascribed to Yahweh. He probably regarded God as the Father of all men, but not as "*my* Father" or in connection with "the Son." It is possible that this carries with it the idea of love and tenderness in God, and that fatherhood is equal with the attribute of sovereignty. God was near to men. In his ethics, Jesus stressed inwardness, a beauty of soul which is possible only in the coming Kingdom. *Metanoia* and forgiveness are equally the gifts of God. The largeness of Jesus' heart caused him to carry this message to the poor and outcast of Israel, not to those within the privileged groups: to the *anavim,* and not to those who

were slaves to their possessions. Furthermore, Jesus probably accepted the eschatology of his day, although how he conceived it cannot be ascertained because of the confusion of our sources.

Major stresses the originality of Jesus as a religious genius. The Kingdom was, for Jesus, consistent with the presentation in the Fourth Gospel. It was a subjective Kingdom within the hearts of men. It comes like the seed growing secretly "by the individual human being accepting and doing the Will of God" (p. 38). Jesus did not teach "the Gospel of Eternal Life" at the outset of his ministry, because only a few would have been attracted to it. Matthew was wrong in making Jesus take over the Baptist's apocalyptic judgment. Manson stresses the importance of repentance in the teaching. "It is a return of the whole personality to God, a submission of the will to His will, the acceptance of His sovereignty. Now it is by this act of submission that the Kingdom of God is entered, and it is this decisive change that is presupposed in the detailed teaching of Jesus" (p. 328). No interim ethic is involved, because "the important thing is not whether the goal is near or far away, but whether the direction is correct" (p. 329). The Kingdom is simply "the realization of God's will in the world" (p. 637).

The emphasis of Enslin is almost the opposite of the position just described. We must remember that the message of Jesus was written for the first century, not in terms of the evolutionary mind of today. "The Kingdom of God, soon to appear, was the Age to Come, the new age which would suddenly and spectacularly follow the cataclysmic end of the present age" (p. 158). So one must repent and be ready for the imminent act of God. It is so near at hand that it is almost "among you." We cannot smooth away the difficulties of the prediction that this would occur before the present generation had died. The ethical sayings of Jesus were for the coming kingdom, to be used now because the kingdom is near.

The teachings of Jesus, agrees Cadbury, lie within the scope of Judaism. Jesus could proclaim the justice, mercy, and love of God and be within the great prophetic tradition. The element of eschatology in Jesus' thought emphasizes something which all must grasp in order to know him at all: the difference in *Weltanschauung* between those days and ours. It was perfectly natural to think in apocalyptic terms, to take it literally, and, in the course of time, to have

been shown to have made a bad guess about history. Furthermore, the apocalyptic viewpoint intensified the correctness of his ethical teaching, for it made the criteria of action independent of all relative historical situations. A return to Jesus would turn us from social programs to "fostering an actual goodness in men and women" (p. 112). It "would mean a return in part at least to the religious motive, the religious attitude with which his advice is inseparably connected even when it seems to be the least altruistic" (p. 118). Jesus believed in a personal God, who "was in nature and behind nature. . . . For Jesus religion is an area continuous with the rest of our life" (p. 161). He was no mystic, but was keenly aware of the moral and spiritual significance of every day living.

VII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JESUS

There is nothing supernatural about Jesus' teachings, according to Guignebert. Anyone could have uttered them, provided one had the same "singular spiritual loveliness and breadth of humanity" (p. 405). In no sense did Jesus intend to found a Church. He did not foresee or desire the institution which bears his name. It was the resurrection experience of Peter, which spread like wildfire, which started the Church. It was the enthusiasm about the risen Jesus among the little band of disciples which made it grow. Indeed, it is very likely that while Jesus was beloved among some of the common people, he was never one who drew the large crowds ascribed to him in the gospels. He never stirred deeply the people of Israel, and "there would have been no Christianity if the belief in the Resurrection had not been founded and systematized" (p. 536).

Major, on the other hand, finds that Jesus was followed by great crowds. He was the Messiah, and his disciples knew it, although it was the resurrection which clinched matters for them. Jesus' teachings were original, for he was "a supreme moral and spiritual genius" (p. xxv). He awakened in the old world "a spirit of faith, hope, and love" (p. xxx). It was the claim of Messiahship upon which "His Church was founded after His death in Jerusalem, and it was the thin red line of the Messiah's blood which separated that Church from Judaism. Only by His death could His Gospel triumph. . . . He died as Messiah . . . on behalf of the many who were to come unto God through Him" (p. xxvii).

Enslin states that, in the light of the apocalyptic element in Jesus' thought, it should be clear that Jesus did not intend to found a Church. He never conceived himself outside the prophetic tradition of Israel. There are traces of the founding of the Church in the synoptics, especially in the Great Commission (Matthew 28:19, 20), but they are without exception later materials. It was natural to read back into Jesus the purposes of the Church itself, and such rites as baptism and the Lord's supper. Christological speculation also began at an early date, and it already was in a well developed state in the Fourth Gospel.

Concerning the significance of Jesus, Cadbury warns us that we are not justified in using religious faith to supplement an imperfect historical portrait. "For many of us it will remain more satisfactory to leave much about him unknown, much about him alien both to ourselves and to the Church that more immediately succeeded him, than to paint him up unconcernedly in our own image, or what becomes so often quite similar, to attempt to supplement the imperfect historical portrait with what we call the Christ of faith. Religious faith has its place, . . . [but] both faith and history have their gaps [and] do not exactly supplement each other. Rather history illustrates faith and faith interprets history. Without illegitimate borrowings between them we may follow both as far as each will lead us" (p. 193).

VIII. SUMMARY

On the basis of these brief summaries, we may conclude that Guignebert, Enslin, and Cadbury are in substantial agreement, although there are many differences in detail and some of them are important. All three diverge a good deal from the more conservative treatments of Major, Manson, and Wright. The latter give their material scholarly treatment, but they also have a theological axe to grind. They are anxious to preserve the liberal Jesus of modernist theology. Major's use of the Fourth Gospel to explain the more primitive passages of Mark hardly seems warranted. His reliance upon the Markan chronology is at least doubtful. Full justice is not done to Form-Criticism. At the same time, much is to be said for the value of this approach. Historically, Christianity owes much to John and Paul, and we have always seen Jesus through their eyes. To

abandon this approach now may prove hazardous to the institution of the Church, and it would certainly affect the conservative credal affirmations of the World Council of Churches.

Guignebert, Enslin, and Cadbury feel that they know much less about Jesus. Instead of accepting the Markan chronology and the bulk of the narrative and teaching material, they are critical of every passage, and their knowledge of Jesus is made consistent with our general information concerning first century Palestine. Jesus was a typical, but superior, Jewish prophet, who conceived himself within the prophetic tradition. He was surrounded by a small band of disciples, and went his way, teaching and doing good. The essence of his teaching was repentance in the light of the coming Kingdom. Finally, he met with opposition from the Roman authorities, and was crucified. As a result of later experiences, especially of Peter, the little band was energized and enlarged, and in time an organization developed which was forced to break away from the synagogues. The center of this movement was the recollected person of Jesus, conceived as an apocalyptic Messiah, and they lived in expectation of the great consummation. Only as the generation of disciples passed away did there come to be any writing about Jesus, and the gospels were written in the light of these later thoughts.

Some theologians have foreseen the breakdown of the infallible Jesus and the "liberal" Jesus. The Barthians have protected themselves by making the Christ of faith central, no matter who Jesus of Nazareth may have been, providing of course that he existed. Others have denied that Biblical criticism has any validity at all. Most of them still "modernize" Jesus. If one believes that the Christ of faith must be found in the historic Jesus, such a solution to the historical problem as we have presented offers many difficulties. If Jesus thought himself a prophet, why should we make him the second person of the Trinity? If he thought himself the Messiah, does this necessarily make him part of the Trinity? If the Easter faith resides primarily in an hallucination of Peter, does that mean that the whole Christian faith rests on an illusion? Is Major right in using the Johannine literature as a basis for modern theology? If we can recover the religion *of Jesus*, can it be made compatible with the religion *about Jesus* which is present-day Christianity? How can history and faith be reconciled?

Biblical and historical criticism have made it necessary that we ask such questions as these. This means that it is again necessary to re-think our picture of the historical Jesus; we must re-formulate our ideas of Christology and the Incarnation; and we must be ready to make radical modifications in our beliefs about the Trinity and the Church.

The theological answers are not easy ones. Some liberals feel that the historical picture of Jesus as Messiah is adequate for accepting Jesus as the one, sufficient, and complete revelation of the nature of God, a unique person in whom the image of God may be seen in all its glory. In him alone we can find evidence of a change in God's attitude toward the world, so that God's love becomes more active in the hearts of men, and his judgment becomes tempered with mercy. His teachings are taken as a final statement concerning ethico-religious conduct. He is the supreme example of what man may become.

Others feel that this picture is a "modernization," combined with wishful value-judgments. We can find salvation through Jesus Christ, because through him is revealed the "way" of absolute commitment to God's unknown will. The teachings of Jesus are not accepted as absolute prescriptions for our actions, but we must accept his spirit if we are to be led into salvation. Such a position as this is consistent with the attitude and claims of Jesus himself, as they have been resurrected by historical study.

This leads to a question concerning the Trinity, which is not a primitive concept. Most modern theologians can give good reasons for conceiving of God as both transcendent and immanent. In Jesus, we can see a significant act of both revelation and manifestation, but this does not necessarily add to the stature of God. If God was in Christ, reconciling the world, this does not make Christ the second person of a Trinity; it means that the immanent spirit of God was in the historic Jesus in the same way that he is in all men who are committed to God, although we may claim that in degree the "divinity" of Jesus is unique.

Revelations of God come primarily through the experiences of individual men, and are imparted to those with whom they can communicate. It is within the canons of history to assume, on the basis of a value-judgment, that in the life and teachings of the historic Jesus we find the fullest manifestation of the spirit of God, that through

faith in him is the most certain way to God, and that the atonement is the supreme lesson, that victory comes through absolute commitment to the uncomprehended will of a righteous and loving Father God. God is the center of the Christian faith, Jesus is rightly accepted and worshipped as the pathfinder who shows us the way, and the spirit of God will come to those who accept Jesus as the Christ. Such conceptions as these may prove a way out of the difficulties offered by historic study.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER
Church Divinity School of the Pacific
Berkeley, California

The Church Through the Centuries. By CYRIL CHARLES RICHARDSON. New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938. x + 255 pp. $2.50.

Dr. Richardson's book is true to its title. It carries one down through the salient episodes of Church history—all the way from the association of Christ with His immediate followers in the first century to the Oxford Conference on Life and Work, and the Edinburgh Conference on Faith and Order, in the twentieth century. It analyzes and makes very clear the peculiar spirit of Christianity as it is found at the outset, tracing its development and manifold applications as they appear in early and later institutions: in primitive life and thought; in the Papacy, Monasticism and Dogma; in the modified Communions of the Reformation period; in a later and purified Romanism; in such leaders as Augustine, St. Francis, and Hooker; in such events as the Council of Nicaea, Canossa, the founding of Methodism (to select only a few from the rich store). And it does all well; it carries the interest throughout. It is an admirable survey as well for the one who knows something of the story as for the beginner.

Vitality is one of its primary qualities. Nothing that has happened throughout the years is dead fact. It all throbs with life. The purpose of the early Church is to conserve and hand on the unique significance of Christ; the purpose of the Church today is the same. The author tries to tell us in how far it failed or succeeded in the attempt. Liturgies, Creeds and Government are all marshalled in review as they express either partially, or in full, the heart of the Christian spirit.

The author goes beyond this, from time to time, in his attempts to indicate in how far all the past events and ideas are of modern significance. The reviewer frankly confesses that the author's attempt to "point the moral and adorn the tale" did not at first appeal to him. Recording one's own reflections as to the permanent significance of the episodes of history is hazardous enough in the class-room or in conversation; it is much more so in cold and permanent print. But here again the reviewer thinks that the author has done it well. Let one example suffice (there are many equally well worth one's reflection). In discussing the significance of the attempt to sever the Church from the State, or vice versa, he says. "The complete separation of Church and State . . . is an idea with which we are familiar today. Yet it entails difficulties. It deprives the State of spiritual direction and makes the Church impotent to exert practical influence. Temporal power, in whatever manner it is conceived, in property or votes, is involved in the Church's existence in the world. To deny this is to set up a false division between spiritual and secular, between eternal and temporal." It may be that here speaks the Englishman. It may be that the author is getting at the heart of the matter, and that those of us who have thought ourselves sound in believing in complete separation had better ponder the problem a little more deeply. In ways like this one's views are frequently challenged. The book is thoughtful.

The reasons for certain cursory treatments and certain omissions are not altogether clear to the reviewer. In so short a volume the selection of material must of necessity be somewhat personal and arbitrary. Those matters that minister to the author's purpose must be chosen. But even so, one wonders why a little more time was not spent on the types of thought represented by the numerous opponents of Athanasius, and why the names of Anselm and Thomas Aquinas are omitted altogether. To be sure, the author is not writing a history of Christian thought, but in such instances as these the thought and the institutions are inextricably interwoven. Furthermore, the author has probably wisely chosen Hooker as a representative of Anglicanism, for Hooker writes at the time of the Anglican settlement, and he puts down on paper the generally accepted Anglican points of view. But is it the religious treatise, rich and satisfactory though it may be, that represents Anglicanism, or is it the man from

whose representative character, religion, learning, and experience the religious formularies came? Are Hooker and *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* as typically Anglican as Cranmer and the *Book of Common Prayer?* The author's choice may be the better, much as the reviewer hesitates to admit it. In other instances the author's choices are so uniformly good that this may be no exception.

As one lays the book down one feels that it holds the story of vital men and vital movements, and that each and all are pertinent to the present day. This is a unique accomplishment. In another edition a few infelicities in language and a few errors in dates will be corrected, for they are doubtless as apparent to the author as to the reviewer.

HENRY BRADFORD WASHBURN

Episcopal Theological School
Cambridge, Massachusetts

The Gateway to the Middle Ages. By ELEANOR SHIPLEY DUCKETT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. xii + 620 pp. $5.00.

How greatly the true scholar can stabilize and fortify our restless modern minds! Quivering among wars and fears, as an epoch of Western civilization draws convulsively to an apparent close, we open a noble book of painstaking research like this by Miss Duckett, to acquire tranquillity and confidence through our lengthened perspective. Her intimate study of the sixth century would seem especially pertinent just now. That century is unknown to most of us except as a blurred extent of shadowy time in what we are pleased to consider the darkest portion of the Christian era. To explore it under the guidance here offered is to encounter horrors as shocking as those in our morning newspapers, even though there were no bombings from the air; and, more serious still, to meet every note of exhaustion, decadence and decay. For we survey a disintegrating and dying world. Classical culture, to which these pages show many fine spirits desperately clinging, is at its last gasp, and traces of new creative impulse are faintly discerned. Yet such traces are present. Better still, the farther we advance into the depressing and confused record, the more vital, persistent, and potentially triumphant appear the spiritual values released by Christianity. It is a story of startling contrasts, of death and birth. No title for the book could be more felicitous than the one chosen, for what a future waited when the sixth century died!

A woman reviewer may be pardoned if she speaks with pleasure of the contributions women are recently making to scholarship. In spite of competence in research and skill in presentation, there is no denying that this volume makes stiff reading. This is probably inevitable, for from the point of view of secular history the sixth century is a singularly dreary age, and naturally the treatment of it, especially in the earlier chapters, is seldom or never aglow. It is, however, satisfying. This reviewer is not competent to discuss the accuracy of the narrative. But footnotes witness to wide and thorough reading, and to careful use of authorities; full digests are given of important contemporary works,—chronicles, biographies, letters, religious treatises, poems; and copious translations from outstanding texts enable the reader to form his own contacts with the self-expression of the age. Procopius, Ennodius, Jordanes, Gregory of Tours, Gregory the Great, Caesarius, Cassiodorus, and others more obscure, not to speak of great Boethius: he can know them probably better than ever he did before. It would seem that every possible item, enlivening, interesting, human, or informative had been gleaned from these authors by Miss Duckett. She conforms to the strictest modern canon for historical writing, and never allows her own personality to color her pages. Times have changed. Carlyle meant to be an historian, but one was quite as much aware of Carlyle himself in his books as of the French Revolution or of Friedrich. The same thing was true in varying degrees of almost all later historians, as the old naïve standard of the chronicle yielded to that of the work of art. Now, we rightly discount and distrust personal coloring, breathing a rather futile wish to make our own discoveries and interpretations. Very well, here is the sixth century, presented through a scrupulously transparent medium, self-revealed so far as may be. The book is avowedly written for the General Reader. That evasive and ambiguous personage may perhaps crave a little more illumined summary or inference to lighten the pages and simplify his outlook. But he should rebuke himself for laziness. It is right that he be sternly treated.

Moreover, as we read the intricate secular history of that tumultuous age—so crude, so weary—certain special characteristics grow clear. We all have facile adjectives at our disposal to describe the renaissance or the middle ages; the sixth century is less easy to label. Yet

from the relentless story of "lust and vengeance," to use Miss Duckett's phrase, powerful figures emerge through whom flow conflicting currents: figures of saga, yet with a difference, since they express a unique combination of savagery with would-be learning. Chronicles, however dull, reveal, as saga cannot, this piquant contrast. There is one curious fact. We do not think of the sixth century as dominated by feminine influence; but "feminism," if it means the claim of women to play a leading part in public life, is evidently no new thing. Many of the most salient figures here are women. They bear names, redolent now of fierce romance, now of classic tradition: Amalasuntha, Galswitha, Radegund, Gudeleva, Fredegund, Ingundis, Honoria, Antonina. They play their parts with such intensity that in them seems focussed the drama of the age, with its extremes of passion, now ferocious, now saintly.

The record grows monotonous. "The thread of the sixth century's narrative is . . . caught in an unending tangle of siege and battle, of famine and murder, distress of nations gripped in duel throughout its time," says Miss Duckett. Just like our own day; and, as we dare to hope, with similar contrast between vehement tragedy on the surface and hidden forces that redeem. In that old century how reviving are the latter! Here is grim epic stuff, but here is much beside. Old wars make dull reading, but old stories of the saints are always fresh. Saints abound in the sixth century: "The rising tide of new life came to its fullness in the things of religion." When Miss Duckett turns to the inner experience of the age, her writing instantly gains in vitality. There is relief in any case in escaping from the confusing chronicle of events to consideration of scholarship and thought. But the best of the time is not to be found in secular writing, whether philosophical treatises, or imitative attempts in verse to assimilate the suave values of the classic past to the new racial life; it is in the revelations of the soul. For here is the Christian ideal, persistent, exalting, transforming. Beauty, imaginative insight, subtle human values, are all to be found in the sixth century, but secular literature does not reflect them. It is in her later chapters that Miss Duckett's book becomes enjoyable as well as valuable. Astounding transition! She leads us within the same sequence of time, from a world undisciplined, stormy, and cruel into a world disciplined and illumined, and whether in presenting the humane statesmanship of Gregory,

the nascent psychological perceptions of Cassiodorus or Caesarius, the glorious Rule of Benedict, or in her selection from the gay and tender legends of the saints, she writes with sympathy, humor and charm.

Not that the sins of the Church or of Churchmen are glossed over. Awful tales, from the pages of the devout Gregory of Tours or other sources, are told about them. "Who will ever be able to tell," sighs Gregory, "all the calamities, all the murders, all the evils, of those times?" Yet, says Miss Duckett, "Behind all this narrative there stands out a background of intense consciousness of supernatural forces, common to saint and sinner alike, fully shared by Gregory himself." This sense of the Numinous flashes intermittent light into the darkness of the scene. To be sure, it is shown again and again in grotesque or naïve ways, and not infrequently seems to reveal new areas of shadow. Miss Duckett is thoroughly detached in her treatment. She savors not only the poetry but the absurdity of miraculous stories, wisely accepting them at their face value as part of the psychological coloring of the period. For instance, in her use of Gregory the Great's *Dialogues* concerning St. Benedict, she transcribes the Legend with much less attempt at critical discrimination than that shown by a recent Roman Catholic writer on the saint, Dom Justin McCann. Will modern civilization ever recover the sense of the Numinous? Well, not quite in the sixth century way. And yet, despite the frank emphasis on marvel, Christianity appears amid the violent hates and woes of the time as a force making, when all is said, for sanity as well as sanctity. Sanctity is neither ancient nor modern; down the Christian centuries it achieves much the same results. Certainly, the account of its exponents in these pages succeeds in bringing the distant near. One reason why the chapters on the religious life, while of no more worth than others to the scholar, furnish the best reading, is that figures with whom we can enter into communication appear among them. We can hardly picture ourselves as contemporaries of Attila or of Odovacar, but we feel that we should not have to change much to spend a pleasant day with a son of St. Benedict in his monastery. Cassiodorus, Caesarius, Columban,—it is good to know them and to realize through letters here freely quoted, the rise of delicate understanding of character in its more subtle phases, and of ethics on a level rarely found in Pagan literature, and assuredly

strange to contemplate as coexistent with the primitive secular life of the times.

There are delightful episodes in the religious story, such as the fascinating account of the poet Fortunatus, author of the great hymns, "Vexilla Regis," "Salve Festa Dies," and "Crux Fidelis." In telling of him and his idyllic friendships with holy women, Miss Duckett has a personal touch for once; her familiarity with the liturgical worship of the Church Catholic as mediated through Anglican forms stands her in good stead. Only in one case must the present reviewer confess to a slight disappointment: that is in the treatment of Boethius. Elaborate and careful, it yet seems faintly colored, especially in the discussion of *The Consolations of Philosophy*. Surely there is reason beyond the moving circumstances under which that book was written, for the reverent emotion with which it was pored over and absorbed during many centuries. Still it retains for the rare but attentive reader stronger appeal than is here conveyed; still there is vibrant power in it, particularly in the great interspersed Odes, here dismissed with a mere mention. Uneven though these are in quality, they should be recognized, in their stately and often beautiful rhythms, as precursors, not only of the quasi-philosophical Eighteenth Century Odes on abstract themes, but of such lyrics as Shelley's "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty," or Wordsworth's "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality."

The chapters on Roman and Celtic Monasticism lead us into a refreshing world. If this book has not the exuberant élan of Montalembert's old *Monks of the West,* it has at least the advantage of ripe modern scholarship, and of using absolutely up-to-date resources. The last chapter, on Gregory the Great, with its admirable analysis of his *Pastoral Care,* leaves us ready to advance beyond the "Gateway" into a medieval world, organized, unified in a sense, and at least conscious of its own ideals and desires. It is the fashion in some circles to look back regretfully to that world, though few people would probably like it if they were able to return thither. Nobody could possibly want to return to the sixth century. But Miss Duckett's full and sensitive survey, so rich in authentic reports and transcripts, gives most of us the entrée to all we shall ever need to know about that great and obscure period. Through her book the century lives

for us clearly, especially in those contrasts between spiritual and secular types and inspirations which, softened as time went on, were yet to persist through many later centuries, until the secularization of life in the renaissance effaced them, at least on the surface of social life and manners. It might be claimed that, beneath the surface, they remain operative even to our own day.

VIDA D. SCUDDER

Wellesley College

Ockham: Studies and Selections. By Stephen Chak Tornay. La Salle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1938. viii, 207 pp. $1.75.

The purpose of this volume, as stated in the Preface, is to give "a brief presentation of the whole of Ockham's philosophy in the form of short essays and original translations illustrating the various fields of his interest." In pursuit of this end, the author offers 210 pages of selected texts in English translation, and 87 pages of critical and historical discussion embodying his own views as to the character and significance of Ockham's thought. The studies by the author treat, respectively, of Ockham's Nominalism, his Natural Philosophy, his Ethical Philosophy, and his Political Philosophy. The selections are arranged on similar lines, as representative of Ockham's logic and metaphysics, his physics, ethics, theology, and political philosophy.

At first sight, the selections translated appear to represent a wide range of Ockham's writings, texts from practically all of his printed works being included. But by far the major part of the selections are from the *Commentary on the Sentences.* A few chapters of the *Sum of All Logic* are translated in their entirety, and several pages are given over to selections from the *Hundred Theological Sayings.* Ockham's other works, however, are represented only by a few sentences or an occasional paragraph.

In view of the immense difficulty of giving an intelligible English rendering of Ockham's highly technical language, Dr. Tornay has performed the task of translator with as much success as could fairly be expected. Even so, it is doubtful if a reader, not already familiar with the language and literature of medieval philosophy, will make much headway in grasping the meaning of many passages. The present reviewer, confronted with some of the more involved sentences of the

translations, found it necessary to retranslate them into Latin in order to make sure of their sense and syntax. But this difficulty can scarcely be avoided in translations of fourteenth century philosophical texts into English, where even the most able translator must frequently make the intolerable choice between inaccuracy and unintelligibility.

The inevitable linguistic difficulty is greatly augmented, however, by the fact that the translations are of scattered texts, and not of any one complete work. Ockham's style is terse, and his discussions presuppose knowledge of what has gone before. Thus a passage which might be fairly clear to one who had followed the thread of discussion from the start, is likely to be misconstrued, or not to be understood at all, when presented in abstraction from its context.

Such a deficiency might be offset to some degree by the introductory essays, if these were devoted to concise and well ordered statement of the definitions, problems, and arguments presupposed by the translated passages. But such is not the case. The original essays of the author are turned to a different end—that of summing up, in a series of historical analogies and generalizations, what he conceives to be the significance of Ockham's philosophy as a whole.

The views presented in these introductory essays are, for the most part, the conventional ones found in the secondary sources. Ockham's significance is said to lie in his denial of the "ontological universal," in his "terministic logic," in his "empiricism," his "subjectivism," and his "scepticism." Once again the *Venerable Inceptor* is exhibited as an explosive revolutionary who undermined aristotelian metaphysics and thomist theology, and as the medieval precursor of Francis Bacon and Descartes. Little is offered, in the way of new source material or textual analysis, to substantiate these well-worn characterizations of Ockham, or to give them a more precise meaning. Yet the author is refreshingly free from dogmatism in his presentation, and sets forth his views more as suggestive possibilities than as well established conclusions. This open-minded attitude, which stands in marked contrast to the partisan heat of earlier treatments of Ockham, is appropriate to a field in which so little solid work has so far been done.

Dr. Tornay's project, of combining studies of Ockham's philosophy with translations from his works, is an excellent one. Such defects as the book has, are mostly due to the fact that it attempts to cover too

much ground at one stroke. Had the author translated one complete work of Ockham's, or even one or two full *Questions* from the *Commentary on the Sentences*, coupling it with a detailed and sustained analysis of the work, the book would have afforded a far more accurate and profound insight into Ockham's philosophy than is afforded by the present volume, which skips over the surface of Ockham's thought without lingering long enough to penetrate any part of it. Even so, the book is a welcome addition to the very small list of works on Ockham in the English language, and it offers an opening wedge for the study of the great Franciscan philosopher, to those who have no other means of reading him.

Ernest A. Moody

Merriewold, N.Y.

Children of Light. Edited by Howard H. Brinton. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. xii + 416 pp. $3.50.

Divine-Human Society. By Howard H. Brinton. Philadelphia: Book Committee of the Religious Society of Friends of Philadelphia and Vicinity, 1938. 107 pp. 50¢.

The Eternal Gospel. By Rufus Jones. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. vi + 235 pp. $2.00.

These three books are by Quakers. They are concerned with the Quaker way of life, the significance of the Society of Friends, and the importance of that steady mysticism which has animated Quaker living. *Children of Light* is a collection of fifteen historical essays in honor of Rufus M. Jones, mystic, philosopher, Quaker historian, and practical humanitarian. They were presented on his seventy-fifth birthday "as an affectionate tribute of gratitude and admiration to one who has contributed more widely than any person now living to knowledge and understanding of the history of the Society of Friends." *Divine-Human Society* is the William Penn Lecture for 1938, delivered at the Race Street Meeting House in Philadelphia by Howard H. Brinton, Director of Studies at Pendle Hill, that unique "school" near Philadelphia where Friends may withdraw for meditation and study. It attempts in brief compass an analysis of the basic ills of modern society, and offers a thought provoking remedy in terms of the organization of the living community of Friends. *The Eternal Gospel*, by

Rufus M. Jones, is a popularly written and persuasive appeal to attend to the continual revelation of God throughout history and in our daily life.

For those who are not Quakers, but who wish a broad understanding of the qualities which make for the distinctive Quaker way of living, *Children of Light* will be the most interesting of these three books. Written by Friends and intended primarily for Friends, scattered in subject-matter and uneven in treatment, it nevertheless gives an attractive composite picture of many sides of Quaker life in the last two and one-half centuries. Certain chapters should be avoided by all but the most zealous archeologists of Quakerism. Who was Edward Byllynge? I fancy it does not matter much, save to those specialists who like to pore over ancient archives and complex genealogies. His influence on the first constitution of the province of New Jersey, however, is another and more important matter. It is well treated by John L. Nickalls, just as Francis R. Taylor in another essay shows how the Quaker, William Penn, not only wrote the most liberal constitution of his time, but also influenced the trend of political theorists in that liberal direction which is the natural consequence of Quaker principles. The knowledge of Hebrew and the use of Latin among the early Friends are again matters of interest only to specialists, although later historians of the Quakers will have reason to thank Professor Cadbury and Mrs. Brinton for their researches in these erudite but unexciting fields.

Two essays deal specifically with the theological and religious convictions of Quakers. In an extremely interesting essay on one of William Penn's early religious tracts, *The Christian Quaker,* Herbert C. Wood illustrates how Penn and the Quakers in general set themselves against the narrow dogmatic Calvinism of the seventeenth century, and insisted upon a universal revealing light which was the possession of all mankind. Against the doctrine of religious exclusiveness, "extra ecclesiam nulla salus," epitomized in the pungent English phrase "not dipt, not Christian'd," Penn preached a belief in divine tolerance and universal sympathy. God reveals himself not merely through the Church, but through Christ, through history, and through the inward religious experiences of mankind. These last, as exemplified in Quaker journals, are the subject of Howard Brinton's contribu-

tion to the symposium. Stage by stage he outlines the inner spiritual progress of outstanding Quakers from George Fox down. This essay will be of particular interest to students of the psychology of religion.

More successfully, I think, than any other religious denomination, the Quakers have carried their religion into their daily life. It cannot be said of them, as it was of their early Calvinistic contemporaries in New England, that "they prayed on their knees on Sunday and on their neighbors the rest of the week." Their religion dictates simplicity in dress, speech, and manner. It commends frequent, often daily, periods of silent meditation to clear the soul's vision for the guidance of that Inward Light which is divine direction. This has meant a spiritual interpretation of the problems of everyday living. It set the Friends against slavery; it has made them pacifists; it led to their activity in prison reform; it has strengthened their belief in education. These aspects of Quakerism are well represented by several essays in this volume. I have already mentioned those on William Penn and Edward Byllynge, leaders in a liberal charter of government. Notable also are Charles F. Jenkins' essay on Joseph Hewes, the Quaker signer of the Declaration of Independence, the essay on Timothy Nicholson of Indiana by Walter C. Woodward, and the beautifully written sketch of Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton by the author of *Elizabeth Fry*. Indeed, it is difficult to pick out chapters here and there. The flavor of Quaker life wells through them all, and it is a flavor worth the knowing.

Divine-Human Society, which is a happy phrase for the Society of Friends, is a small book,—too small, I think, for its scope. It falls into two parts. The first is an examination of the central problem of modern civilization, with brief comments on some proposed solutions. The second is the suggestion that in the peculiar organizations of the Friends lies a hopeful clue to a possible remedy. The problem in this materialistic age is to build a society that will be a home for the human spirit as well as for the body. The Middle Ages had its solution, but the modern world must find its salvation in terms of contemporary conditions and thought-forms. How are we to transcend the individualism and materialism which began with the Renaissance, and which has resulted in the disintegration of modern life? Fascism, communism, socialism will not suffice. Here the author makes an assumption which many will question: there is no solution possible without recognition

of the unifying power of God. Just as the Middle Ages made man spiritually and physically at home with its theocratic organization, so the solution for our day must rest on a *religious* principle. Where are we to find a model to go by? Not in Protestantism, which emphasizes individual salvation, with the Church a kind of atomic group. Not in Catholicism, which emphasizes the whole to the exclusion of the parts, although it is interesting to note that, in spite of the differences which seem to put Catholicism and Quakerism at opposite religious poles, the author finds a closer connection on this point with Catholicism than with Protestantism. The answer must be in an *organic* type of relationship, and this is best illustrated by the religious organization of the Society of Friends.

The assumptions involved in this argument will leave many, I fear, in disagreement. It must be confessed that the treatment is too short for so important a theme. Many points need more careful treatment and defence than the time limits of the original lecture permitted. It may be true that we cannot solve our problems without recourse to a personal God, but many think that that fact is not obvious. What we need, these critics say, is *faith*, but not necessarily faith in God. The ultimate solution must needs be spiritual, but it need not be religious in the narrower sense.

If Howard Brinton is suggestive rather than convincing in his larger thesis—and that after all is without doubt his intent—he is both suggestive and convincing in the second half of the book, where he turns to a critical discussion of the Quaker "meeting for business." This will be interesting to non-Quakers in the insight it gives into the organization of the Society of Friends, and it ought to be required reading for all members of the Society itself. Each Quaker Meeting, or Church, holds a "meeting for worship" on Sunday, or "First Day," morning. These meetings, without any formal services, and in all but a few places without a paid minister, are occasions for quiet meditation together. Whenever some Friend has a "concern," or whenever the "Inner Light" prompts him to speak, he gets to his feet and says what is on his mind and heart to say. The long period of silence, and the complete freedom in speaking, give the effect of great simplicity. The actual organization of the Society is based on similarly simple and democratic principles. Each Meeting has a monthly meeting for its business; several Meetings will have a quarterly meeting together;

and several quarterly meetings will unite in a yearly meeting. At these meetings no vote is ever taken; the clerk will interpret the "sense of the meeting," and action will be taken when complete unanimity is reached. Rarely is an individual overruled. If there are dissenters, discussion and meditation will be continued until all are in agreement. If this is not reached, the subject will be put aside until a future time. Only where immediate action must be taken will dissent occasionally be disregarded.

It is a slow method, ponderous at times, but for two hundred and fifty years it has been extraordinarily successful. It is a perfect example of the method of arbitration, and a practical illustration of pacifist principles. It is an experience in co-operation which has made possible many of the joint social enterprises of the Friends. The dangers and strength of this type of organization are ably discussed by Howard Brinton, and the discussion gives an illuminating picture of the inner working of the Society of Friends.

The Eternal Gospel of Rufus Jones concentrates upon one of the central tenets of Quakerism—its mysticism. A mystic himself, Rufus Jones is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Haverford College, for a long time Chairman of the Friends' Service Committee, and the author of over forty volumes on religion, mysticism, and Quaker history. This is the first to appear in a new series, entitled *The Great Issues of Life Series,* under his general editorship. Each volume will be written by a different author, and the general intent is to produce a series of "lucid and luminous" books on topics of great fundamental religious importance.

There is no doubt that Rufus Jones has written such a lucid and luminous book himself. It is extremely readable, with a wealth of quotations and illustrations drawn from a lifetime of varied reading and rich experience. By the Eternal Gospel he means "the endless revelation to men of a spiritual Reality who is over all and in all, and at the same time vastly more than all things in space and time, a Reality both immanent and transcendent, as Spirit in its essential nature is bound to be." This is a typical Quaker belief, although it is not limited by any means to Quakers. We can see this continual revelation in the advent of Christ, in history, in literature, in the development of the Church, in the experiences of the great mystics, but above all—and here comes the Quaker note—in the little happenings of our daily

life, and in the Inner Light which guides us day by day, if we will but sit quietly and wait for it. The author has little use for those theological systems which divide the natural and the supernatural into two distinct realms. There is no clear dividing line between them. It is because the human spirit is continuous with the Spirit that is beyond that man is capable of receiving this continual revelation and that God is capable of making it.

Any topic such as this must touch upon the major religious and philosophic problems. To the extreme mystic who has seen what is ineffable there are no such problems, for he claims to have transcended reason altogether. One of the great virtues of Quaker mysticism, however, is its quiet modesty and sweet reasonableness. It produces few trances and fits; it clothes daily living with power and dignity. And the author sides with Paul as against the Romans that speaking with tongues is of little value if men's reasons are not persuaded. Hence it is only natural to look for the evidence of a reasonable interpretation of the relation of man and God. There is much here at which no one could cavil, but there are also points which leave one wondering.

In the first chapter, after asserting his belief in God and defining his meaning of the Eternal Gospel, Rufus Jones is forced into consideration of the exact relation of God to man. What view shall we take—theism, pantheism, or agnostic humanism? The last is unsatisfactory, but pantheism is equally "sterile." The theistic conception of God as Spirit must be accepted, but we find no defence of it against the usual difficulties which are so familiar. It is this theism which, in a later chapter, solves the problem of emergent evolution. We must admit novelty and levels of existence which cannot be explained in terms of what has preceded. This implies the belief in an active, creative God. But does it? There are other ways of looking upon emergence, and the while the divine *nisus* is a tenable hypothesis, it is a little dogmatic to write as if it were the only one. Again, any theistic theory must face the problem of evil. Now, for Rufus Jones "all forms of monism and pantheism crack on the gigantic boulder of the fact of unmistakable *evil* in our world." Their error lies in reading evil out of the universe, instead of recognizing it for what it is. What then are we to make of this statement a page later? "We must either admit that God is not all-powerful and can be defeated, *or* that there is some high and undefeated purpose expressing itself through this mixed and

tangled web of things we call our world. I am distinctly for this latter alternative." If God has a purpose into which everything necessarily fits, then what seems to us to be evil must in fact, and in the long run, be good. What is this but the monistic view that evil is not an unmistakable fact? The appeal to free-will is of little help. If freedom is taken seriously and of cosmic importance, God can not have a set purpose which He is working out in his own way. If not, freedom might account for moral evil, but it leaves untouched the nightmare of physical evil for which no human being is responsible. On either alternative the problem remains unsolved.

One would expect a book on the continual revelation of God in human life to be vitally concerned with the validity of the mystic experience. Rufus Jones recognizes that there is a problem. "Not everyone who claims to have *seen* has thereby actually seen. Secret, private interviews are not always reliable or convincing. Illusion and delusion dog our footsteps in every field of human interest. The mind of man is prone to mistake dream for reality and to follow wandering fires." Such experiences must be tested, examined, verified before they can be relied upon. But what constitutes verification (the term is in the text)? I find no answer. It is not enough to say that mysticism gives power or gentleness or love, for the dream can do this as well as the reality. I am not sure that there is an answer, but here, as in the other issues, a book that will appeal to men's reasons as well as to their emotions must advance carefully and reason clearly.

For all these technical points *The Eternal Gospel* is an attractive and persuasive book. And as it is intended for a popular audience, it would be unfair to lay too great stress on its omission of a full treatment of philosophic issues. It contains excellent preaching and much ripe wisdom. There are flashes of penetrating insight, such as the discussion of the book of Job, which make it well worth reading. If it lacks a certain subtlety in theory, it is at one in that respect with Quakerism as a whole. And in its practical wisdom and human warmth it is also typical of the genius of Quakerism. For the Friends are a practical people, not given to refinements in theory, but strong in good works, and spiritually significant far beyond their numbers.

John W. Nason

Swarthmore College

Religion in Transition. By S. Radhakrishnan, C. F. Andrews, G. A. Coe, A. Loisy, J. H. Leuba and E. D. Starbuck. Edited (with preface) by Virgilius Ferm. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. 266 pp. $2.75.

The past few decades have witnessed, the world over, concerted efforts to get philosophers, theologians and others to tell in essay form the story of their intellectual development. The role which Professor Vergilius Ferm has played in all this is familiar to those who have followed these matters. Professor Ferm has done us a considerable service gathering the essays that have gone into the making of *Religion in Transition.* The task, he tells us, has not been an easy one—not incomparable to assembling six top-ranking Hollywood stars for one radio program. However, he did it, and the results deserve acclaim. We have case material in brief essay form from S. Radhakrishnan, C. F. Andrews, George A. Coe, Alfred Loisy, James H. Leuba and Edwin D. Starbuck—religious development in *sebstdarstellung*. In commenting on a book of this kind one can begin, I suppose, with the work of the editor and then go on to the essays.

The editor has concerned himself with gathering the personal experiences of those who have labored beyond the boundaries of "theology" in adjacent fields of philosophy, history, psychology, education, and missionary work. He also relates that material, however, to the present crisis in religion and culture. Just to get the picture clearly in mind, it ought to be observed again that there are great crises which produce men whose thoughts and actions set the stage for centuries. Such men were Plato, the Upanishad thinkers, Confucius, and the scientists of the European Renaissance. Then there are minor crises that produce men who effect changes which are fairly important, but not very deep. Too often we confuse the two. A quotation from Wieman and Wieman opens the volume and suggests to us—and we all deeply feel it—that we are living in one of the great crisis periods of history. I doubt, however, that any of the six men whose essays follow the quotation feel themselves to be key figures in the crisis, even though they have been leaders in their fields. With due respect to all, their work will not be the six pillars upon which will rest the religion of the future. And perhaps Professor Ferm did not wish to leave that impression, but rather that each had wrought well in his

own field in the early decades of the twentieth century and had not been lacking in prophetic insight. Not a small achievement!

Inevitably, one guesses, a group of essays such as the present one suggests that they are representative of the era. Perhaps from that point of view the weakness of the book is its omissions, or rather its lack of balance. New leaders emerged, almost at the turn of the century, whose accounts would have given a different picture of the formative period of the twentieth century—especially in terms of the life-development of a single individual. One wonders, therefore, what the picture would have been if the chapter on the meeting of Eastern and Western culture in terms of philosophy had been written by Tagore or Hu Shih; if the chapter on Psychology of Religion had been written by William Brown of Oxford, instead of Starbuck; if the chapter on Catholicism had been written by Father Ryan; and if the Biblical history part of Loisy's chapter had been done by Bultmann. How different the twentieth century would be made to appear, at least within the covers of one book. Common to all six of the contributors is a conscious or strongly developing secularism of a fairly easy-going variety. Nowhere is there a hint of the impact of phenomenology on religion and the additional tendency to segregate the "essence" and make it "holy."

It is not without interest that the story of the development of the attitudes and work of the five occidentals is written chiefly in terms of a reaction to the past. There were no cultural invasions from without in their lives. Changes were taking place under the pressure of the rise of the doctrine of evolution, and new scientific methods in the natural and cultural sciences. A reluctant flight from the past, but a clinging to the past. Radhakrishnan's story, however, is in part a reaction to an invading Christianity and a search for Hindu values, indicating conflict between cultures, as well as within a culture. In the account of C. F. Andrews, on the missionary front, the two types of conflict meet—first the wrestling with changing beliefs, then the participation in national and cultural conflicts.

Individually the chapters are both profitable and enjoyable reading. Radhakrishnan again presents Hinduism as the intuitive way of life, finding its end in the integrated self whose salvation is integration in the Whole through the ethical and communal life of the group—an attractive view if one could only find adequate grounds for his "faith."

Unfortunately he goes on to tell only of his moral influence on Western students, but gives little insight in this chapter into East-West relations. After the early major problems of belief were settled, C. F. Andrews went from one moral problem to another—war, labor problems, cultural and class conflict. In him the development of a humanitarian Christianity went far, and it went deep into his own soul. If he did not conceive the problem very profoundly he may be excused with the question: Which of the great missionary leaders did? And the answer must be: Only Albert Schweitzer. With his usual humor and urbanity George A. Coe tells of his trek from theology, through nineteenth century Christian Liberalism, and the wastes [mine] of religious education, to a wrestling with the social foundations of education and the problem of revolution. To the proletariat he looks for light on religion. His closing pages on the moral value of the anticipated close of his career—Death—are a little gem. Loisy retells his futile effort to move the Roman Catholic Church. One sees clearly how deeply he was affected by the culture of his time, rather than by tradition or the times with which he dealt in his historical treatises. Personal development and social evolution, those two great nineteenth century ideals, were rooted deep in his being. Like Troeltsch, he came to believe that Christianity would gradually disappear in an emerging religion of mankind. It may—but not through the even flow of progressing enlightenment and social evolution as was so comfortably believed a decade or more ago. Leuba and Starbuck recount the adventures of psychologists amid the changing American academic scene. Though both exerted influence outside the academic world, their stories deal mostly with the developing views of the academic man and his science. At the present stage in their long careers both of these men emphasize broad non-sectarian views—Leuba in social ethics, Starbuck in characterology.

Starbuck, more than any of the others, seems to realize that we have moved out of the scientific climate of the nineteenth century, and that the physical sciences have given us a new world. Coe senses the great changes in the social world. If none of the six presents his successors with large leading ideas to use in the construction of the future religion, it must be said that all look forward, and in none is there a spirit of nostalgia. That spirit, curiously enough, exists—in many forms—in younger men. Many of us feel ourselves far removed from the ideas,

forces, and problems amid which these men began their careers, and with which they wrestled long and hard. How far we are removed, a reading of this book will vividly bring home to us.

HAROLD BUSCHMAN

University of Kansas City

City and Church in Transition: A Study of the Medium-Sized City and Its Organized Religious Life. By MURRAY H. LIEFFER. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 1938. xiii + 301 pp. $2.50.

In *City and Church in Transition* Professor Lieffer has given to pastors, paid workers, and official boards in city churches a book of such profound help as has seldom been written. It is of special value to those who are working in the medium-sized city from 50,000 to 150,000 population which the author calls mediopolis. In the cities of this size transition from the small city to the metropolis is under way. The full force of intensive urbanization is at work. The terrific changes which are inherent in this process leave their inescapable marks upon people and social institutions. Churches, whether they will or not, or whether they know it or not, are in transition. If these churches are to survive as useful institutions depends, first of all, on an understanding, by their leaders of what is happening and why, and second, on their ability to adapt their churches to changing circumstances.

As a basis for such an understanding, the transition is simply but basically analysed in relationship to five different types of cities: the commercial city, the industrial city, the industrial suburb, the residential suburbs, and the resort city. Professor Lieffer finds the fundamental difference in these types of cities to be in the distribution of occupations in which workers are employed. From this are developed profound implications involving kinds of people, social circumstances and problems, and their effects on living which define physical, population, economic and sociological characteristics of each type of city. A series of brief sketches of particular cities of each type show clearly what these characteristics mean, and in addition point out that each city also has "a personality" of its own. These characteristics and this personality are readily determined with study.

The second half of the book deals with an analysis of churches and their problems in each type of city, with a consideration of particular cities to show the effects of individual peculiarities. The basis of this

analysis was the data obtained from 313 churches through questionnaires, developed as a result of a series of four summer conferences (1934-1937), dealing with problems of churches in medium-sized cities, in which ministers representing sixteen of these cities were present. Certain problems were found to be common to churches of each type of city, others are due to a single city's distinctive character. The final chapter is a non-technical presentation of methods which are useful to those who desire to build policies and programs for their churches on a basis of facts about their communities and cities.

Throughout the discussion many fundamental sociological principles emerge such as: " . . . the population growth tends to shape the religious life of the community and to determine which organizations will prosper and which will remain static," and " . . . unless it (a church) takes into account the distinctive traits and needs of the community it will gradually lose its raison d'etre," and again, "the various denominations have their respective locales in which they can prosper, just as certain plants will grow in sandy soil but not in loam, or vice versa."

The replies of pastors revealed very clearly some of the fundamental weaknesses in the churches. Statement of objectives were general and vague, and evidences of specific adaptation to community needs were lacking in many cases. Competition was frequent, and a constructive co-operative approach to problems of churching cities was almost entirely absent. These facts indicate a lack of understanding of the social forces and circumstances analysed in this study.

The criticisms which are made of churches are more implicit than explicit. While they are severe, they are always constructively made. Not too much blame should be laid on the shoulders of pastors, even though they cannot escape responsibility, because comparatively few of those who are products of theological seminaries received sociological training as a part of their curriculum. This is even today an entirely neglected study in most theological seminaries. Professor Lieffer's book, if it is used as widely as it should be, will provide a significant compensation for this unfortunate lack in training.

It is fair to judge the book only in terms of what it is intended to be. As a basic analysis of cities and their churches, against which those who are responsible for city churches can see the foundations of their problems more clearly, and in which they can find a pattern to follow

in solving these problems with greater promise of success in extending the usefulness of their churches, it is a masterful job. It reads like a fascinating story and yet almost every sentence is packed with significant suggestions to set an intelligent reader directly to work on the problems of his own church.

For the sociologist the book has much that is important: the basis of classifying cities, the implications of the distinctive characteristics of each type of city, the significance of these characteristics for social institutions. The development of the primary thesis, that the medium-sized cities are of special sociological significance because they represent the transition period in city growth, is a valuable contribution. Studies of this size cities have been all too few. The sociologist will, without doubt, miss tables, footnotes, references and bibliography. It would be helpful to him if they were there. The book, however, was not written primarily for the sociologist, and he should, at least, give the author the benefit of the doubt in his decision that they were both better omitted for the audience to which he was writing.

It is quite possible that Professor Lieffer's book sets an advance pattern for sociological writing. While this is essentially a research study with adequate data which has been thoroughly studied and analysed, the data and analyses are not presented as an array of facts, but in reference to their administrative implications. It is a guide book and a pattern for those who want to do something about making churches more effective in American cities.

It was Charles Beard who said that the report of President Hoover's Committee on Recent Social Trends was in all probability the last great research study which would be reported as a mass of facts. This book is one sort of illustration of what Dr. Beard had in mind as a more practical and useful report.

WILBUR C. HALLENBECK

Columbia University

The Christian Understanding of Man. By T. E. JESSOP, R. L. CALHOUN, and Others. Chicago and New York: Willet, Clark & Co., 1938. xii + 268 pp. $2.00.

This is one of the books prepared in advance of the Oxford Conference. Like most of the other volumes in its series, the present work consists of essays contributed by scholars from various countries. But

it is no ordinary symposium; the plan and content of most of the papers were discussed in small international conferences, and mimeographed drafts circulated for criticism and comment in different countries. Anyone who saw several of these essays in their early form may discover for himself that some of the papers were revised and rewritten in the light of these criticisms. This international exchange of ideas not only gives these books an ecumenical character, but inaugurates a method of co-operation that may do much to cure the insularity into which Christian thought has drifted. This volume illustrates the fact that the British and the American theologian are closer in spirit and method to each other than either is to his continental colleague. While the former have shown themselvs eager to learn from the insights of the latter, there is less evidence in the present group of essays that this responsiveness has been reciprocated. The process of mutual education must therefore go on, since American theology, in particular, has achieved important methods and insights that need continually to be pressed as essential components in theological thought claiming to be ecumenical.

The central problem of the present volume is the relation of the Christian doctrine of man to anthropologies based upon natural knowledge. This theme, indeed, is found in all the essays. The book is divided into two parts: in the first, T. E. Jessop, Robert L. Calhoun and N. N. Alexeiev define Christian belief against the "heretical" doctrines of natural science, positivistic humanism and Marxism, respectively; in the second, Emil Brunner, Austin Farrer, Walter M. Horton and Pierre Maury attempt, each in his own way, to formulate a positive statement of the Christian doctrine of man. We shall here confine ourselves to a sampling of the treatment accorded the central question, together with some comment on the issues involved.

In the opening essay, Professor Jessop attempts to show that the scientific and religious interpretations of man cannot conflict, since these "are reached from distinct points of view and by distinct methods" (p. 25). The nature of objective natural science being "the study of a definite field of perceptual existents under the ideal of logical system" (p. 20), it is "incompetent to pronounce on religion in so far as religion includes affirmations about transcendental entities and values" (p. 34). Not science, then, but its speculative extension into naturalistic philosophy challenges the religious doctrine of man. He

does not find this a very great difficulty, however, since in his judgment the merely naturalistic extension of the scientist's world, having room only for events related spatially, temporally, mathematically, and causally, does not include cognition. In short, the scientist's world does not include the scientist. He is a priori to science. "What includes man is not a purely causal system; . . . the ground and significance of his nature must be a spiritual order . . . " (p. 41).

Professor Calhoun finds the limited frame of reference employed by naturalism, as exemplified by American pragmatism, not only inadequate to explain man, but inadequate also to provide meaning and power to man's moral aspirations and struggles. He acknowledges that "much in what is affirmed by pragmatism, and by the unreflective modernism to which it gives one sort of voice, can be affirmed also by a contemporary Christian. . . . But such affirmation, when set in the frame of Christian faith, takes on meaning beyond any for which naturalism has room" (p. 68). Thus the Christian faith conflicts with modernism only when the latter tends to make positivism itself a creed. But this creed is not a sufficient explanation of man's inability to live simply in the present, his attempt to measure up to norms that transcend present desire, his felt responsibility. "To regard such a being as completely describable in terms of phenomena is to miss the most distinctive thing about him: his being haunted by what seems a perpetual summons from beyond every present appearance" (p. 73). Only when man interprets himself against the sovereignty of God as the ultimate reference can he realize the fulfilment of his root nature (p. 75). And, indeed, this recognition of responsibility is the mark of man's humanity. "In failing or refusing to acknowledge the sovereignty of God, they deny their own nature as human, and condemn themselves to inner conflict, incurable by anything they themselves can do, which tends continually to their own destruction" (p. 77).

If the scientific and positivistic anthropologies are either limited or inadequate, where shall we turn for light? Professor Brunner, in his article, asserts that we must begin by recognizing that "man is a 'theological' being: that is, his ground, his goal, his norm, and the possibility of understanding his own nature are all in God" (p. 142). The Christian view of man, accordingly, is not to be derived from

natural knowledge, but from God who has disclosed himself in the Bible. Although the biblical doctrine of man springs from the divine revelation, its object is the empirical man, man as he actually is: a responsible and personal creature. "If anyone could say what this responsible personal existence is, whence responsibility comes, what its aim is and why it is that the actual man is always in conflict with his true responsibility, he would have found the key to the mystery" (p. 151). "Natural" doctrines of man, which he has evolved out of his own inner consciousness, can give no real answer to the question. The answer is to be found only in the view of man as revealed in the Bible, in the doctrines of man's creation in the image of God, of the Fall, and of the restoration through Christ, who reveals to man both his original nature and his inner contradiction, and thus restores him to his original unity.

While the other contributors to Part II agree with Professor Brunner that the Christian doctrine of man must be oriented against a theological background, they represent divergent points of view on some of the issues involved. Thus Mr. Farrer insists that the Christian doctrine of man has two roots: "The doctrine revealed from heaven and the doctrine which springs from the enlightened conscience" (p. 183). He adds that "to maintain that apart from the one revelation there is no conception of man's nature or pattern of life, is nothing more or less than an attempt to silence good evidence by hard swearing . . ." (p. 191). For him "the content of the Christian doctrine of man is the whole deliverance of the true Christian conscience, in unity with our Lord's, concerning the good for man in this life" (p. 200). Professor Horton, in his remarkably well-balanced essay, reminds us that "the secular, scientific portrait of man . . . needs to be incorporated in the Christian view, both as to points of contact with the secular mind, and as a needed check upon fanatical aberrations in Christian belief" (p. 233). He accordingly conceives it to be his task to organize our contemporary empirical knowledge of man in terms of the Biblical understanding. At the opposite extreme of this sympathetic appreciation of the contribution of natural knowledge stands M. Maury, who asserts that "to be really Christian, it is necessary that anthropology, like other theological doctrines, should give up taking as a starting point the same knowledge that the secular

anthropologies take. . . . Just as metaphysics are incapable of judging the truth of the revelation, . . . so an anthropology according to the Bible cannot be judged by any secular anthropology; it judges them all" (p. 248).

There are two groups of questions raised in this work which require further thought and discussion. These have to do with science and with revelation. As to the former, it may be urged that the demonstration of the limitations of science does not establish the transcendental character of those things which transcend science. These latter may transcend science without transcending experience. The recognition that there is much in experience that is not caught in the net of scientific categories indeed leaves room for an empirical theology, but gives no support to assertions about "transcendental entities and values" based on revelation as this is understood by most of the contributors to this volume. Furthermore, those who would exploit the limitations of science in the interest of theology must be clear as to whether they regard science in realistic or in positivistic fashion. If the former, then the categories of science have metaphysical status; they transcend the phenomenal realm, and whatever is asserted about transcendental values and entities must be such as to be harmonious with the structure of reality as presented in the sciences. On these premises, the existence of transcendental entities and values will be conditioned by the possibility of their harmonious inclusion within the framework of scientific laws elevated into metaphysical principles. If, on the other hand, science be regarded in positivistic fashion, as merely man's way of organizing his experience, it does not, by definition, assert anything about unseen reality. Indeed, science thus regarded becomes a more or less verifiable myth about experience. But if the formulations of science are denied absolute truth value, then transcendental theology would seem to take its status as myth also, only much less verifiable. One suspects, therefore, that realistic theology would be well advised not to ride to an easy triumph on the doctrine of science's relative and limited character.

In the second place, readers who have been brought up under the historical approach to religious literature and the doctrines contained in it, will want to know why they should accept biblical doctrine as authoritative revelation. The answer given in the volume under

review is that this "revealed" doctrine alone will give adequate explanation or meaning to certain human experiences. The answer is open to two lines of objection: (1) the claim that the biblical doctrine alone explains certain experiences does less than justice to alternative theories; (2) the explanation afforded by the biblical doctrine is not ultimate. It ends in the inscrutable mystery of God. It has no logical force over those who prefer the more familiar mysteries of experience itself. These latter will prefer to say that the experiences in question explain biblical doctrines rather than vice versa. This is to say that the latter too are "natural" doctrines, evolved out of human consciousness—a proposition that is ultimately inescapable. The claim that biblical doctrines do not have their origin in experience is itself a theory (totally out of harmony with modern biblical scholarship) with human origins, and as such cannot make good its claim to special privilege.

The issue between science and theology, between natural knowledge and revelation, is not so much a question of content, or even of jurisdiction, as it is one of method. The empirical method in theology alone can solve this issue in such a way that theology can command the respect of secular thought and develop along with it. Confident insistence upon the claims of this method may well prove to be the significant contribution that American thinkers can make to ecumenical Christian thought.

Herman A. Brautigam

Colgate University

BOOK NOTES

The Negritos of Malaya. By I. H. N. Evans, Cambridge: At the University Press. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. xiii + 323 pp. $7.00.

This is by far the most thorough and comprehensive work on the Negritos of Malaya which has appeared to date. The author was in close contact with these little people for nearly twenty years, has already published a great number of monographs dealing with specific aspects of their culture, and is better equipped to write such a book than any other person. The work is cast in the form of a standard ethnological treatise, uninfluenced by the recent psychological and functional developments in anthropological theory. In his attempt to maintain complete accuracy and objectivity the author has eliminated much material which would have been considered valuable by workers in these fields. Occasional reminiscences show that he has this material at his command, but the present work will be of interest primarily to those dealing with trait distributions and the historic reconstructions which may be based upon them. It presents the formal patterns of Negrito belief and behavior in great and exact detail, but it throws little light on what the members of this primitive group think or feel.

The Negritos are one of the most primitive, in the sense of culturally simple, people in existence today. The sections dealing with their beliefs and magical practices are therefore of especial interest to students of the evolution of religion. It is somewhat startling to learn that their own legends of their origin reflect episodes in the Hindu *Rāmāyana* so closely that one is forced to believe that they were borrowed from it. Their religion centers about either one or two great sky-dwelling deities, the number depending upon the particular tribe, which the author believes to be deified remote ancestors. These deities appear to be more interested in the enforcement of certain taboos than in what we would consider ethical or unethical conduct, expressing their displeasure by lightning and flood. At the first sign of divine wrath the offender must make an offering of his own blood. Of particular interest is the complete absence here of either anamistic or anamatistic beliefs. There are little beings, the Chinoi, who may enter birds or plants, but by no means all individuals of the species which they frequent have them. There is also a complete absence of any belief in mana, impersonal supernatural power.

Ralph Linton

Shamanism in Western North America. By Willard Z. Park. (Northwestern University Studies in the Social Sciences No. 2.) Evanston and Chicago, 1938. viii + 166 pp. $2.25.

Dr. Park's own field work among the Paviotso Indians in western Ne-

vada has furnished the nucleus of this volume. To it are added data from various published and manuscript accounts which carry the reader occasionally into the Southwest and southern British Columbia, but are derived in the main from Indian tribes of the western United States.

If the title has led the student of religions to anticipate a comprehensive description which will link what has become almost the type picture of shamanism, that of eastern Siberia, with contiguous New World areas, he is doomed to disappointment. The anthropologist is apt to think of Alaska, and especially of western Canada, as the "Northwest," so that Dr. Park's "western North America" is in truth the region lying between the Northwest on the one hand and the Southwest on the other. The current anthropological problem within this area concerns the cultural relationship of the tribes of the Great Basin, in which the Paviotso are included, with others, most particularly with those of the Plateau and of Central California. As explained in the sub-title, this is "a study in cultural relationships," and it aims "to ascertain those interrelationships of tribal cultures reflected in the geographical distributions of the elements found in a single localized shamanistic complex" (page 2).

The path of such an investigation is beset with methodological pitfalls which Dr. Park considers briefly. He finds that, although there are important links between the Paviotso and all of the surrounding cultures, the data do not point conclusively in any one direction, and the Basin tribes have a considerable number of practices in common. The question, however, is not that of establishing a new culture area in the Wisslerian sense, but rather that of recognizing affiliations through culture history which cut across the boundaries of the descriptively determined areas.

The picture of shamanism which emerges from such a setting is necessarily marred by the emphasis upon elements. But the Paviotso complex receives rather full ethnological treatment. Its dominant idea is that of curing, and the chief ceremony is the curing rite. This ceremony, plus the communal antelope drive which is in charge of a shaman, form the important items in the simple ceremonial practice. Shamans acquire supernatural power from animal or natural "spirits" and can control health, not only by curing, but also by causing illness, almost entirely without the magical appliances so often connected with sorcery. Beliefs, as well as practices, center around the shaman and his unusual abilities, and it is deemed unnecessary in the local situation to raise the question of the significance of shamanism as compared with other forms of religious behavior.

MARION W. SMITH

Lukians Schrift über die syrische Göttin. By CARL CLEMEN. (Der Alte Orient, 37, ¾). Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1938. 57 pp. R.M. $2.10.

The twenty-one pages of Lucian's treatise *On the Syrian Goddess* constitute the best ancient source for the beliefs, practices, and apparatus of

the religions on the eastern periphery of the Greco-Roman world. The treatise presents a mingling of many strands, diverse in their origins and in their destined ultimate transformations. Here the story of Deucalion and the Deluge, for example, has patent affinities with both the Gilgamish epic *and* the biblical account. We read of sacred fish, of sacred doves, of a castrated and tonsured priesthood, of a religious practise of ascending and remaining atop of phallic pillars, of tatooing and the sacrifice of hair, as well as significant accounts of Herakles, Astarte, Europa, Aphrodite, Adonis, and the fish-goddess Derceto. The tales of Stratonice and her step-son, and of Stratonice and Combabus, have had interesting reincarnations in the literature of Europe.

Professor Clemen, who has lectured on this text many years, presents here a German translation and a commentary in the form of excursuses on: (1) "Die phönikischen Heiligtümer"; (2) "Die Sagen von der Entstehung des Tempels in Hierapolis"; (3) "Die Lage und Einrichtung des Tempels in Hierapolis"; (4) "Der Kult im Tempel in Hierapolis." The subject matter naturally requires excursuses on such points, but a running commentary on the whole is also wanted. Except for the fact that Clemen's notes are up to date (he cites the Ras Shamra texts and the discoveries at Dura-Europos and at Khirbet et-Tannur in Transjordania) the notes and other subsidiary material in Strong and Garstang's *The Syrian Goddess* are more helpful in this respect. What is wanted is an edition presenting: (1) the original along with the translation (the Greek, though Ionic, is extraordinarily simple, and the connotations of the Greek words are especially important here); (2) a critical apparatus (the variants, especially in names, are significant); (3) a running commentary, with references to parallels in ancient literature and to archeological remains; and (4) a collection of illustrations, from the ancient monuments, of the deities and objects described; as well as a series of excursuses, which should, among other things, trace the subsequent history of some of the practices dealt with. No scholar is better able to provide such an edition than Professor Clemen, and it is to be hoped that the present somewhat popular work is only a prelude for a fuller one to come.

Moses Hadas

Mahayana Buddhism. By Beatrice Lane Suzuki. London: The Buddhist Lodge, 1938. xxxiv + 170 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*

The author of this little book, parts of which have already been published in recent issues of the periodical, *Buddhism in England*, is the American-born wife of the famous interpreter of Zen, Daisetsu Teitaro Suzuki, who contributes a long and important Introduction to this publication. The author intends to answer a genuine need of our time, since no other brief outline of Mahayana Buddhism is available, although study in this field has had the most stimulating effect on research in the history of

religions during the last decade. While D. T. Suzuki's many volumes offer a complete picture of the most important doctrines of later Mahayana Buddhism, B. L. Suzuki alone can claim to have presented a short abstract of the whole field of Mahayana doctrine. This outline does not offer anything new to the scholar who is already acquainted with the literature in this field, and with the sources themselves, and, on the other hand, it is too condensed and too abstract for the mere layman, but it does offer to the student an excellent means of acquiring in a short time a comprehensive conception of the history, main problems, and doctrines of Mahayana. It is worth mentioning that for this purpose it was important to add the good bibliography and index that is found in this book. But the "Short Glossary of Buddhist Terms" is much too short, and the explanation of Sanscrit and Chinese terms too general to be really helpful—a rather general fault in short glossaries.

While the wish for an outline of Mahayana has been fulfilled by this informative little book, there still remains the needs for a comprehensive Mahayana anthology. The seventeen pages of selections from those scriptures included here do not at all answer this need, partly because the extracts are much too short and aphoristic, and partly, also, because the point of view of their selection seems to have been the supposed interest and needs of western, Christian students. Thus, moralistic passages, and essays on sin and repentance are quoted by preference, while the more characteristic metaphysical paradoxes are almost entirely omitted. May we not ask interpreters of Eastern wisdom to consider the fact that in the Western approach to religious problems there has occurred a definite change in recent times?

FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG

A Buddhist Bible. By DWIGHT GODDARD. Edited and published by Dwight Goddard. Thetford, Vermont, 1938. 700 pp.

This is the second and greatly enlarged edition of a work first published in 1932. It is a collection of variously translated scriptures, chiefly representative of Mahayana Buddhism. Intended to be a source of spiritual inspiration for American readers it is hardly to be judged in terms of critical linguistic and historical scholarship. Its selections from Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan and modern sources give the reader some idea, not too technical, of the immense and subtle world of Buddhist piety and aspiration as these are encountered in the scriptures. Works presented more or less integrally are such classics as the Tevigga Sutta, the Diamond, Surangama and Lankavatara Sutras, the Awakening of Faith, together with less well-known writings, translated in some instances by modern Japanese and Tibetan Buddhists. On the whole the book, though not critically precise, is impressive and suggestive.

CLARENCE H. HAMILTON

The Old Testament and Modern Discovery. By STEPHEN L. CAIGER. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 102 pp., 8 plates. 90 cents.

The student of the Old Testament is frequently uninformed of the main results of archeological excavation in Bible lands, such as the pre-Hebrew civilizations of Canaan and the state of the country in the thirteenth century when the Israelites make their appearance, the appearance and equipment of Hebrew towns and fortresses, cultural and political relations of the Hebrew kingdoms with other states, and the like. Caiger's effort to provide a brief introduction to this field suffers from two fatal defects. Like so many persons who have a deep interest in the Bible, Caiger labors under the fallacy that the proposition that "the Old Testament is right," or its opposite, can be demonstrated by archeologists, or by any other craft. The Old Testament consists of thirty-six books, varying widely in literary character and purpose, a good portion of which—the poetic and wisdom sections—is by nature immune from the criterion of accuracy. It is this false concern which has led Caiger to seek in Egyptian literature proof that the Lord smote the first-born, for example, rather than content himself with realistic light on Hebrew history provided by those sources. The second great failing of this book lies in the arrangement under geographic units, rather than by historical periods, each illuminated by discoveries in various lands. This exhibits Caiger's lack of the historical outlook, which also accounts for a number of misplaced emphases scattered throughout the book. Caiger's book is immeasurably inferior to the similar survey by William F. Albright, *Recent Discoveries in Bible Lands*, which forms the introduction to the 1936 edition of Young's *Concordance to the Bible*.

JOSHUA STARR

The Ethics of Judaism from the Aspect of Duty. By MAXWELL SILVER. New York: Block Publishing Co., Inc., 1938. 384 pp. $2.50.

Though the voice is that of *Dewey and Tufts*, the hand is closer to Hermann Cohen's, for the author's attempt to prove that in the teaching of the rabbis the moral law is categorical, universal and autonomous, and that, therefore, Judaism is a religion of moral duty, rather than of legalistic precepts, overlooks most of the characteristic features of *Dewey and Tufts*' analysis of duty. It overlooks, especially, the difference between Kantian moral autonomy and "conscious morality," between *the* moral law and the relativity (both psychologically and socially) of duties, and between the conflict of duty *versus* desire and the presence of conflict *in* duty. Rabbi Silver also identifies far too readily the rabbinic doctrine of human nature with the doctrines of psychology, for, though he is no doubt justified in repudiating the dualism of body and soul as foreign to Judaism, he admits the polarity of good and evil in human nature, which misses the point of much of *Dewey and Tufts*, to say nothing of Spinoza and Freud.

However, this failure to identify Judaism with contemporary theories of duty is really in the book's favor. The author remains close enough to his sources, and to the teachings of Judaism, to give an informative and fairly critical survey of Jewish ideas of duty. Even the evident partiality for Deuteronomy and the "ethical" prophets appears to have a basis in tradition, as well as in the author's own mind. For the reader who is not familiar with this literature the book is especially valuable, revealing within the idioms of Talmudic teaching, and medieval Jewish philosophy, practically all the classic schools and controversies of moral theory. A chapter on the ethics of the covenant relationship would have been a welcome addition to the exposition, and might have served incidentally to make Judaism more "modern" than the author's reliance on the moral law permitted.

H. W. S.

Jewish Community Organization in the United States: an Outline of Types of Organizations, Activities, and Problems. By MAURICE J. KARPF, New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1938, xv + 234 pp. $2.00.

The director of the Graduate School for Jewish Social Work, doubtless partly out of a need to place that work on a more scientific basis, has compiled facts, figures and personal observations bearing on the Jewish population in the United States and its distribution in numbers and economic activity, anti-Semitism, immigration and adjustment problems, communal, charitable and cultural organizations. At crucial points he indicates what research work needs to be done.

Readers of the *Review of Religion* will be especially interested in the brief section on religious activities. Most Jews in America take the fact of their Jewishness for granted and give little thought to rationale or survival. Some are militantly nationalistic, others assimilationist. But those who fall into a religious category (about a third of the four and a half million Jews in America) will be in the largest group of "Orthodox," who conform to the traditional faith and forms; or the second largest group, "Conservative," who have departed in moderate measure from the tradition or are among Mordecai Kaplan's Reconstructionists, who observe many old practices less for theological reasons than because they are a sociological bond for a Jewish community with prized cultural values of its own; or the smallest group, "Reform," which largely mimics Protestant Church services and soft-pedals community ties among Jews.

"It has been charged by friends and foes alike," writes Dr. Karpf, "that Jews are non-religious, if not irreligious; that the synagogue and temple no longer attract even the old, much less the young; that the Rabbinate is disintegrating, and that the programs of organizations concerned with the furtherance of Jewish religious life are groping blindly and are carrying on their work unintelligently; that the orthodox and conservative synagogues prepare them for ethical culture, Christian Science, and Christianity; that Rabbis are trained not for the problems which they face in

the modern community, but along lines which give them a knowledge of the past, little appreciation of the present, and no preparation for the future" (p. 158).

In the face of demonstrated increases in American anti-Semitism, which must cause the deepest anxiety to anyone watching the accompaniments of anti-Semitism abroad, the attention of heads of departments, deans, and presidents of universities is called to Dr. Karpf's observation that: "Despite their interest, preparation, and willingness to make the sacrifices which academic work demands, positions in universities for Jewish young men and women seem almost out of reach." Soon, he adds, we shall be hearing that Jews are doing nothing to promote the intellectual life of America. What about this?

BERYL HAROLD LEVY

New York City

The Eastern Branches of the Catholic Church. Six Studies on the Oriental Rites. Compiled by the Liturgical Arts Society, with an introduction by DONALD ATTWATER. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1938. xiii + 110 pp. $1.50.

These six studies by various authors are, of course, written from a purely Roman Catholic point of view, and they contain a great deal of valuable information. Numbers Two and Three, on the Syro-Malankara Church and the Ethiopic Church, by the Most Reverend Mar Ivanios, Archbishop of Trivandrum and His Eminence Eugene Cardinal Risserant, contain material that is easily available elsewhere. Of the other essays, the one on "Liturgy and Asceticism in the Eastern Church," by John LaFarge, S.J., is especially good. There are a few phrases to which exception might be taken, especially in regard to the Decembrists and the Russian sectarians, but the author has brought out well some of the fundamental differences in spirit between Eastern and Western Christianity, and has handled them with great fairness. Likewise, the article on "The Spiritual and Aesthetic Value of Icons," by Ildefonse Dirks, O.S.B., gives a very good summary of the Russian attitude towards icons. In both of these articles, the authors are writing about the Orthodox Church of Russia, and have avoided the tendency that is found elsewhere to devote themselves to the smaller sections of the Church that are in definite relations with the Pope. On the whole the work is valuable, and in these two cases particularly revealing and interesting. The volume contains also a good bibliography.

C. A. M.

The Episcopal Church in the United States, 1800-1840. By WILLIAM WILSON MANROSS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938. 270 pp. $2.75.

This volume contains a great deal of information in an attractive form on the history and life of the Episcopal Church in the early part of the

nineteenth century, and as such it is to be welcomed. There is an amazing lack of information and interest in the period which saw the reorganization of the Church as an independent part of the Anglican communion, after its long neglect as a part of the Church of England.

However it may not be amiss to point out a few omissions in the volume, or to indicate various matters which deserve a more extensive study. The first of these is the question of disestablishment, perhaps in the South, and certainly in the neighborhood of New York. The history of such a Church as Saint Paul's, Eastchester, shows the extreme complication of the settlement. There was ultimately an informal settlement between the Church and the village, in which the churchyard was itself divided into a Church churchyard and a village churchyard, with only one register for the two, and with the sexton receiving at least part of his income from the village. This was probably only one of the forms adopted at the time, and it would be interesting to know whether the Virginia settlements were as generous to the Church or not.

The division of the chapters between the Rector and the Missionary may give at first a false idea to the casual reader. It is true that the rector does belong to the economically more sucessful class in the ministry (p. 69), but this perhaps does not give a true picture. In those days there were far fewer young men serving as assistants in large parishes than there are today, and besides it is probable that many of the rectors fared little better in worldly goods than did some of the missionaries. The division was made not so much by worldly success as by the tendency of the Church to adapt the parish form even in the West, as soon as a stable congregation had been brought together. As so often in histories the study of the rector seems to apply more to the settled parishes of the original states, and the reader has the impression (despite page 111) that most of the Western work was purely missionary. It would have been interesting in this connection had the author added a table of the parishes in the various states at approximately 1840 so as to balance the picture.

There are also several references to schools which involved the rectors and bishops in financial troubles. It might not have been out of place in this connection to have mentioned the Protestant Episcopal Public School Society, which was established by Trinity Church in 1806 to take over the Charity School of the Parish (now Trinity School) as an example of the way in which Trinity Church sought to use its resources under the new national form of government.

These are all small omissions. The volume in its general comments on the education of the clergy, the origin of the seminaries, Sunday schools, etc., contains much valuable material, and we can only be grateful to the author for collecting the information and for putting it together in such an attractive form. The book deserves wide interest from those who are interested in early American life and thought.

C. A. M.

Von Hügel and Tyrrell: The Story of a Friendship. By M. D. Petre. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1938. xii + 203 pp. $1.85.

The modernist controversy in the Roman Catholic Church is dead these many years; and yet it may be said that no series of events in recent Church-history is fraught with deeper significance than that of the early part of this century, involving as it did the destinies of the greatest of Christian bodies and the lives of some of its greatest sons. Whatever judgment may be made upon the Roman Church in its merciless stamping-out of modernism, we are here face to face with profound problems of faith and history, freedom and authority, belief and reason. Much has been written on the controversy—perhaps no book more rounded than Vidler's *The Modernist Movement in the Roman Church*; and much has resulted from it in the way of better understanding of the genius of Christianity as an historical, authoritative religion, yet with an open-mindedness and geniality towards new truth. If these are not all true at Rome, they are true for other Christian groups, especially the Anglican Church—which was probably the recipient of more benefits from the modernist movement in Rome than has always been recognized or admitted.

Because of this rather particular importance of the period, the publication of Miss Petre's book is of interest. Here the old friend of two English leaders of modernism has collected letters (connecting them with her own commentary) which cover the whole movement's development up to Tyrrell's death. Many of the letters have been published before, but many of them are now given to us for the first time. They show the swift, almost rapier, mind of the Irishman; and the slow, but unspeakably profound mind of the Scottish-German. One can understand anew the impatience of Tyrrell; but one comes to sympathize, despite Miss Petre's obvious prejudice, with the less rapid, but more balanced thought of Von Hügel.

Only one comment may be made. The letters do not bear out, what Miss Petre would have us believe, that Von Hügel, having led the ardent young Irishman into the whole field of controversy by interesting him in the many-sided problems of the day, tended to withdraw into his own almost reactionary transcendentalism. The reviewer feels that this book, read in connection with the letters of Von Hügel himself, published elsewhere, shows rather that it was, so to say, the logic of personality working itself out: Tyrrell quickly pushing through problems, never resting until he had gone to the limit, wherever it might be; his friend feeling his way, making suggestions of a radical nature, but yet testing them and holding commitment in reserve until proof came along, resting more deeply on the Church's tradition and experience, although just as indignant at the Church's intransigeance and even obscurantism.

The most touching episode in the book is the account of Tyrrell's aiding the Baron's daughter in her mental disturbance, following upon the too intensive consideration of religious problems to which her father's enthusiasm had brought her. The real genius of Tyrrell is shown in this

little story, and one can wish that he had spent his life in such spiritual direction rather than in the field of theology and speculation.

Canon Lilley writes an illuminating preface to a book which all who have read either of these men will wish to possess. Incidentally, Miss Petre speaks with delicacy and beauty about her own relationships with Tyrrell; it is refreshing to have this frank account of a friendship which was so fruitful and rewarding.

W. Norman Pittenger

New Frontiers of Religion. By Arthur L. Swift, Jr. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. ix + 171 pp. $2.00.

In this volume Dr. Arthur L. Swift has made an extraordinarily clear sociological approach to the study of religion in its modern setting. "Sociology of religion," he says, "may be defined as the scientific study of the origins of religion as a social institution, its development, the varying forms it has assumed and the functions it has fulfilled with special reference to the scope and meaning of these functions in themselves and in relation to the functioning of other contemporary institutions. . . ." Dr. Swift himself is a sociologist, a man of deep religious faith, and one whose counsels are valued among large areas of social workers, combining in himself the best of social scientific theory, practical church experience, and theological training. He brings to this task unusual qualities of mind and heart. In answer to the question, What is the relation between organized religion, especially Protestantism, and social change?—he divides his answer in two parts. The first deals with the effect of change upon religion, and the second with the effect of religion upon change.

Part I deals with the Church as a social institution, with religious conceptions and worship, and aspects of the religious life which have survived from primitive beginnings.

Part II deals with the effect of changing environment on the Church; the evolution of the Church in Judaism and Early Christianity; the beginnings of Protestantism in Europe and America; the Church in an industrial era; the relation of science to religion, and a discussion of the different types of Churches.

Part III deals with the Church in the world, the Church in the state and the verdict of history.

Part IV, entitled "New Frontiers of Religion," is a fresh and brilliant discussion of Worship and the Reality of God, Religion and Leisure, the Church and Group Education for Child and Adult, the Church and the Methods of Self-Study.

The last chapter, "The Churches and Psychiatry," should be read by all who are interested in making use of modern implements in handling ancient problems. It is a sound analysis of what is good and useful in the field of psychiatry. It gives a balanced statement of what the pastor can hope to achieve in the field of mental hygiene, what the dangers are, and

how he may call in professional colleagues, who have a secular outlook, but who can be of immense assistance in dealing with human problems. Dr. Swift states that psychiatry has measurably usurped the place of the confessional and the pastor's private office. He recognizes that the psychiatric approach to behavior difficulties, rather than fixing blame, or requiring punishment, has come to assume the deep desire of men and women to live well, and to view wrong action as symptomatic of mental illness.

The author insists it is not the business of a minister or church worker to practice psychiatry. It is his business to be sufficiently well-informed in this field to deal with a variety of problems which do not require professional handling, and to recognize those which do. Those who have known Dr. Swift through the years would expect such a book from his pen, but they can be no less delighted when it is actually forthcoming.

GEORGE STEWART

The Church and the Christian. By SHAILER MATHEWS. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 150 pp. $2.00.

One's reaction to this most recent product from the prolific pen of the Dean Emeritus of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago will depend on his own religious bent; more so than might often be the case, for Dr. Mathews' book is a thoroughly partisan polemic, in which he strikes out repeatedly against the "neo-Orthodox" and "Catholic" conceptions of the Church. For these two schools, this book provides the best example of the worst in the so-called liberal theology of the present time. For the "liberals" it provides a very cogent argument for social function as the basis for Christian Unity rather than "anachronistic" dogma.

Dr. Mathews is primarily concerned with the Churches as social groups, sensitive to a varity of forces in society, and themselves capable of affecting the social process for good. Looking back in history he demonstrates the influence of political and economic life in the changes in theological emphasis. The Doctrine of the Atonement is taken as an example to show how, in different periods, the social pattern was reflected in explaining the share of Jesus in producing the forgiveness of God. As he faces our day the author wants the Churches to realize that they perform their function only as they, in loyalty to Jesus and acting as social groups (in society, not over against the world), "further the help-gaining adjustment of individuals with those cosmic activities upon which we are dependent, with which we are organically united, and which operate in the personal as well as in the chemical and physical realms to which humanity belongs" (p. 141). Churches start from "a faith in Jesus Christ," but the point is to give expression to the ethics of Jesus in the lives of individuals and society, rather than to give precise definitions of what that "faith" means. Dr. Mathews seems greatly disturbed that the hundred or more churches

represented at the Edinburgh Conference (1937) should "make a belief in Jesus as 'God and Savior' a basis of what they profess to be ecumenicity, but which is in fact a paradoxically selective Catholicism" (p. 105). He much prefers the Oxford Conference reports, which "presume an ecumenicity founded upon the function of the Churches to carry forward the spirit of Jesus through individuals into our present world order" (p. 137). The former suggests to him religious imperialism and "transcendentalized politics"; the latter implies for him democracy and co-operation as the mode of Christian cohesion. Dr. Mathews casts one vote for the latter.

ROBERT G. ANDRUS

Steps Toward the World Council. By CHARLES S. MACFARLAND. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1938. 128 pp. $1.00.

Within the limits of this small volume, Dr. Macfarland outlines the century of progress toward the ideal of an ecumenical Christianity which has most recently found its expression in the Conferences at Oxford and Edinburgh during the summer of 1937. These Conferences, The World Conference on Church, Community, and State, at Oxford, and the Second World Conference on Faith and Order, at Edinburgh, were undoubtedly more truly representative of world Christianity than any since the period of the Reformation, and possibly since the break between Eastern and Western Catholicism. Of the major bodies into which Christendom is divided only two were unrepresented, the Roman communion, which had declined its invitation, and the German Confessional Synod, whose delegates were denied passports by their government.

The author tells the story of the beginnings of the ecumenical movement in the co-operation begun almost a century ago in the fields of missionary enterprise and Bible circulation. His book is concerned with the development of that movement: its growing inclusiveness, the strength contributed to it by national Protestant councils, the readiness of the Churches for some sort of world co-operation just before the outbreak of the Great War, the painful work of keeping the spirit of tolerance alive during the war, and even after the war, when the plans were taken up again, how the movement was kept from becoming only "Pan-Protestant," and how the distrust of the Anglican communion was allayed by the spirit prevailing within the Eastern Orthodox Churches. These are the matters with which the volume deal.

But quite apart from the information which it contains, the book has a deeper value from the fact of its having been written by the one living American who was associated with the leadership of the movement when it took on new life just after the war. Indeed, as General Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, Dr. Macfarland had been drawn into the movement even before the war, and had been

active during it in maintaining bonds of Christian unity so far as possible. Because it is the record of a man whose life was so intimately bound up with the work, the volume affords glimpses into the minds and characters of the other leaders of the movement which no subsequent historian will be able to supplant. Official files and documents are completely without value upon this matter, and we are fortunate to have had the story written by one who knew the principal actors personally.

Although Dr. Macfarland carries his story only so far as the World Conference on Life and Work at Stockholm in 1925, we see how the ground was laid for Oxford in 1937. And while the author's main endeavor was always within the so-called Life and Work movement, he cannot avoid allowing us insights into the parallel effort on Faith and Order which met first at Lausanne in 1927, and in Edinburgh in 1937. It may be that the value of the movement toward ecumenical Christianity requires the perspective of history for appreciation. The author himself expresses the same feeling. But neither the author nor the reader will be able to escape the conviction that in the movement itself "God was guiding many minds, in many ways, both consciously and unconsciously, for His divine intervention in the affairs of men and nations."

GEORGE E. RATH

Trouble and Promise in the Struggle of the Church in Germany. By KARL BARTH. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1938. 28 pp. 40 cents.

This is a "translation of the substance" of the Philip Maurice Deneke lecture delivered at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, on March 4, 1938. The translator is P. V. M. Benecke. In the lecture Barth spoke of the Church in Germany as afflicted with a three-fold trouble: its great temptation "to become a chapel of the temple of German nationality," its internal divisions and strife, and its becoming "an object of scorn and oppression." Each point was trenchantly described. As for the promise of the struggle, Barth felt it possible to be "clearer still." He finds it in the fact that the Church is brought "into a condition of salutary trial," that it discovers its foundation on "the majesty of the Word of God," and is "allowed to give a proof that faith is an actual reality." Barth admits that today we do not know the result nor the future, but he concludes that the road of this struggle is not peculiar to the Church in Germany, but is common to the Church throughout the world.

H. L. F.

Twelve Religions and Modern Life. By HAR DYALL. Edgware (Middlesex), England: Modern Culture Institute, 1938. 250 pp. 2*s*. 6*d*.

Humanism has repeatedly been said to be an "intellectual climate" at large in all the religions—and so it is, though it tends ever and again to

become a sect, even an organized one. Most of the so-called Humanists have been influenced by the idea of the "evolution" of religion. Some were more deeply touched by the idea of historical change: religion had to do with social change and essences could be neglected. Courses in "comparative religion" (especially in Christian theological seminaries) which compared the essence, central ideas, or values of non-Christian religions with Christianity were deplored, and histories of religions which tacked such comparisons on to the end of each chapter were resented. Perhaps this has been a contributing reason why Humanists have conspicuously neglected to compare the salient features of Humanism with those of the great religions of man, even though they clarified their positions with respect to certain matters in religion, particularly theistic theology and piety, supernaturalism, and non-scientific dogma.

So far as the reviewer knows, Har Dyall's book, mistitled *Twelve Religions and Modern Life*, constitutes the first departure from the prevailing attitude. It is the first head-on comparison of the tenets of Humanism with those of twelve great religions of mankind. As such the book is not without significance. If this is not the last book of its kind, then hope may abound that the job will be done in the future with consummate ability and insight.

Har Dyall seeks to "indicate some elements of permanent value in twelve religious systems" from the point of view of Humanism, which he regards as the new constructive gospel that "comes to fulfill all old dispensations." The essays are, unfortunately, popular in an uncomplimentary sense, and they seldom give a penetrating or well-rounded interpretation of any one religion. Usually they are running comments on selected aspects. The book abounds in half-truths and even misleading statements; e.g., Judaism eschews metaphysical wrangling (p. 25); Shintoism is really Japanese patriotism in religious garb (p. 41); "polytheism or polydemonism was the original creed of all the primitive tribes in the early historic period" (p. 114). Likewise his comments on Humanism will often startle and embarrass its adherents. Thus: "Humanism puts forth the minimum demand that every child that is born shall live at least a hundred years" (p. 46); breath control (in connection with the discussion of good features of yoga) "should be obligatory for all earnest Humanists" (p. 94); Humanism teaches that meat, alcohol, drugs, tobacco, and white bread are harmful, while milk, dairy products, etc., are wholesome (p. 91); the saints of Christianity "are all in the camp of Humanism now" (p. 169).

If comparison is to be made on the basis of a phenomenological approach, to religion, it is obvious that improvement is possible by some Humanist who wishes to put his nose to that particular grindstone. The virtue of Har Dyall's essays is that he approaches his work with simplicity, humility, urbanity, graciousness, kindliness, and generosity.

HAROLD BUSCHMAN

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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